McArthur v. BALAS

166 A.2d 640, 402 Pa. 116, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 344
CourtSupreme Court of Pennsylvania
DecidedJanuary 4, 1961
DocketAppeals, 232, 233, 234, 235, 265, and 266
StatusPublished
Cited by22 cases

This text of 166 A.2d 640 (McArthur v. BALAS) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McArthur v. BALAS, 166 A.2d 640, 402 Pa. 116, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 344 (Pa. 1961).

Opinion

Opinion by

Mk. Justice Benjamin R. Jones,

David McArthur and Bertha McArthur, his wife, owned land, improved with a dwelling house, in Fore-ward Township, Allegheny County. To the rear of and adjoining McArthurs’ property was a large tract of land owned by Andrew Balas and John Balas, Jr. (herein called Balas). The Balas’ land was on a hillside at a considerable elevation above and sloped downward toward McArthurs’ property. Balas’ land contained a “four foot” vein of coal which lay near the surface.

On February 13, 1953, Balas entered into a coal lease agreement with Joseph E. Gross under the terms of which Gross was to strip mine Balas’ land. In accordance with the terms of the Balas-Gross lease, Gross entered Balas’ land to strip mine the coal on March 6, 1953 and occupied the land for that purpose until October 14, 1953. During the course of that time, Gross uncovered the coal in the “four foot” vein and made a lateral cut in the hillside 30 feet in width and 1200-1400 feet in length. During that time Gross uncovered about 4,000 tons of coal of which only 2,000 *119 tons were removed because of market conditions for coal at tlxe time. The excavated earth or overburden which had covered the coal was placed by Gross on the downhill side of the cnt.

In July of 1955, Balas entered into a contract with Michael Rostosky and Joseph Rostosky to remove the remaining uncovered coal in the cnt, this contract providing, inter alia, that Rostoskys should place their earth or overburden inside the cut and not outside of the cnt. Rostoskys entered upon Balas’ land in July of 1955 and remained thereon until August 18, 1955 at which time they removed therefrom.

In the early part of March, 1956, the land to the rear of McArthurs’ property began to slide and, as a result of this earth slide, McArthurs’ property was damaged. 1

On August 1, 1957, McArthurs filed a complaint in trespass against Balas (the landowners), Gross and Rostoskys (the strip mining contractors) in the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County. After a trial before a court and jury, McArthurs recovered a verdict for their property damage in the amount of f8300 against Balas (the landowners) and Gross and the Rostoskys (the strip mining contractors) were exculpated by the jury from any liability. McArthurs and Balas filed motions for a new trial, both of which were granted. 2 From this grant of a new trial generally, McArthurs and Rostoskys have appealed.

*120 These appeals present a single issue: did the court below abuse its discretion in awarding a new trial as to all the defendants?

It is axiomatic that the grant or refusal of a new trial is discretionary with the lower court and will not be reversed by an appellate court in the absence of a manifest or palpable abuse of discretion. To determine whether the court below abused its discretion requires an examination of the opinion of the court below wherein the court has set forth reasons for its action in granting a new trial generally.

In respect to Balas’ motion for a new trial, the court below, concluding that the facts of record made it clear that all the defendants — that is, the landowners and the strip mining contractors — were concurrently negligent and jointly and severally liable, stated: “The situation which caused the damage to the plaintiffs’ [McArthurs] was not created by the defendant landowners [Balas]. It was created by either or both the defendant coal strippers [Gross and Rostoskys]. It was not an independent act of negligence by the landowners [Balas] and therefore to hold them alone liable is an injustice and is an inconsistent verdict which must be corrected by the granting of a new trial.”

Our examination of the record reveals nothing unjust nor inconsistent in the verdict against Balas. It is never unjust to hold a person responsible for harm or damage occasioned by his negligence. As herein-before stated, the record reveals that Balas’ land, in the rear of McArthurs’ property, was at a considerable elevation above and sloped down toward McArthurs’ property. Pursuant to the two coal leases, Gross and the Rostoskys, at different time intervals, carried on coal mine stripping operations on the Balas’ hillside. During the interim period between Gross’ strip mining *121 and Rostoskys’ strip mining- — October 1953 to July 1955 — Balas had the sole control and possession of the land. There was testimony that during this period of time — in the spring of 1955 — the piles or mounds of overburden along the cut had begun to crack and move. Balas took no steps to prevent these mounds or piles of overburden from sliding down on the McArthur property.

In March of 1956, while Balas had sole control and possession of the land, David McArthur noted that a portion of the overburden was beginning to slide and he notified Andrew Balas, one of the landowners, who, with him, examined the property. Balas did not feel that the slide would reach McArthurs’ property and took no steps to stop its movement. The slide continued and Balas was again notified. Once again, Balas examined the property, hut: “When warning was given by one of the plaintiffs, it was too late for the landowners to do anything as the land had started to glide.” 3 The slide continued and finally destroyed the McArthur property.

Nothing in the lower court’s opinion indicates that the verdict against Balas was not just and proper. In fact, the court stated: “The defendant landowners are liable if the jury finds that they knew or should have known that the pile of earth on the hillside involved an unreasonable risk of harm to others. Restatement of Torts, §364. ... As hereinbefore stated, while it is true that these defendants [Balas] did not originally create any dangerous condition, they may nonetheless *122 be liable. There was evidence that they should have known that a condition involving an unreasonable risk of harm had been created.”

It was Balas’ duty to so use and maintain their land as not to injure adjoining landowners: McCarthy v. Ference, 358 Pa. 485, 58 A. 2d 49; Gordon v. Pettey, 291 Pa. 258, 139 A. 914; McKnight v. Denny, 198 Pa. 323, 47 A. 970.

A review of the instant record indicates that Balas’ liability was not predicated on the creation of the artificial condition, nor need it be, but rather, upon its maintenance and continuance. With notice and knowledge of the unreasonable risk to the lower adjoining landowners, Balas took no measures, preventive or corrective, to eliminate the danger which subsequently caused the damage to McArthurs’ property. A finding against Balas was clearly not dependent upon a finding against either or both coal strippers, Gross and Rostoskys.

It is obvious that the action of the court below in granting Balas’ motion for a new trial was prompted solely by its opinion that Balas were jointly and severally liable and that the verdicts should have been against either or both the exculpated strip mine contractors.

Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI

Related

Bank of New York Mellon v. Butterline, M.
Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 2018
Norfolk Southern Railway Co. v. City of Pittsburgh
235 F. App'x 907 (Third Circuit, 2007)
Opinion of the Justices
688 A.2d 1006 (Supreme Court of New Hampshire, 1997)
Sprague v. Walter
656 A.2d 890 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1995)
Smith v. King's Grant Condominium
614 A.2d 261 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1992)
Paone v. City of Scranton
9 Pa. D. & C.4th 115 (Lackawanna County Court of Common Pleas, 1991)
Rivera v. PHILADELPHIA THEOLOGICAL SEM.
507 A.2d 1 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1986)
Wade v. S. J. Groves & Sons Co.
424 A.2d 902 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1981)
Palmer v. Brest
386 A.2d 77 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1978)
TONSIC Et Vir. v. Wagner
329 A.2d 497 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1974)
Steckel v. Strickland
50 Pa. D. & C.2d 784 (Monroe County Court of Common Pleas, 1971)
Interstate Creamery, Inc. v. Reinerth
243 A.2d 451 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1968)
Corbin v. M. Wilson & Son
219 A.2d 687 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1966)
Harger v. Caputo
218 A.2d 108 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1966)
Price v. Commonwealth
208 A.2d 23 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1965)
Commonwealth v. Remo
195 A.2d 866 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1963)
Davidson v. Eagal
192 A.2d 417 (Supreme Court of Pennsylvania, 1963)
Crosson v. Johnson
173 A.2d 674 (Superior Court of Pennsylvania, 1961)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
166 A.2d 640, 402 Pa. 116, 1961 Pa. LEXIS 344, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcarthur-v-balas-pa-1961.