McBrayer v. Columbia Casualty Co.

160 S.E. 556, 44 Ga. App. 59, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 596
Court of Appeals of Georgia·Decided September 16, 1931·No. 21127·Published·Cited by 13 cases

Opinion

Stephens, J.

The workmen’s compensation act, as originally enacted (Ga. L. 1920, p. 167), provided, in § 2 (c), that compensation should be computed on the basis of the annual earnings of the injured employee received in the employment of the same employer continuously during the year next preceding the injury, and where the injured employee had not been in the employment of the same employer for a full year immediately preceding the injury, the compensation should be computed according to the annual earnings which persons of the same class in the same em[60] ployment and the same location or of neighboring employments of the same kind have earned during such period. The act provided also, in sections 30 and 31, which fixed the compensation to be awarded for total and partial incapacity, that there should be paid as “weekly compensation” a designated portion of the injured employee’s “average wages” and “average weekly wages.” Section 2 (c) of the act of 1920 was, by an act of 1922 (Ga. L. 1922, p. 185), amended to read as follows: “The compensation of an injured person shall be computed on the basis of the regular wage received by the employee om the date of the accident. The compensation of the injured person who has not been receiving regular wages and has been employed for such a short period of time that it is impracticable to accurately determine his wages, the wages of the employees of the same class, in the same employment, in the same locality or, if that be impracticable, of neighboring employees of the same kind shall be used as a basis for determining the wages of such injured employee.” Sections 30 and 31, in so far as they provided as weekly compensation a portion of the injured employee’s “average wages,” or “average weekly wages,” were not changed. Section 30 was changed only in so far as it fixed the maximum and minimum amount of compensation to be paid.

Section 2 (c) of the original act fixed the basis for computing compensation in all cases, and sections 30 and 31 fixed only the amount of compensation to be paid weekly for total and partial incapacity. In providing that the weekly compensation should be a designated portion of the “average wages,” or the “average weekly wages,” these sections did not in themselves provide that the average wages should be used as the basis for computing compensation, but, by referring to “average wages” or “average weekly wages,” these sections merely recognized, as the method for computing compensation, the method provided in section 2 (c), which was upon the annual earnings of the injured employee, which, when paid weekly, would necessarily be the average weekly wages. Since the act of 1922, by amendment to section 2 (c) of the act of 1920, abolished the payment of weekly compensation computed on the basis of the annual earnings, and therefore necessarily eliminated any consideration of the average wages in computing compensation, the provisions of sections 30 and 31, having reference to “average [61] wages” and “average weekly wages,” and which were not expressly stricken by the amendment, are rendered impotent and of no force or effect. As provisions of the statute they are purely vestigial. Under the act as now amended compensation, whether for total or partial incapacity, is computed without reference to the “average wages” or the “average weekly wages” of the injured employee. As now provided, “the compensation of an injured person shall be computed on the basis of the regular wage received by the employee on the date of the accident” [italics ours]; but if he at the time of the accident was not receiving the “regular wage,” his compensation is determinable by the wages of other employees of the same class in the same employment. The question for determination is what constitutes a “regular wage.”

Funk & Wagnall’s New Standard Dictionary defines “regular” as: made according to rule; formed after a uniform type; conforming to a consistent plan; symmetrical; conformed; as, a regular arrangement; acting according to rule; following a uniform course; unvarying in practice; recurring without fail; methodical; orderly constituted, appointed or conducted in the proper manner; conformable to law or custom. Webster’s New International Dictionary defines “regular” as: formed, built, arranged according to some established rule, law, principle or type; governed by rule or rules, steady or uniform in course, practice or occurrence; not subject to unexplained or irrational variation; steadily pursued.

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McBrayer v. Columbia Casualty Co., 160 S.E. 556, 44 Ga. App. 59, 1931 Ga. App. LEXIS 596 (Ga. Ct. App. 1931).

160 S.E. 556 (McBrayer v. Columbia Casualty Co.) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.

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