McBreairty v. Jordan's Store, Inc.

CourtSuperior Court of Maine
DecidedJune 23, 2005
DocketCUMcv-04-488
StatusUnpublished

This text of McBreairty v. Jordan's Store, Inc. (McBreairty v. Jordan's Store, Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Superior Court of Maine primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McBreairty v. Jordan's Store, Inc., (Me. Super. Ct. 2005).

Opinion

STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT

Cumberland, ss

Civil Action \, Docket No. CV-04-488 . ve lee

A Boat PAULA McBREAIRTY, Plaintiff DECISION AND ORDER v. ON DEFENDANT'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT JORDAN’S STORE, INC. *

Defendant

I. NATURE OF CASE

This is an action for personal injury to plaintiff’s ankle which she alleges occurred when she stepped out of her vehicle before going into the defendant's store.

On August 22, 2003, plaintiff Paula McBreairty parked her car in front of Jordan’s Store on Long Beach in East Sebago. As she stepped out of her car she stepped into a pothole, rolled her left ankle and collapsed. She claims that the defendant, Jordan’s Store, Inc. (Jordan’s), was negligent in its repair of the potholes in front of its store.

Plaintiff originally filed this complaint in the District Court at Bridgton. The defendant removed the case to Superior Court, M.R.Civ.P. 76C, and requested a trial by jury.

If. MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

The defendant has filed a motion for summary judgment, M.R.Civ.P. 56, alleging that the pothole in question was not located on its Property but located in the roadway on State property. Defendant argues that it has no duty to ensure that the State owned land in front of its lot is in perfect repair.

Plaintiff responded to the motion, but did not properly dispute defendant’ s

statements of material fact. Instead of denying, admitting or qualifying them, plaintiff

chose to reword the facts. Therefore, because plaintitf did not deny or qualify any of defendant's facts, all of the defendant's facts are deemed to be admitted. M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(2).’ See also, Stanley v. Hancock County Commissioners, 2004 ME 157, 713,__ A 2d (“A party’s opposing statement of material facts must explicitly admit, deny, or qualify facts by reference to each numbered paragraph, anda denial or qualification must be supported by a record citation.” [Internal quotations and citations omitted]).

In opposing defendant's request for summary judgment, the plaintiff alternatively asks the court to grant summary judgment for her. Even though she did not properly contest defendant’s facts, she did file a separate Statement of Material

Facts which was properly replied to by defendant.

III. DISCUSSION A. Undisputed Facts. Based on the defendant's Statement of Material Facts and M.R.Civ.P. 56(h)(2), the court finds that the following facts are notin dispute:

I. Plaintiff was injured when she stopped her car at the side of the road in front of defendant's store. (Defendant's statement of material facts { 1)

(DSMF J __). 2. Plaintiff stepped into a pothole and injured her ankle. (DSMF { 1). 3. The pothole was not located on the defendant's property. (DSMF { 2).

4. The pothole was located on State property. (DSMF { 3).

' M.R.Civ.P. 56 (2004), Summary Judgment (h)(2} A party opposing a motion for summary judgment shall submit with its opposition a separate, short, and concise statement of material facts. The opposing statement shall admit, deny or qualify the facts by reference to each numbered paragraph of the moving party’s statement of material facts and unless a fact is admitted, shall support each denial or qualification by a record citation as tequired by this rule. Each statement shall begin with the designation “Admitted,” “Denied,” or “Qualified” (and, in the case of an admission, shall end with such designation), (emphasis added).

5. The plaintiff filed a notice of claim with the State. (DSMF q 4). 6. The State responded that it was immune from suit. (DSMF ¥ 5). B. Disputed Facts. In support of her own request for summary judgment, plaintitt offers a statement of five separate facts that were properly denied or qualified by the defendant. 1. Plaintiff was injured when she stepped out of her vehicle into a pothole in the parking area of [defendant's store]. (Plaintiff's statement of material facts qT 1)

(PSMF J ___). (Qualified by defendant) ?

2. The pothole was located on the boundary between the defendant's property and the State of Maine’s property. (PSMF 2). (Denied).

3. The pothole was located in the area commonly used to access the defendant's parking area. (PSMF { 3). (Qualified).

4. The defendant had knowledge of and/or repaired potholes located on state owned land in the past. (See PSMF {{{ 4, 5). (Qualified).

However, even to the extent that any of these facts remain in dispute, they are not sufficient to counter the facts alleged by defendant and defeat the Motion for Summary Judgment.

Ill. DISCUSSION

Defendant alleges that the pothole in question was not on its land; rather it was on land owned by the State of Maine. Plaintiff did not directly counter this, but argues generally that; (1) that the pothole was on the boundary line between the defendant's land and that of the state; and, (2) that the defendant has a duty to maintain the “parking area typically and customarily used as access to the parking area.” Both arguments rest on the premise that defendant was responsible for repairs to land that it did not own.

A. Duty to Repair.

* These facts, as set out by plaintiff, are summarized in whole or in part.

Plaintiff's opposition to the Motion for Summary Judgment admits that plaintiff “injured herself by stepping into a pot hole located at or in close proximity to Jordan’s property boundary.” See plaintiff's opposition to defendant’s Motion for Summary Judgment. Clearly, if the pothole was located on the defendant's land, it would have a duty to repair the pothole and/or warn patrons of its existence. However, it is admitted that the pothole was not, in fact, on the defendant's property but in the roadway that is owned and maintained by the State.

To make out a prima facie case of negligence, a plaintiff must establish that a duty was owed, that the duty was breached, and that the plaintiff's injuries or damages were proximately caused by the breach of that duty. Parrish v. Wright, 2003 ME 90, { 8, 828 A.2d 778, 783.

In order to avoid summary judgment, a plaintiff must make a prima facie showing of each element of the negligence claim. Champagne v. Mid-Maine Medical Ctr., 1998 ME 87, 7 9, 711 A.2d 842, 845. Whether one party owes a duty to another is a question of law. Trusiani v. Cumberland & York Distributors, 538 A.2d 258, 261 (Me. 1988). A possessor of land has a duty to use reasonable care towards all persons who are lawfully on the premises. Quadrino v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co., 588 A.2d 303, 304 (Me. 1991), see also Joy v. Eastern Maine Medical Center, 529 A.2d 1364, 1365 (Me. 1987).

Before the court can determine whether a defendant owes a duty of care toa plaintiff, it must be established that the defendant was, in fact, the possessor of the land at the time of the injury. Quadrino, 588 A.2d at 305, A possessor of land is one who

manifests intent to control the land. Id., see also Hankard v. Beal, 543 A.2d 1379, 1378 (Me.

1988). There is no evidence in the record that the defendant possessed or had intent to possess the State’s land in the roadway.

The defendant did not have any possessory interest in the land where the pothole was located; therefore, the defendant did not owe the plaintiff a duty of care.

B. Duty to Maintain.

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Related

Stanley v. Hancock County Commissioners
2004 ME 157 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2004)
Trusiani v. Cumberland & York Distributors, Inc.
538 A.2d 258 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1988)
Lewis v. Town of Rockport
1998 ME 144 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Parrish v. Wright
2003 ME 90 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 2003)
Joy v. Eastern Maine Medical Center
529 A.2d 1364 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1987)
Orr v. First National Stores, Inc.
280 A.2d 785 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1971)
Champagne v. Mid-Maine Medical Center
1998 ME 87 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1998)
Quadrino v. Bar Harbor Banking & Trust Co.
588 A.2d 303 (Supreme Judicial Court of Maine, 1991)
Bryan R. v. Watchtower Bible & Tract Society of New York, Inc.
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Colvin v. a R Cable Services-Me, Inc.
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Shaw v. Piel
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Keenan v. Fearon
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McBreairty v. Jordan's Store, Inc., Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcbreairty-v-jordans-store-inc-mesuperct-2005.