24CA1918 McBride v Johnson 11-13-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1918 Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CV32302 Honorable J. Steven Patrick, Judge
Steven R. McBride d/b/a McBride QDRO Services,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Maurice A. Johnson,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025
Richard K. Rufner, Maineville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Maurice A. Johnson, Centennial, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 The defendant, Maurice A. Johnson, appeals the trial court’s
judgment and order (1) dismissing his deceptive trade practices
counterclaim; and (2) awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff,
Steven R. McBride. We affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s
counterclaim, reverse the award of attorney fees, and remand the
case for a hearing on McBride’s fees request.
I. Background
¶2 The factual background of this case is taken from a prior
opinion of a division of this court. See McBride v. Johnson, (Colo.
App. No. 22CA1074, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶3 Johnson is a licensed Colorado attorney who specializes in the
preparation of qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs). Id., slip
op. at ¶ 3. McBride, who is not a licensed attorney, is trained and
experienced in preparing, filing, and obtaining approval of QDROs.
Id.
¶4 In November 2016, Johnson filed a complaint with the Office
of Attorney Regulation Counsel alleging that McBride was engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law by preparing QDROs on behalf
of clients. Id. at ¶ 4. In April 2017, regulatory counsel concluded
1 that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
when preparing QDROs. Id. Specifically, regulatory counsel
determined,
[W]hile [McBride’s] preparation of QDROs involves some exercise of legal discretion, he has caused no harm. Rather, it appears his work benefits the family law bar and divorcing parties. He charges modest fees, increasing access to justice. Under these circumstances, we decline to investigate further.
Id. at ¶ 15.
¶5 In 2019, Johnson contacted several individuals, including a
client who had hired McBride to prepare QDROs for a dissolution of
marriage, to tell them that McBride was an “unlicensed QDRO
template salesman” engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Id. at ¶¶ 5-8. McBride filed a lawsuit against Johnson, claiming
that Johnson had defamed him, and Johnson filed (as relevant
here) a counterclaim alleging that McBride had violated the
Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) by engaging in deceptive
trade practices. Id. at ¶ 10. After a jury trial that was converted
into a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of McBride on both
claims. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Johnson then appealed.
2 ¶6 On appeal, a division of this court upheld the trial court’s
findings that (1) Johnson had received regulatory counsel’s April
2017 letter determining that McBride was not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, and (2) Johnson’s statements that
McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law were
defamatory per se. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. But the division held that the
trial court had erred by granting McBride’s motion in limine to
exclude evidence of Johnson’s deceptive trade practices
counterclaim, and it remanded the case for the court to resolve the
counterclaim. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 57.
¶7 On remand, the trial court held a second bench trial at which
only McBride and Johnson testified. Following this trial, the court
ruled that McBride was not engaged in a deceptive trade practice.
¶8 Johnson now appeals.
II. Deceptive Trade Practices Counterclaim
¶9 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his
deceptive trade practices counterclaim. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
¶ 10 At the start of the second trial, Johnson attempted to argue
that McBride’s work preparing QDROs on behalf of clients was a
3 deceptive trade practice because it constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. Specifically, Johnson argued that McBride’s QDRO
work violated section 6-1-105(1)(z), C.R.S. 2025, which provides
that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the
course of the person’s business, the person “[r]efuses or fails to
obtain all governmental licenses or permits required to perform the
services . . . as agreed to or contracted for with a consumer.”
“[P]racticing law without a license,” he argued, “is a deceptive trade
practice.”
¶ 11 McBride objected, noting that regulatory counsel, the trial
court, and a division of this court had already determined that
McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The
trial court sustained the objection, ruling that “we’re not going to
revisit the issue of whether there’s an unauthorized practice of law.”
B. Governing Law and Standard of Review
¶ 12 To prove a private claim for relief under the CCPA, a plaintiff
must establish
(1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice; (2) that the challenged practice occurred in the course of defendant’s business, vocation, or occupation; (3) that it significantly impacts the public as
4 actual or potential consumers of the defendant’s goods, services, or property; (4) that the plaintiff suffered injury in fact to a legally protected interest; and (5) that the challenged practice caused the plaintiff’s injury.
Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. 2006) (citation omitted).
¶ 13 “When a court enters a judgment following a bench trial, that
judgment presents a mixed question of law and fact.” May v.
Petersen, 2020 COA 75, ¶ 10 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, ¶ 12). “While we review the court’s
application of the governing legal standards de novo, we review the
court’s factual findings for clear error.” Id.
C. Discussion
¶ 14 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by ruling that he
could not revisit the issue of whether McBride was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, which limited his ability to prove that
McBride was engaged in a deceptive trade practice in violation of
section 6-1-105(1)(z).
¶ 15 The trial court did not err. Regulatory counsel determined in
2017 that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law when preparing QDROs and that, in fact, “his work benefits the
5 family law bar and divorcing parties” and “increas[es] access to
justice.” McBride, No. 22CA1074, slip op. at ¶ 15. After the first
trial, the court found that Johnson’s statements claiming that
“untrue,” and a division of this court upheld that finding.1 Id. at
¶ 67. The trial court thus had no discretion on remand to revisit
the question of whether McBride was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. See Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condo.
Ass’n, 2021 COA 114, ¶ 24 (“‘Conclusions of an appellate court on
issues presented to it as well as rulings logically necessary to
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24CA1918 McBride v Johnson 11-13-2025
COLORADO COURT OF APPEALS
Court of Appeals No. 24CA1918 Arapahoe County District Court No. 19CV32302 Honorable J. Steven Patrick, Judge
Steven R. McBride d/b/a McBride QDRO Services,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
Maurice A. Johnson,
Defendant-Appellant.
JUDGMENT AFFIRMED, ORDER AFFIRMED IN PART AND REVERSED IN PART, AND CASE REMANDED WITH DIRECTIONS
Division V Opinion by JUDGE YUN Freyre and Pawar, JJ., concur
NOT PUBLISHED PURSUANT TO C.A.R. 35(e) Announced November 13, 2025
Richard K. Rufner, Maineville, Ohio, for Plaintiff-Appellee
Maurice A. Johnson, Centennial, Colorado, for Defendant-Appellant ¶1 The defendant, Maurice A. Johnson, appeals the trial court’s
judgment and order (1) dismissing his deceptive trade practices
counterclaim; and (2) awarding attorney fees to the plaintiff,
Steven R. McBride. We affirm the dismissal of Johnson’s
counterclaim, reverse the award of attorney fees, and remand the
case for a hearing on McBride’s fees request.
I. Background
¶2 The factual background of this case is taken from a prior
opinion of a division of this court. See McBride v. Johnson, (Colo.
App. No. 22CA1074, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant to
C.A.R. 35(e)).
¶3 Johnson is a licensed Colorado attorney who specializes in the
preparation of qualified domestic relations orders (QDROs). Id., slip
op. at ¶ 3. McBride, who is not a licensed attorney, is trained and
experienced in preparing, filing, and obtaining approval of QDROs.
Id.
¶4 In November 2016, Johnson filed a complaint with the Office
of Attorney Regulation Counsel alleging that McBride was engaged
in the unauthorized practice of law by preparing QDROs on behalf
of clients. Id. at ¶ 4. In April 2017, regulatory counsel concluded
1 that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law
when preparing QDROs. Id. Specifically, regulatory counsel
determined,
[W]hile [McBride’s] preparation of QDROs involves some exercise of legal discretion, he has caused no harm. Rather, it appears his work benefits the family law bar and divorcing parties. He charges modest fees, increasing access to justice. Under these circumstances, we decline to investigate further.
Id. at ¶ 15.
¶5 In 2019, Johnson contacted several individuals, including a
client who had hired McBride to prepare QDROs for a dissolution of
marriage, to tell them that McBride was an “unlicensed QDRO
template salesman” engaged in the unauthorized practice of law.
Id. at ¶¶ 5-8. McBride filed a lawsuit against Johnson, claiming
that Johnson had defamed him, and Johnson filed (as relevant
here) a counterclaim alleging that McBride had violated the
Colorado Consumer Protection Act (CCPA) by engaging in deceptive
trade practices. Id. at ¶ 10. After a jury trial that was converted
into a bench trial, the trial court ruled in favor of McBride on both
claims. Id. at ¶¶ 11-12. Johnson then appealed.
2 ¶6 On appeal, a division of this court upheld the trial court’s
findings that (1) Johnson had received regulatory counsel’s April
2017 letter determining that McBride was not engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, and (2) Johnson’s statements that
McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law were
defamatory per se. Id. at ¶¶ 21-22. But the division held that the
trial court had erred by granting McBride’s motion in limine to
exclude evidence of Johnson’s deceptive trade practices
counterclaim, and it remanded the case for the court to resolve the
counterclaim. Id. at ¶¶ 48, 57.
¶7 On remand, the trial court held a second bench trial at which
only McBride and Johnson testified. Following this trial, the court
ruled that McBride was not engaged in a deceptive trade practice.
¶8 Johnson now appeals.
II. Deceptive Trade Practices Counterclaim
¶9 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by dismissing his
deceptive trade practices counterclaim. We disagree.
A. Additional Background
¶ 10 At the start of the second trial, Johnson attempted to argue
that McBride’s work preparing QDROs on behalf of clients was a
3 deceptive trade practice because it constituted the unauthorized
practice of law. Specifically, Johnson argued that McBride’s QDRO
work violated section 6-1-105(1)(z), C.R.S. 2025, which provides
that a person engages in a deceptive trade practice when, in the
course of the person’s business, the person “[r]efuses or fails to
obtain all governmental licenses or permits required to perform the
services . . . as agreed to or contracted for with a consumer.”
“[P]racticing law without a license,” he argued, “is a deceptive trade
practice.”
¶ 11 McBride objected, noting that regulatory counsel, the trial
court, and a division of this court had already determined that
McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of law. The
trial court sustained the objection, ruling that “we’re not going to
revisit the issue of whether there’s an unauthorized practice of law.”
B. Governing Law and Standard of Review
¶ 12 To prove a private claim for relief under the CCPA, a plaintiff
must establish
(1) that the defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice; (2) that the challenged practice occurred in the course of defendant’s business, vocation, or occupation; (3) that it significantly impacts the public as
4 actual or potential consumers of the defendant’s goods, services, or property; (4) that the plaintiff suffered injury in fact to a legally protected interest; and (5) that the challenged practice caused the plaintiff’s injury.
Crowe v. Tull, 126 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. 2006) (citation omitted).
¶ 13 “When a court enters a judgment following a bench trial, that
judgment presents a mixed question of law and fact.” May v.
Petersen, 2020 COA 75, ¶ 10 (quoting State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins.
Co. v. Johnson, 2017 CO 68, ¶ 12). “While we review the court’s
application of the governing legal standards de novo, we review the
court’s factual findings for clear error.” Id.
C. Discussion
¶ 14 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by ruling that he
could not revisit the issue of whether McBride was engaged in the
unauthorized practice of law, which limited his ability to prove that
McBride was engaged in a deceptive trade practice in violation of
section 6-1-105(1)(z).
¶ 15 The trial court did not err. Regulatory counsel determined in
2017 that McBride was not engaged in the unauthorized practice of
law when preparing QDROs and that, in fact, “his work benefits the
5 family law bar and divorcing parties” and “increas[es] access to
justice.” McBride, No. 22CA1074, slip op. at ¶ 15. After the first
trial, the court found that Johnson’s statements claiming that
“untrue,” and a division of this court upheld that finding.1 Id. at
¶ 67. The trial court thus had no discretion on remand to revisit
the question of whether McBride was engaged in the unauthorized
practice of law. See Owners Ins. Co. v. Dakota Station II Condo.
Ass’n, 2021 COA 114, ¶ 24 (“‘Conclusions of an appellate court on
issues presented to it as well as rulings logically necessary to
sustain such conclusions become the law of the case,’ which the
1 “To be actionable, an allegedly defamatory statement must contain
a material falsehood.” Fry v. Lee, 2013 COA 100, ¶ 50. The McBride division reversed the trial court’s judgment in McBride’s favor on his defamation claim only because the trial court had not ruled on the legal issue of whether Johnson’s statements “about [McBride] being engaged in the unauthorized practice of law involved a matter of public concern.” McBride v. Johnson, slip op. at ¶ 44 (Colo. App. No. 22CA1074, Aug. 3, 2023) (not published pursuant to C.A.R. 35(e)). The division instructed that, “[i]f the court concludes that the unauthorized practice of law was not a matter of public concern in the context of this case, the court shall reinstate its judgment in favor of [McBride].” Id. at ¶ 67. On remand, the trial court determined that Johnson’s statements did not involve a matter of public concern. Accordingly, it reinstated its judgment in McBride’s favor on his defamation claim.
6 trial court must follow on remand.” (alteration and citation
omitted)).
¶ 16 Because Johnson’s claim that McBride was engaged in a
deceptive trade practice was premised on his argument that
McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law, we
conclude that the record supports the trial court’s finding that
McBride’s activities “do not constitute a deceptive trade practice.”2
¶ 17 Johnson further argues that the trial court erred by finding
that McBride’s activities had a minimal impact on the public at
large and that Johnson had not established any damages. But
because Johnson failed to prove the first element of a private
consumer protection claim under the CCPA — namely, that the
defendant engaged in an unfair or deceptive trade practice — we
2 During oral argument, Johnson argued that his deceptive trade
practices counterclaim went beyond the allegation that McBride was engaged in the unauthorized practice of law when preparing QDROs. However, the deceptive trade practices counterclaim alleged in his answer, as well as his opening and closing arguments at the bench trial on that counterclaim, referred only to McBride’s QDRO work. The theme of his closing argument at trial was that “the preparation of QDROS . . . is the practice of law” and that “McBride’s deceptive trade practices are intended to divert business from others who do QDROs.”
7 need not address his arguments concerning other elements. See
Crowe, 126 P.3d at 201.
¶ 18 We thus conclude that the trial court did not err by dismissing
Johnson’s deceptive trade practices counterclaim.
III. Attorney Fees
¶ 19 Johnson contends that the trial court erred by granting
McBride’s motion for attorney fees without a hearing. We agree.
¶ 20 On May 17, 2022, after he prevailed in the first trial, McBride
filed a motion seeking $4,270.50 in attorney fees as a sanction for
Johnson’s “significant and serious failures to properly submit
timely jury instructions” — behavior that ultimately led the trial
court to dismiss the jury on the second day of trial and proceed
with a bench trial. In his response, filed on June 7, 2022, Johnson
defended his actions regarding the jury instructions, challenged the
reasonableness and necessity of McBride’s claimed fees, and
requested a hearing. The trial court did not rule on McBride’s
motion for attorney fees or Johnson’s request for a hearing.
¶ 21 Two years later, after McBride prevailed in the second trial, the
trial court invited him to submit a bill of costs and ordered that
8 Johnson would have fifteen days to respond thereto. On
September 12, 2024, McBride submitted a document titled
“Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs.” He requested $2,028.93 in costs for the
first trial and $570 in costs for the appeal and second trial, totaling
$2,598.93. On the second page of the same document, he noted
that he had previously requested $4,270.50 in attorney fees “as a
sanction for [Johnson’s] malfeasance related to his aborted jury
demand” in the first trial but that the court had never ruled on his
motion. He thus requested an “award of costs in the amount of
$2598.93 and an award of attorney fees in the amount of
$4270.50.”
¶ 22 Johnson did not respond, and, on October 1, 2024, the trial
court entered an order with McBride’s “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs”
attached, stating, “The motion/proposed order attached hereto:
APPROVED.”
B. Law and Discussion
¶ 23 “If a party requests a hearing concerning an award of fees, the
trial court must hold a hearing.” Walker v. Women’s Pro. Rodeo
Ass’n, 2021 COA 105M, ¶ 81 (quoting Shyanne Props., LLC v. Torp,
210 P.3d 490, 493 (Colo. App. 2009)); see C.R.C.P. 121, § 1-22(2)(c)
9 (“When required to do so by law, the court shall grant a party’s
timely request for a hearing” on a motion for attorney fees). “When
a hearing is requested to determine the reasonableness and
necessity of attorney fees, due process requires that the trial court
hold such a hearing.” Walker, ¶ 81 (quoting Roberts v. Adams,
47 P.3d 690, 700 (Colo. App. 2001)).
¶ 24 In its written order dismissing Johnson’s deceptive trade
practices counterclaim, the trial court invited McBride “to submit a
bill of costs.” Although McBride submitted a document titled
“Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs,” he also included in that document a
renewal of the motion for attorney fees he had filed two years
earlier. Because Johnson had already requested a hearing on
McBride’s original motion for attorney fees, the court erred by
granting the renewed motion without a hearing. See id.
¶ 25 We are not persuaded otherwise by McBride’s argument that,
because Johnson did not respond to McBride’s “Plaintiff’s Bill of
Costs” within fifteen days, as ordered by the trial court, he waived
10 any right to object to McBride’s renewed motion for attorney fees.3
First, Johnson had already filed a response opposing the motion for
sanctions and specifically requested a hearing. As a result, he was
entitled to a hearing. See id. Second, because McBride’s motion for
costs and fees was simply titled “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs,” it was not
obvious that the document also included a renewed motion for
attorney fees. See Denner Enters., Inc. v. Barone, Inc., 87 P.3d 269,
274 (Colo. App. 2004) (When a party “did not file a separate motion
for the additional attorney fees,” the division was “unable to
ascertain from the record whether the [trial] court intended to deny
the request or merely overlooked it.”). And third, the trial court did
not explain the basis for the attorney fees award, nor did it make
any findings regarding the reasonableness of those fees. See
3 Johnson also argues that the trial court erred by permitting him
only fifteen days, instead of twenty-one days, to respond to McBride’s “Plaintiff’s Bill of Costs.” We are not persuaded. C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-22(2)(b), provides that any response to a motion for attorney fees “shall be filed within the time allowed in practice standard [section] 1-15.” C.R.C.P. 121, section 1-15(1)(b), in turn, provides that “[t]he responding party shall have 21 days after the filing of the motion or such lesser or greater time as the court may allow in which to file a responsive brief.” (Emphasis added.) The court thus did not err by permitting Johnson fifteen days to respond.
11 Yaekle v. Andrews, 169 P.3d 196, 201 (Colo. App. 2007) (reversing
an attorney fees award when “the trial court did not identify the
basis for awarding fees [and] made no factual findings supporting
its determination of the reasonableness of defendants’ fees”), aff’d
on other grounds, 195 P.3d 1101 (Colo. 2008).
¶ 26 We thus reverse the award of attorney fees and remand the
IV. Appellate Attorney Fees
¶ 27 Both parties request an award of their attorney fees incurred
on appeal. Although neither party cites legal authority, we interpret
both fees requests as alleging that the other party’s arguments were
frivolous. See § 13-17-102(4), C.R.S. 2025 (permitting an award of
attorney fees if we find that a party brought or defended an action
lacking substantial justification, meaning it was substantially
frivolous, groundless, or vexatious). McBride has not shown that
Johnson’s appeal, as filed or argued, was frivolous. Johnson
prevailed on one of his claims, see Andres Trucking Co. v. United
Fire & Cas. Co., 2018 COA 144, ¶ 62 (declining to award appellate
attorney fees when the other party prevailed on appeal), and while
he did not prevail on the other, we do not agree that an award of
12 fees is warranted, see Glover v. Serratoga Falls LLC, 2021 CO 77,
¶ 70 (noting that the court awards appellate attorney fees only in
clear and unequivocal cases of egregious conduct when no rational
argument is presented). And Johnson has not demonstrated that
McBride’s arguments in defending against the appeal were frivolous
since McBride prevailed on the CCPA counterclaim. Accordingly,
we decline to award appellate attorney fees to either party.
V. Disposition
¶ 28 The trial court’s judgment dismissing Johnson’s CCPA
counterclaim is affirmed. The portion of its order awarding attorney
fees to McBride is reversed, and the case is remanded for a hearing
on McBride’s attorney fees request.
JUDGE FREYRE and JUDGE PAWAR concur.