McCallister (Donald) v. State

Opinion

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF NEVADA

DONALD E. MCCALLISTER, No. 68445 Appellant, vs. THE STATE OF NEVADA, FIL Respondent.

FEB 17 2017 ELIZABETH BROIv•IN

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CLERK F SU"kEME COURT BY •

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DEPIETC ir

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ORDER AFFIRMING IN PART,

REVERSING IN PART AND REMANDING This is an appeal from a district court order denying appellant s.

Donald E. McCallister's postconviction petition for a writ of habeas corpu Eighth Judicial District Court, Clark County; Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, Judge. McCallister argues that the district court erred in rejecting his claims that he received ineffective assistance from his trial counsel. We affirm in part and reverse in part.

To demonstrate ineffective assistance of counsel, a petitioner must show that counsel's performance was deficient and that prejudice Warden

resulted. Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687-88 (1984);

the test

v. Lyons, 100 Nev. 430, 432-33, 683 P.2d 504, 505 (1984) (adopting in Strickland). Both components of the inquiry must be shown, the

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 697, and the petitioner must demonstrate underlying facts by a preponderance of the evidence, Means v.

State, 120

t

Nev. 1001, 1012, 103 P.3d 25, 33 (2004). We give deference to the distric court's factual findings that are supported by substantial evidence and not clearly wrong but review the court's application of the law to those facts de (2005).

novo. Lader o. Warden, 121 Nev. 682, 686, 120 P.3d 1164, 1166 "[T]rial counsel's strategic or tactical decisions will be virtually SUPREME COURT OF NEVADA

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v. State, 120

unchallengeable absent extraordinary circumstances." Lara omitted).

Nev. 177, 180, 87 P.3d 528, 530 (2004) (internal quotation marks McCallister first argues that trial counsel should have asserted a statute-of-limitations defense. We agree with the district court as to the

that McCallister did not demonstrate deficient performance se there

charges of sexual assault of a minor under 14 years of age becau based on

was no viable statute-of-limitations defense to those charges v. Quinn, 117

NRS 171.095(1) (1993) 1 and NRS 171.083(1). See also State overy" for

Nev. 709, 71516, 30 P.3d 1117, 1121-22 (2001) (discussing "disc 51, 56, 752

purposes of NRS 171.095(1)(a)); Winstrom v. State, 104 Nev.

a minor is

P.2d 225, 228 (1998) (discussing when sex offense involving Hubbard

committed in a "secret manner"), overruled on other grounds by we agree that

v. State, 112 Nev. 946, 920 P.2d 991 (1996). In particular, 83(1) in

the victim filed a police report within the meaning of NRS 171.0 ations

November 2006 and, as a result, that statute removed the limit es. 2 We

period for commencing a prosecution on the sexual assault charg ctivedisagree

, however, with the district court's assessment of this ineffe 14 years

assistance claim as to the charges of lewdness with a child under thus did

of age because NRS 171.083(1) is limited to "sexual assault" and

ed

lAt all pertinent times in these proceedings, NRS 171.095(1) appli Bailey v.

as amended in 1993. See 1993 Nev. Stat., ch. 177, § 1, at 305-06;

g that

State, 120 Nev. 406, 407-08, 91 P.3d 596, 597 (2004) (explainin limitations period is that in effect at the time of the offense).

2We note that NRS 171.083 applied to each count of sexual assault to sexual

because the Legislature expressly intended the statute to apply te of

assaults committed before its effective date where the statu see State

limitations had not yet run. 1997 Nev. Stat., ch. 248, § 4, at 891; v. Merolla, 100 Nev. 461, 464, 686 P.2d 244, 246 (1984).

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(0) 1947A ers,

n on the

not remove the limitations period for commencing a prosecutio (reviewing

lewdness charges. See Bailey, 120 Nev. at 409, 91 P.3d at 598 ing); ct

statute for its plain language where words have an ordinary mean abuse of a

NRS 171.095(1)(b) (referring to "any offense constituting sexual . It further

child, as defined in NRS 432B.100," which includes lewdness)

enced

appears that the prosecution for the lewdness charges was not comm st period

within the applicable limitation period even considering the longe unlikely

afforded by NRS 171.095. Although we acknowledge that it is to raise a

that counsel could have had a sound strategic reason for failing People v.

statute-of-limitations defense to the lewdness charges, see no

Harris, 43 N.E.3d 750, 753 (N.Y. 2015) (holding "there could have been as against

strategic purpose for failing to raise the statute of limitations Defense

the time-barred charge"); ABA Criminal Justice Standards for the hearing

Function, 4-5.1(b) (4th ed. 2015), we conclude that an evidentiary rmance

is necessary for a final determination as to whether counsel's perfo fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. 3 Second, McCallister argues that trial counsel should have es as an

called his supervisor to testify as to his good character, his virtu night.

employee, and that other teachers had hosted students over witnesses

McCallister has not shown deficient performance because other ony

testified to the same matters and therefore the supervisor's testim

3 The deficiency prong is crucial here beca use it is clear that, if

nstrate

counsel's performance was deficient, McCallister can demo statute-ofprejudice

with respect to the lewdness convictions—a successful charges.

limitations defense would have barred a trial on the lewdness dice as

We do not believe, however, that McCallister can demonstrate preju uded a

to the sexual assault convictions had trial counsel successfully precl trial on the lewdness charges.

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(0) 1947A a would have been cumulative. See Elam v. Denney, 662 F.3d 1059, 1065 (8th Cir. 2011) (observing that the "failure to present cumulative evidence does not constitute ineffective assistance of counsel") (quotation marks omitted); Lara, 120 Nev. at 180, 87 P.3d at 530. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim.

Third, McCallister argues that trial counsel should have objected to the State's questions during jury selection. Because McCallister has not demonstrated that the State's inquiries were improper or argued that any of the impaneled jurors were not impartial, see Wesley

v. State, 112 Nev. 503, 511, 916 P.2d 793, 799 (1996) (concluding that defendant is not entitled to relief from limitation of voir dire if impaneled jury is impartial), he has not shown that counsel's performance was deficient or that any objection would have led to a reasonable probability

t

of a different outcome at trial. We therefore conclude that the distric court did not err in denying this claim.

Fourth, McCanister argues that trial counsel should have withdrawn due to counsel's preexisting brain injury and prosecution as the target of a tax investigation. McCallister has not identified and the record does not indicate any effect that counsel's personal issues had on his performance in this matter, and thus McCallister has not shown deficient performance or prejudice. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim.

Fifth, McCallister argues that trial counsel should not have introduced evidence of an uncharged act of sexual assault. Based on

d

counsel's opening statement at trial, it is clear that the strategy behin introducing this evidence was to impeach the victim's credibility. As the State's case relied heavily on the victim's credibility, McCallister has not

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bility

demonstrated that counsel's strategy to impeach the victim's credi fell below an objective standard of reasonableness. See Vaca v. State, 314

ective in

S.W.3d 331, 335 (Mo. 2010) (holding counsel was not ineff introducing evidence of uncharged misconduct as trial strategy);

State v.

Nev.

Bedell, 322 P.3d 697, 703-04 (Utah 2014) (same); see also Lara, 120 court did

at 180, 87 P.3d at 530. We therefore conclude that the district not err in denying this claim.

Sixth, McCallister argues that trial counsel did not adequately cross-exa mine the victim. McCanister has not demonstrated that ard of

counsel's strategy in cross-examination fell below an objective stand or argued

reasonableness, see Lara, 120 Nev. at 180, 87 P.3d at 530, not err in

prejudice. We therefore conclude that the district court did denying this claim.

Seventh, McCallister argues that trial counsel should have er as to

objected to testimony by the school psychologist and another teach it was

whether either had hosted a student overnight on the ground that their own

improper expert testimony. These witnesses testified based on or other

perceived experiences, not based on scientific, technical not as

specialized knowledge. They therefore testified as lay witnesses, testimony

expert witness. Compare NRS 50.265 with NRS 50.275. As the a futile

was admissible, counsel was not deficient in failing to raise , 1103

objection. See Ennis v. State, 122 Nev. 694, 706, 137 P.3d 1095 denying

(2006). We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in this claim.

Eighth, McCallister argues that trial counsel failed to adequ ately prepare him to testify, leading to his impeachment with prior e merely

inconsistent statements. Counsel cannot be deemed "ineffectiv

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(0) 1947A e because his client was unable to adhere to a consistent version of the facts." Commonwealth v. Hill, 301 A.2d 587, 591 (Pa. 1973). The decision and

to testify lies with the accused, Lara, 120 Nev. at 182, 87 P.3d at 531, McCallister does not show that counsel's preparation was so deficient that it deprived him "of the ability to choose whether to testify on his own er,

behalf," see Beasley v. State, 18 So. 3d 473, 496 (Fla. 2009). Furth McCanister fails to argue prejudice. We conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim.

Ninth, McCallister argues that trial counsel conducted a "rambling" opening statement. The record belies this claim, as counsel's 's

opening statement coherently set forth the defense theory that the victim

r

allegations were not credible. McCallister offers no authority or furthe development for this bare claim and has failed to show either deficient performance or prejudice. We therefore conclude that the district court did not err in denying this claim.

Tenth, McCallister argues that cumulative error warrants relief. While it is unclear whether multiple deficiencies in counsel's performance may be cumulated for purposes of demonstrating prejudice, n.17

see McConnell v. State, 125 Nev. 243, 259 n.17, 212 P.3d 307, 318

d

(2009), McCallister has identified only one deficiency, for which a reman is warranted. One instance of deficient performance cannot be cumulated.

Lastly, McCallister argues that he was entitled to an evidentiary hearing on his claims. Aside from the ineffective-assistance s,

claim related to the statute-of-limitations defense to the lewdness charge McCallister has failed to support his claims with specific factual 124

allegations that, if true, would entitle him to relief. See Nika v. State, Nev. 1272, 1300-01, 198 P.3d 839, 858 (2008). We therefore conclude that

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IC)) 1947A aeljo the district court did not err in denying the other claims without conducting an evidentiary hearing.

Having considered McCallister's contentions and concluded that his ineffective-assistance claim regarding the statute-of-limitations defense to the charges of lewdness with a child under 14 years of age warrants an evidentiary hearing and that the remainder of his claims lack merit, we

ORDER the judgment of the district court AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART AND REMAND this matter to the district court for proceedings consistent with this order.

Hardesty

J.

Parraguirre ‘-' Stiglicli

cc: Hon. Elizabeth Goff Gonzalez, District Judge Paternoster Law Group Attorney General/Carson City Clark County District Attorney Eighth District Court Clerk

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