McAlpin v. Baird

166 N.W. 639, 40 S.D. 180, 1918 S.D. LEXIS 44
CourtSouth Dakota Supreme Court
DecidedMarch 8, 1918
DocketFile No. 4117
StatusPublished
Cited by8 cases

This text of 166 N.W. 639 (McAlpin v. Baird) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering South Dakota Supreme Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McAlpin v. Baird, 166 N.W. 639, 40 S.D. 180, 1918 S.D. LEXIS 44 (S.D. 1918).

Opinion

POLLEY, J.

This is an ¡appeal from an order overruling a ¡demurrer. The portion of the -complaint that is material on the appeal reads ¡as follows:

“That on the 15th --day of M-ay, 1916, and on -divers and other -days between that time and: -the -commencem-enit of this action, li-nichrdlimg the 28th -day of June, 1916, ¡said defendant wrongfully, wickedly, maliciously, and unjustly debauched and cann-a-lfy knew one Edina McAllphin, then and there ¡being and still being- the wife of -plaintiff, and thereby the affection of -said Edna McAlpbki far plaintiff was ali-en-ated and- ¡destroyed and the plaintiff -has -been ¡deprived -of -the -comfort, fello-w,s-h-ip, society, and ¡assistance of hi's -said wife ¡in his domestic affairs and has -been brought ¡inita dishonor and -disgrace to his ■ damage,” etc.

To ¡tlhliis -oomp-liaiiimt ¡defendant 'demurred on the grounds, first, that the c'ompllaliinit does noit 'State facts sufficient to constitute a Cause of action; -and, second, that ¡several ¡causes of action are improperly united.

Appeilant contends ¡that the complaint is b'a-d 'because it ¡do-es melt allege an intent on defendant’s part -to deprive plaintiff of the society, comfort, anld assistance of his wife, or that it was with -such intent ¡that 'defendant debaunched plaintiff’s wife and alienated her ¡affection from -plaintiff, ¡and for ¡the further reason ¡that -said complaint fails to negative the consent, connivance, or privity of plaintiff. Defendant further' contends ¡that the complaint is -baidi, because 'it fails to allege that, at the time of the alleged wrongful ¡acts, plaintiff and ¡lilis said wife were l-iving and cohabiting ¡togelthier, -or that plaintiff wa¡s¡ enjoying t-he affection, lo-v-e, comfort, society, and assistance of his- wife, 'and further contends that the 'Complaint falls to allege an-y acts by which the affection of -plaintiff’s' wife was alienated' or -destroyed!

[1] These -Contentions are wiiltholut merit. The allegation that the defendant deb-au-oh-adi -and- carnally knew plaintiff’s wife states a -cause -of ¡action- foir -dam-ages. It i-s not necessary t'o allege [183]*183aln intent on defcmdlant’s- part to injure the plaintiff. Such intent is inferred- from the wrongful acts alleged. If iit is a fact that plaintiff -and litis wife were not living together at the time of the wrongful acts c'ompl’aimedi of, such fact could' be shown- in mitigation of damages; or if it were- a fact ' that plaintiff co-n-is'enJtied! to or eonmiyieid ‘ait said wrongful acts, such fact would -cpmstitute .a d!ef erase. The extent of tihe injury 'to the husband in -such cases 'depends- upon the relations existing between- tihe husband and wife -a,t and prior to the time of the alleged wrongful acts. If 'tihe husband -is mot enjoying ithe 'society -of Ms wife at the time olf the -acts complained of, or if, -by his own neglect or misconduct, he has aii-edatedi her affection, -such a-ct's and circumstances will -reduce the amount of damages to which- hie might otherwise be entitled. Prettyman v. Williamson, 1 Pennewill (Del.) 224, 39 Atl. 731; Bunnell v. Greathead, 49 Barb. (N. Y.) 106. But such facts are matters of defense, to be shown by defendant in-mitiigiation of 'damages, rather than to be negatived by the .plaintiff in 'his complaint.

[2, 3] The facts stated in tihe 'complaint constitute a cause of action, but ¡there is nlo merit in the contention that several causes of action- are improperly -united!. In the first -place, but one cause of action is pleaded!. But, if it were to be held ’that more than -one cause of -action is pleaded, they all grow out of the same subjecit-miaitter and m'ay be joined' in the same -action. In su'dh case 'the remedy is melt by demurrer, but by motion to state tire -different causes of action separately. Just v. Martin, 37 S. D. 470, 159 N. W. 44.

The order -appealed from is affirmed.

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
166 N.W. 639, 40 S.D. 180, 1918 S.D. LEXIS 44, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcalpin-v-baird-sd-1918.