2021 IL App (5th) 200226-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 04/14/21. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0226 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
JON McANELLY, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Williamson County. ) v. ) No. 19-L-136 ) DONALD GULLEY and SOUTHERN ) ILLINOIS POWER COOPERATIVE, ) Honorable ) Brad K. Bleyer, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because defendant’s cease and desist letter was not defamation per se and plaintiff conceded he could not prove defamation per quod.
¶2 Plaintiff, Jon McAnelly, appeals from the circuit court order dismissing with prejudice his
two-count complaint for defamation per se against defendants, Donald Gulley, personally, and
Gulley’s employer, Southern Illinois Power Cooperative (SIPC).
¶3 On appeal, plaintiff argues that correspondence from Gulley to plaintiff was defamation
per se and the trial court’s dismissal, with prejudice, was in error. We disagree and affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On June 27, 2019, Gulley sent correspondence to plaintiff on SIPC letterhead that stated:
1 “RE: NOTICE TO CEASE AND DESIST TRESPASS
***
On January 26, 2015, in connection with my termination of your employment at
SIPC, I sent a letter informing you that you were not allowed on SIPC property without my
express permission. Without obtaining my permission, you have repeatedly entered on
SIPC property.
By this letter, you are notified that absent obtaining express permission from me
prior to entry, you may not enter upon any SIPC property. SIPC owns entirety of the
waters of the Lake of Egypt and its shoreline (below the 505’ elevation). Your entry upon
the land and water of the Lake of Egypt is forbidden. By this letter SIPC notifies you
to cease and desist trespassing on ALL SIPC property. This Notice is issued in
compliance with the Illinois Criminal Trespass to Real Property Statute (729 [sic] ILCS
5/21-3).” (Emphases in original.)
¶6 On September 20, 2019, plaintiff filed his complaint alleging defamation per se against
Gulley in count I and respondeat superior against SIPC in count II. Both counts were based on
Gulley’s July 27, 2019, correspondence.
¶7 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) based on the innocent construction rule. Defendants
claimed the July 27, 2019, correspondence was a legal notification requesting plaintiff stay off
SIPC’s property.
¶8 On July 1, 2020, the trial court issued a docket entry order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint
with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.
2 ¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, plaintiff argues that (1) defendant Gulley’s statements in the July 27, 2019,
correspondence established defamation per se because it accused plaintiff of a crime and (2) the
court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
¶ 11 A. Defamation Per Se
¶ 12 To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts showing that the defendant made
a false statement about the plaintiff, that the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that
statement to a third party, and that the publication caused damages to plaintiff. Krasinski v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill. 2d 483, 490 (1988). “A statement is defamatory if it impeaches a
person’s integrity, virtue, human decency, respect for others or reputation and thereby lowers that
person in the estimation of the community or deters third parties from dealing with that person.”
Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 741 (1980).
¶ 13 “There are two types of defamatory statements, defamation per se and defamation
per quod.” Brennan v. Kadner, 351 Ill. App. 3d 963, 968 (2004). Claims for defamation per quod
require the plaintiff to plead and prove actual damages. Bryson v. News America Publications,
Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 87-88 (1996). A defamatory per se statement is “obviously and naturally
harmful to the person to whom it refers.” Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273, 277 (1986). If a defamatory
statement is actionable per se, the plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damage to his or her
reputation to recover. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87.
¶ 14 Statements are considered defamation per se if they fall within one of the following five
categories:
“(1) words that impute a person has committed a crime; (2) words that impute a person is
infected with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute a person is unable
3 to perform or lacks integrity in performing his or her employment duties; (4) words that
impute a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person in his or her profession;
and (5) words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication.” Green v.
Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 491-92 (2009) (citing Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 307
(1998)).
Statements that fall within these categories are “so obviously and materially harmful” to a plaintiff
that injury to a plaintiff’s reputation may be presumed. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87.
¶ 15 On review of a 2-615 dismissal, we determine “ ‘whether the allegations of the complaint,
when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted.’ ” Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 491 (quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic,
209 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (2004)). “All facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, including the exhibits
attached thereto, must be considered,” and our review is de novo. Id. “A cause of action should not
be dismissed under section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved
that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Id.
¶ 16 Although it would appear that the innocent construction rule is an affirmative defense that
should be pled under section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018)), such pleading is not
always necessary because the court must first determine if the statement is reasonably susceptible
to innocent construction. See Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 509 (2006); Heerey v. Berke, 188
Ill. App. 3d 527, 530 (1989); Taradash v. Adelet/Scott-Fetzer Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 313, 318 (1993).
As explained in Becker v. Zellner, 292 Ill. App. 3d 116, 123 (1997):
“[W]hile the question of whether a statement is reasonably understood as defamatory is
generally a question of fact for the jury, it is nevertheless the role of the court to determine,
in the first instance, if the alleged defamatory remark is reasonably susceptible to an
4 innocent construction. [Citations.] In other words, even though innocent construction is an
affirmative defense and would normally only be raised in a section 2-619 motion, a court
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
2021 IL App (5th) 200226-U NOTICE NOTICE Decision filed 04/14/21. The This order was filed under text of this decision may be NO. 5-20-0226 Supreme Court Rule 23 and is changed or corrected prior to the filing of a Petition for not precedent except in the
Rehearing or the disposition of IN THE limited circumstances allowed the same. under Rule 23(e)(1). APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
FIFTH DISTRICT ______________________________________________________________________________
JON McANELLY, ) Appeal from the ) Circuit Court of Plaintiff-Appellant, ) Williamson County. ) v. ) No. 19-L-136 ) DONALD GULLEY and SOUTHERN ) ILLINOIS POWER COOPERATIVE, ) Honorable ) Brad K. Bleyer, Defendants-Appellees. ) Judge, presiding. ______________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE VAUGHAN delivered the judgment of the court. Justices Cates and Wharton concurred in the judgment.
ORDER
¶1 Held: The trial court properly dismissed plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice because defendant’s cease and desist letter was not defamation per se and plaintiff conceded he could not prove defamation per quod.
¶2 Plaintiff, Jon McAnelly, appeals from the circuit court order dismissing with prejudice his
two-count complaint for defamation per se against defendants, Donald Gulley, personally, and
Gulley’s employer, Southern Illinois Power Cooperative (SIPC).
¶3 On appeal, plaintiff argues that correspondence from Gulley to plaintiff was defamation
per se and the trial court’s dismissal, with prejudice, was in error. We disagree and affirm.
¶4 I. BACKGROUND
¶5 On June 27, 2019, Gulley sent correspondence to plaintiff on SIPC letterhead that stated:
1 “RE: NOTICE TO CEASE AND DESIST TRESPASS
***
On January 26, 2015, in connection with my termination of your employment at
SIPC, I sent a letter informing you that you were not allowed on SIPC property without my
express permission. Without obtaining my permission, you have repeatedly entered on
SIPC property.
By this letter, you are notified that absent obtaining express permission from me
prior to entry, you may not enter upon any SIPC property. SIPC owns entirety of the
waters of the Lake of Egypt and its shoreline (below the 505’ elevation). Your entry upon
the land and water of the Lake of Egypt is forbidden. By this letter SIPC notifies you
to cease and desist trespassing on ALL SIPC property. This Notice is issued in
compliance with the Illinois Criminal Trespass to Real Property Statute (729 [sic] ILCS
5/21-3).” (Emphases in original.)
¶6 On September 20, 2019, plaintiff filed his complaint alleging defamation per se against
Gulley in count I and respondeat superior against SIPC in count II. Both counts were based on
Gulley’s July 27, 2019, correspondence.
¶7 Defendants moved to dismiss the complaint under section 2-615 of the Code of Civil
Procedure (735 ILCS 5/2-615 (West 2018)) based on the innocent construction rule. Defendants
claimed the July 27, 2019, correspondence was a legal notification requesting plaintiff stay off
SIPC’s property.
¶8 On July 1, 2020, the trial court issued a docket entry order dismissing plaintiff’s complaint
with prejudice. Plaintiff appealed.
2 ¶9 II. ANALYSIS
¶ 10 On appeal, plaintiff argues that (1) defendant Gulley’s statements in the July 27, 2019,
correspondence established defamation per se because it accused plaintiff of a crime and (2) the
court abused its discretion by dismissing plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
¶ 11 A. Defamation Per Se
¶ 12 To state a defamation claim, a plaintiff must present facts showing that the defendant made
a false statement about the plaintiff, that the defendant made an unprivileged publication of that
statement to a third party, and that the publication caused damages to plaintiff. Krasinski v. United
Parcel Service, Inc., 124 Ill. 2d 483, 490 (1988). “A statement is defamatory if it impeaches a
person’s integrity, virtue, human decency, respect for others or reputation and thereby lowers that
person in the estimation of the community or deters third parties from dealing with that person.”
Newell v. Field Enterprises, Inc., 91 Ill. App. 3d 735, 741 (1980).
¶ 13 “There are two types of defamatory statements, defamation per se and defamation
per quod.” Brennan v. Kadner, 351 Ill. App. 3d 963, 968 (2004). Claims for defamation per quod
require the plaintiff to plead and prove actual damages. Bryson v. News America Publications,
Inc., 174 Ill. 2d 77, 87-88 (1996). A defamatory per se statement is “obviously and naturally
harmful to the person to whom it refers.” Owen v. Carr, 113 Ill. 2d 273, 277 (1986). If a defamatory
statement is actionable per se, the plaintiff need not plead or prove actual damage to his or her
reputation to recover. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87.
¶ 14 Statements are considered defamation per se if they fall within one of the following five
categories:
“(1) words that impute a person has committed a crime; (2) words that impute a person is
infected with a loathsome communicable disease; (3) words that impute a person is unable
3 to perform or lacks integrity in performing his or her employment duties; (4) words that
impute a person lacks ability or otherwise prejudices that person in his or her profession;
and (5) words that impute a person has engaged in adultery or fornication.” Green v.
Rogers, 234 Ill. 2d 478, 491-92 (2009) (citing Van Horne v. Muller, 185 Ill. 2d 299, 307
(1998)).
Statements that fall within these categories are “so obviously and materially harmful” to a plaintiff
that injury to a plaintiff’s reputation may be presumed. Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 87.
¶ 15 On review of a 2-615 dismissal, we determine “ ‘whether the allegations of the complaint,
when construed in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, are sufficient to establish a cause of
action upon which relief may be granted.’ ” Green, 234 Ill. 2d at 491 (quoting Vitro v. Mihelcic,
209 Ill. 2d 76, 81 (2004)). “All facts apparent from the face of the pleadings, including the exhibits
attached thereto, must be considered,” and our review is de novo. Id. “A cause of action should not
be dismissed under section 2-615 unless it is clearly apparent that no set of facts can be proved
that would entitle the plaintiff to recovery.” Id.
¶ 16 Although it would appear that the innocent construction rule is an affirmative defense that
should be pled under section 2-619 (735 ILCS 5/2-619(a)(9) (West 2018)), such pleading is not
always necessary because the court must first determine if the statement is reasonably susceptible
to innocent construction. See Tuite v. Corbitt, 224 Ill. 2d 490, 509 (2006); Heerey v. Berke, 188
Ill. App. 3d 527, 530 (1989); Taradash v. Adelet/Scott-Fetzer Co., 260 Ill. App. 3d 313, 318 (1993).
As explained in Becker v. Zellner, 292 Ill. App. 3d 116, 123 (1997):
“[W]hile the question of whether a statement is reasonably understood as defamatory is
generally a question of fact for the jury, it is nevertheless the role of the court to determine,
in the first instance, if the alleged defamatory remark is reasonably susceptible to an
4 innocent construction. [Citations.] In other words, even though innocent construction is an
affirmative defense and would normally only be raised in a section 2-619 motion, a court
may review it under a section 2-615 motion because of the nature of the cause of action
and the defense. Only the court may determine whether an allegation is capable of an
innocent construction, and that determination can be made from the four corners of the
complaint.” (Internal quotation marks omitted.)
As the language in Gulley’s correspondence was included both in the complaint and as an
attachment thereto, we find this matter proper for review under section 2-615. However, we note
that although we must, under section 2-615, accept as true all facts alleged in the complaint, we
are not “required to accept the plaintiff’s interpretation of the disputed statement as defamatory
per se.” (Emphasis in original.) Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at 510. “The meaning of the disputed statement
is not a fact that can be alleged and accepted as true.” Id.
¶ 17 Here, plaintiff contends that Gulley’s correspondence accused plaintiff of violating
Illinois’s criminal statutes by trespassing on SIPC property. No part of Gulley’s correspondence
directly accused plaintiff of “criminal trespass.” Instead, plaintiff contends that selected portions
of the letter impute that he committed a crime. The contention is based on Gulley’s statement that
plaintiff “repeatedly entered on SIPC property” without obtaining permission and Gulley’s citation
to Illinois criminal code. In response, defendants argue that the innocent construction rule
precludes a finding of defamation per se. 1
1 Both in its briefing and during oral argument, defendants also argued that evidence submitted at the counterclaim hearing provided additional context for the letter and further proved that the allegations in plaintiff’s complaint were false. We decline to accept or consider these contentions as our review of a section 2-615 dismissal, as pled by the defendants, requires us to accept as true all well-pled facts found in the complaint (Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 86) and precludes review of material that would also require an underlying section 2-619(a)(9) motion and affidavit, neither of which are present here. 5 ¶ 18 “To constitute defamation per se based on imputing the commission of a crime, ‘the crime
must be an indictable one, involving moral turpitude and punishable by death or by imprisonment
in lieu of a fine.’ ” Kirchner v. Greene, 294 Ill. App. 3d 672, 680 (1998) (quoting Adams v.
Sussman & Hertzberg, Ltd., 292 Ill. App. 3d 30, 46 (1997)). At this juncture, we need not
determine whether criminal trespass is a crime of moral turpitude because we are not required to
accept the plaintiff’s interpretation of the writing as defamation per se and we do not review
selected passages in isolation when addressing the innocent construction rule. Tuite, 224 Ill. 2d at
510, 512.
¶ 19 Instead, when “construing the statement under the innocent construction rule, [we] must
‘give the allegedly defamatory words their natural and obvious meaning’ and interpret them ‘as
they appeared to have been used and according to the idea they were intended to convey to the
reasonable reader.’ ” Id. at 510 (quoting Bryson, 174 Ill. 2d at 93). “[T]he context of [the] statement
is critical in determining its meaning.” Id. at 512. “A given statement may convey entirely different
meanings when presented in different contexts.” Id. “Thus, the innocent construction rule requires
a writing ‘to be read as a whole.’ ” Id. (quoting John v. Tribune Co., 24 Ill. 2d 437, 442 (1962)).
The length of the entire writing must be considered, even if it is a book, to determine the context
of the allegedly defamatory statements. Id.
¶ 20 Here, Gulley’s communication was a “cease and desist” letter sent to plaintiff that noted
plaintiff’s prior presence on SIPC property and advised that, in the absence of express permission
from Gulley prior to entry, plaintiff was forbidden to enter on SIPC property. The letter further
advised plaintiff that the Lake of Egypt was SIPC property. The correspondence concluded by
demanding plaintiff “cease and desist trespassing” on the SIPC property and stated the “Notice”
was issued in compliance with Illinois’s criminal trespass statute.
6 ¶ 21 Reviewing the entire writing, as we must, we do not find that the intent of Gulley’s July
27, 2019, correspondence was to accuse plaintiff of criminal activity. Instead, we find the writing,
based on the words used and idea they intended to convey to the reasonable reader, was to advise
plaintiff that (1) he had been spotted on SIPC property since his termination, (2) SIPC’s property
included both the land and water encompassing the Lake of Egypt, and (3) plaintiff’s future
presence on SIPC’s property, specifically including the Lake of Egypt, without Gulley’s prior
permission, would violate Illinois’s criminal trespass code. Therefore, taken as a whole, we find
that Gulley’s July 27, 2019, correspondence is insufficient to constitute defamation per se.
¶ 22 B. Dismissal With Prejudice
¶ 23 Plaintiff further contends that he should have been allowed to amend his complaint. A trial
court’s dismissal with prejudice is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Muirfield Village-Vernon
Hills, LLC v. K. Reinke, Jr., & Co., 349 Ill. App. 3d 178, 195 (2004). However, here, plaintiff
conceded that defamation per quod was not possible becaused he did not believe he would be able
“to trace any economic *** damages to SIPC Defendants’ letter” and further conceded that he
“would accept the dismissal with prejudice if this Court rules that the letter is not defamatory
per se.” Based on our findings and plaintiff’s concessions, we find the issue moot and affirm the
trial court’s dismissal of plaintiff’s complaint with prejudice.
¶ 24 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 25 For the reasons stated herein, we affirm the trial court’s order dismissing plaintiff’s
complaint with prejudice.
¶ 26 Affirmed.