McArthur v. Pennington

253 F. Supp. 420, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7483
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Tennessee
DecidedOctober 22, 1963
Docket4675, 4676
StatusPublished
Cited by18 cases

This text of 253 F. Supp. 420 (McArthur v. Pennington) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McArthur v. Pennington, 253 F. Supp. 420, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7483 (E.D. Tenn. 1963).

Opinion

ROBERT L. TAYLOR, Chief Judge.

These cases arise under the Civil Rights Statute, Title 42, Sections 1983 and 1985, United States Code, and the statutes and common law of the State of Tennessee.

Plaintiffs, William David McArthur and his brother, Charles Edward McArthur, were truck operators owning their own trucks at the time of the matters complained of in these suits. William McArthur is still engaged as a truck operator and lives in Chattanooga, Tennessee, and Charles has, temporarily at least, abandoned that field of endeavor and is engaged in other business and living in Franklin, Williamson County, Tennessee.

The defendants, Messrs. John Pennington and Tom Russell, were police officers of the Town of Loudon, Tennessee at the time of the matters complained of, and insofar as the Court knows are still police officers of that town.

The City of Loudon, the third defendant, is a municipality created by the State Legislature of Tennessee and is located within the limits of Loudon County.

Briefly stated, plaintiffs claim that the two officers, while in the performance of their duties, deprived them of their liberties under the federal statutes, the Tennessee statutes, the City Ordinances of the City of Loudon, and the common law of Tennessee by arresting them and placing them in jail without probable cause; that they held them incommunicado from the time of their arrest around 3:30 a. m., until around 5:30 to 5:40 a. m., refusing to permit them to consult counsel or to- notify their relatives and friends of their arrest and condition; that they held them without placing any charges against them until they were taken before the City Recorder’s Court; that they committed illegal and unlawful searches and seizures of their vehicles; that they took them before the City Recorder’s Court and the Court of General Sessions of Loudon County and there wrongfully pyramided the charges against them, thus hindering, impeding and defeating justice in due course and causing them much expense in the form of attorney fees, court reporter fees, traveling costs, etc.

The City of Loudon contends that it cannot be held as a matter of law for the alleged violation of plaintiffs’ rights. This phase of the case may be disposed of in short order. The City is right in this contention. It is not liable under the Civil Rights Statute. Monroe v. Pape, 365 U.S. 167, 81 S.Ct. 473, 5 L.Ed.2d 492; Sires v. W. R. Cole et al. (C.A.10, July 17, 1963) 320 F.2d 877.

The City contends further that if the things set forth in the complaint are true that it cannot be held in damages in this case because the alleged wrongful acts complained of were not committed by the officers in the scope of their authority as police officers of the City of Loudon. The City denies that the officers were guilty of any irregularities or other wrongful acts.

The officers contend that they had a legal right to do what was done in arresting the McArthurs because William committed a traffic violation in their presence which gave them authority to arrest and as and when they were undertaking to make the arrest they were met with resistance, or threats of resistance, in *422 the performance of their duties as police officers; that the charges they made against the McArthurs were justified; that the search they made of the McArthur trucks was not illegal; that they were not held incommunicado but were allowed to make a telephone call from the jail within forty-five minutes after their arrest; that they did not conspire to do anything wrong.

The issues as set forth in the pre-trial order are as follows:

1. Did the defendants, if so which one, if not all, violate any right of plaintiffs or either of them, if so which one, under Title 42, Sections 1983 or 1985 ?

2. Did defendants falsely arrest, maliciously prosecute, wrongfully assault or falsely imprison the plaintiffs or either of them and if so which one, or were these individual defendants guilty of a conspiracy to violate plaintiffs’ civil rights, Title 42, Section 1985, for which plaintiffs have a right of action? (The City of Loudon is no longer in the suit on the conspiracy charge, the Court having heretofore entered an order of dismissal.)

3. If the plaintiffs are entitled to recover, what is the amount due each ?

It was stipulated that the judgments in the City Recorder’s Court, General Sessions Court, the Criminal Court and Circuit Court, which have been marked as exhibits in the case, are properly authenticated.

It was further stipulated that the place of the initial contact between the officers and the plaintiffs was within one mile of the corporate limits of the City of Loudon.

This ease has given the Court more than ordinary concern. We are dealing with the rights of individual citizens and with the rights and duties of authorized officers of a municipality. The Court recognizes the rights and the duties of a police officer to arrest for violations of the City Ordinances within the limits of the municipality served by the officers, and under a recent act of the legislature within one mile of the city limits. The Court further recognizes the trials and tribulations of a police officer in the performance of his duties. These officers also served during the nighttime which makes the performance of their duties more difficult. They were charged with the responsibility of enforcing the ordinances of the City of Loudon and with the responsibility, along with the county and state officers, of protecting the lives and property of the citizens of the City of Loudon.

We also have to consider the rights of two young men, one of them around thirty years of age and the other thirty-three years of age, engaged in their business of driving large trucks from Chattanooga, Tennessee to New Jersey and New York.

On the early morning of April 12,1962, these young men passed through the City of Loudon between 3:30 a. m., and 4:15 a. m., each operating his own truck. They passed through the town and negotiated a bridge on the eastern outskirts of the town when William discovered a police car following him. He stopped his truck beside the road and was accosted by the officers. His brother Charles, finding him in custody of two officers, or about to be placed in custody of the officers, stopped his truck a short distance to the rear of William’s truck and immediately went to the place where William and the officers were standing and asked the officers, in effect, why they were about to arrest William. This aggravated the trouble, which seems to have started when Mr. Russell asked William for his driver’s license and William asked, in substance, why he had been stopped. Mr. Russell did not like the question and soon made it known to William that he did not.

William McArthur testified that Mr. Russell struck him with his police weapon, and Mr. Russell stated, in substance, that William struck him; that he took hold of his arm; that he gave him an unusual amount of trouble, and while this trouble was going on, Mr. Pennington, as contended by him, had his book in his hands for the purpose of citing William to ap *423 pear before the Recorder’s Court for a traffic violation, but observing Mr.

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Bluebook (online)
253 F. Supp. 420, 1963 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7483, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcarthur-v-pennington-tned-1963.