McCaffrey v. Doyle

Supreme Court of Rhode Island

McCaffrey v. Doyle

14 R.I. 313, 1883 R.I. LEXIS 71

DecidedDecember 26, 1883

StatusPublished

This text of 14 R.I. 313 (McCaffrey v. Doyle) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Rhode Island primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

McCaffrey v. Doyle, 14 R.I. 313, 1883 R.I. LEXIS 71 (R.I. 1883).

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Opinion

Per Curiam.

This action was originally brought in tbe Justice Court of the city of Providence, where, on November 23,1882, judgment was entered for the defendant. On November 27 tbe plaintiff appealed to the ensuing June Term of the Court of Common Pleas. The next term of the Court of Common Pleas was the December Term, commencing December 3, 1882. The question raised by the exceptions is, whether an appeal to the June Term was valict; the defendant contending that it should have been taken to the previous December Term. The statute, Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 218, § 1, allows the party aggrieved to appeal to tbe next term of tbe Court of Common Pleas, provided he shall perfect his appeal within five days after the rendition of *314 tbe judgment. If this section be literally construed, tbe appeal should have been taken to tbe December Term. Tbe section, however, must be construed in connection with § 6, which prescribes that the appellant shall file his reasons of appeal in the court appealed to “ at least ten days before the sitting of such court.” In the case at bar the December Term commenced just ten days after judgment, and the appellant might therefore have complied with § 6 if he had immediately perfected his appeal. But he appealed within the time permitted, and the appeal as taken was too late for compliance with § 6. It is evident, too, that cases may often occur in which judgments are rendered by justice courts within less than ten dajrs before the next term of the Court of Common Pleas, and in which it would consequently be utterly impossible to comply with § 6 if the appeal were taken to that term. The provisions are not new, but have long existed on the statute books. We understand that the practice has been to appeal to “ the next term,” commencing more than ten days after the taking of the appeal, and that this practice has been always recognized in the Court of Common Pleas as correct, no one disputing it. We think the practice rests on a fair and reasonable construction of the statute, and that after having prevailed so long, it ought to be upheld without any question. Mx-eeptions overruled.

George J. West, for plaintiff. William S. Greene, for defendant.

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Per Curiam.

This action was originally brought in tbe Justice Court of the city of Providence, where, on November 23,1882, judgment was entered for the defendant. On November 27 tbe plaintiff appealed to the ensuing June Term of the Court of Common Pleas. The next term of the Court of Common Pleas was the December Term, commencing December 3, 1882. The question raised by the exceptions is, whether an appeal to the June Term was valict; the defendant contending that it should have been taken to the previous December Term. The statute, Pub. Stat. R. I. cap. 218, § 1, allows the party aggrieved to appeal to tbe next term of tbe Court of Common Pleas, provided he shall perfect his appeal within five days after the rendition of *314 tbe judgment. If this section be literally construed, tbe appeal should have been taken to tbe December Term. Tbe section, however, must be construed in connection with § 6, which prescribes that the appellant shall file his reasons of appeal in the court appealed to “ at least ten days before the sitting of such court.” In the case at bar the December Term commenced just ten days after judgment, and the appellant might therefore have complied with § 6 if he had immediately perfected his appeal. But he appealed within the time permitted, and the appeal as taken was too late for compliance with § 6. It is evident, too, that cases may often occur in which judgments are rendered by justice courts within less than ten dajrs before the next term of the Court of Common Pleas, and in which it would consequently be utterly impossible to comply with § 6 if the appeal were taken to that term. The provisions are not new, but have long existed on the statute books. We understand that the practice has been to appeal to “ the next term,” commencing more than ten days after the taking of the appeal, and that this practice has been always recognized in the Court of Common Pleas as correct, no one disputing it. We think the practice rests on a fair and reasonable construction of the statute, and that after having prevailed so long, it ought to be upheld without any question. Mx-eeptions overruled.

George J. West, for plaintiff. William S. Greene, for defendant.

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Bluebook (online)

14 R.I. 313, 1883 R.I. LEXIS 71, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mccaffrey-v-doyle-ri-1883.