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STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NOS. CV-19-31 and CV-19-32 LISA MCALLISTER, D.O. and ERIC ) SLAYTON, D.O., ) APR JJ:l. '19 PN2:25 ) HNDRO SUPERIOR COURT Plaintiffs ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S ) MOTION TO DISMISS AND V. ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL ) ARBITRATION CENTRAL MAINE HEALTHCARE, ) ) Defendant. )
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' motion' to compel arbitration' and Defendant's
motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied,
and Plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration is granted.
I. Background
On February 26, 2019, Plaintiffs Drs. Lisa McAllister and Eric Slayton filed nearly
identical complaints in this Court. Plaintiffs' complaints both allege they entered into an
employment agreement with Defendant Central Maine Healthcare ("CMHC") to work as
full-time family medicine physicians at Bridgton Hospital. Relevant to this motion, the
employment agreements entered into by both Plaintiffs contain a post-employment
restriction clause and an arbitration clause. Count I of Plaintiffs' complaints requests that
the Court compel this matter to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. Count II
requests, in the alternative, that the Court issue a declaratory judgment that the
agreement's post-employment restriction is unenforceable.
1 Under separate docket numbers, both Plaintiffs filed substantially the same complaint and motion to compel arbitration, and Defendant filed substantially the same m otion to dismiss each Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiffs' cases were consolidated 0 11 March 29, 2019, and therefore, for simplicity, the Court makes no distinction between Defendant's separately-filed motions or between Dr. McAllister's motion and Dr. Slayton' s motion, except where otherwise noted. 2 In the alternative, Plaintiffs have moved for declaratory judgment on the merits of their claim. Because the Court finds this matter should be compelled to arbitration, the Court does not consider Plaintiffs' alternative motion at this time.
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The post-employment restriction states, in relevant part:
Physician agrees that in the event Physician ceases to be employed by [CMHC], for any reason, Physician will not directly or indirectly engage in the practice of medicine or osteopathy within 25 miles from 253 Bridgton Road, Fryeburg Maine for a period of eighteen months thereafter.'
(Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, Ex. A at 5.) The arbitration clause states, in relevant part:
Any claim or dispute arising out of or requiring an interpretation of this Agreement, or the employment relationship, including the termination of this Agreement; or any violation of this Agreement which may occur after the termination of this Agreement shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration ....
(Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, Ex. A at 5.)
While both Plaintiffs continue to be employed by CMHC and there is no dispute
that neither Plaintiff has breach.e d their post-employment restriction, both Plaintiffs
allege they have been offered other employment within the geographic area designated
by the post-employment restrictions. They also allege they have demanded arbitration
seeking a declaration that the post-employment restrictions are not enforceable, and that
CMHC would not agree to arbitration and stated that it would pursue enforcement of the
post-employment restrictions.
II. Discussion
In both its motion to dismiss• and its opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to compel
arbitration, CMHC essentially makes the same two arguments: 1) this matter is not ripe
for decision, and 2) pursuant to the employment agreement, this matter is not subject to
arbitration.
A. Ripeness
3 The quoted language is drawn from Dr. McAllister's contract. The restriction in Dr. Slayton's conb:act is slightly different, restricting him from practicing within 25 miles from the intersection of High Street and Hospital Drive, Bridgton, Maine for two years after teasing employment by Defendant. 4 CMHC formally brings its motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6).
2 of 5 CMHC' s ripeness argument centers on the fact that Plaintiffs have not yet
breached their agreement. To that end, CMHC has wholly failed to address the language
of Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA). The DJA provides "a simple and effective means by
which parties may secure a binding judicial determination of their legal rights, status or
relations under ... written instruments where a justiciable controversy has arisen."
Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 669 (Me. 1980). The DJA expressly provides: "A
contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof." 14
M.R.S. § 5955; see also Coastal Ventures v. Alsham Plaza, LLC, 2010 ME 63, CJICJI 1, 10, 1 A.3d
416 (affirming trial court's construction of non-compete agreement prior to breach). To
bring a claim under the DJA, "'[n]o injury need have been suffered nor wrong inflicted
as a predicate to a declaratory judgment action; the very purpose of the declaratory
judgments act is to spare the parties the necessity of doing or suffering wrong before their
legal rights can be construed judicially."' Gamash v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. BCD-CV-2018
17, 2018 Me. Bus. & Consumer LEXIS 51, at *8 (Sept. 10, 2018) (quoting Horton &
McGehee, Maine Civil Remedies § 3-l(c) at 33 (4th ed. 2004)). The Court agrees with
Plaintiffs that, as provided by statute, they are not required to breach the agreement prior
to seeking a declaration as to their rights under the agreement.
CMHC further argues Plaintiffs' claim is unripe and therefore nonjusticiable
because Plaintiffs' breach of the agreement and consequent damages are purely
hypothetical and speculative. See Johnson v. Crane, 2017 ME 113, CJI 10, 163 A.3d 832
("Without a concrete, certain, or immediate legal problem, a controversy is not fit for
judicial consideration" (internal quotes omitted)). To the contrary, Plaintiffs both allege
that they have received job offers to practice medicine within the geographical area
covered by the post-employment restrictions, the acceptance of which would ostensibly
violate their agreements. Plaintiffs also allege that CMHC has expressed an intention to
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seek to enforce the post-employment restrictions. Without actually breaching the
agreement-as . Plaintiffs are not required to do prior to bringing this declaratory
judgment action-the Court cannot envision how Plaintiffs' claims could be more
concrete. Plaintiffs' claims are ripe for consideration.
B. The arbitration carve-out
CMHC's second argument is that, pursuant to a carve-out in the post-employment
restriction clause, the arbitration clause does not apply to questions raised under the post
employment restriction clause. CMHC's interpretation of the carve-out is overbroad. The
carve-out states: "Notwithstanding the arbitration clause in this Agreement, [CMHC]
may elect to enforce this clause by civil action, in which case the arbitration clause shall
not be applicable." (Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, Ex. A at 5 (emphasis added).) Although CMHC
characterizes the carve-out as an inconsistency or an ambiguity, the Court disagrees. The
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(
STATE OF MAINE SUPERIOR COURT ANDROSCOGGIN, ss. CIVIL ACTION DOCKET NOS. CV-19-31 and CV-19-32 LISA MCALLISTER, D.O. and ERIC ) SLAYTON, D.O., ) APR JJ:l. '19 PN2:25 ) HNDRO SUPERIOR COURT Plaintiffs ) ORDER ON DEFENDANT'S ) MOTION TO DISMISS AND V. ) PLAINTIFFS' MOTION TO COMPEL ) ARBITRATION CENTRAL MAINE HEALTHCARE, ) ) Defendant. )
Before the Court are Plaintiffs' motion' to compel arbitration' and Defendant's
motion to dismiss. For the following reasons, Defendant's motion to dismiss is denied,
and Plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration is granted.
I. Background
On February 26, 2019, Plaintiffs Drs. Lisa McAllister and Eric Slayton filed nearly
identical complaints in this Court. Plaintiffs' complaints both allege they entered into an
employment agreement with Defendant Central Maine Healthcare ("CMHC") to work as
full-time family medicine physicians at Bridgton Hospital. Relevant to this motion, the
employment agreements entered into by both Plaintiffs contain a post-employment
restriction clause and an arbitration clause. Count I of Plaintiffs' complaints requests that
the Court compel this matter to arbitration pursuant to the arbitration clause. Count II
requests, in the alternative, that the Court issue a declaratory judgment that the
agreement's post-employment restriction is unenforceable.
1 Under separate docket numbers, both Plaintiffs filed substantially the same complaint and motion to compel arbitration, and Defendant filed substantially the same m otion to dismiss each Plaintiff's complaint. Plaintiffs' cases were consolidated 0 11 March 29, 2019, and therefore, for simplicity, the Court makes no distinction between Defendant's separately-filed motions or between Dr. McAllister's motion and Dr. Slayton' s motion, except where otherwise noted. 2 In the alternative, Plaintiffs have moved for declaratory judgment on the merits of their claim. Because the Court finds this matter should be compelled to arbitration, the Court does not consider Plaintiffs' alternative motion at this time.
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The post-employment restriction states, in relevant part:
Physician agrees that in the event Physician ceases to be employed by [CMHC], for any reason, Physician will not directly or indirectly engage in the practice of medicine or osteopathy within 25 miles from 253 Bridgton Road, Fryeburg Maine for a period of eighteen months thereafter.'
(Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, Ex. A at 5.) The arbitration clause states, in relevant part:
Any claim or dispute arising out of or requiring an interpretation of this Agreement, or the employment relationship, including the termination of this Agreement; or any violation of this Agreement which may occur after the termination of this Agreement shall be resolved exclusively by arbitration ....
(Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, Ex. A at 5.)
While both Plaintiffs continue to be employed by CMHC and there is no dispute
that neither Plaintiff has breach.e d their post-employment restriction, both Plaintiffs
allege they have been offered other employment within the geographic area designated
by the post-employment restrictions. They also allege they have demanded arbitration
seeking a declaration that the post-employment restrictions are not enforceable, and that
CMHC would not agree to arbitration and stated that it would pursue enforcement of the
post-employment restrictions.
II. Discussion
In both its motion to dismiss• and its opposition to Plaintiffs' motion to compel
arbitration, CMHC essentially makes the same two arguments: 1) this matter is not ripe
for decision, and 2) pursuant to the employment agreement, this matter is not subject to
arbitration.
A. Ripeness
3 The quoted language is drawn from Dr. McAllister's contract. The restriction in Dr. Slayton's conb:act is slightly different, restricting him from practicing within 25 miles from the intersection of High Street and Hospital Drive, Bridgton, Maine for two years after teasing employment by Defendant. 4 CMHC formally brings its motion to dismiss pursuant to M.R. Civ. P. 12(b)(l) and 12(b)(6).
2 of 5 CMHC' s ripeness argument centers on the fact that Plaintiffs have not yet
breached their agreement. To that end, CMHC has wholly failed to address the language
of Declaratory Judgments Act (DJA). The DJA provides "a simple and effective means by
which parties may secure a binding judicial determination of their legal rights, status or
relations under ... written instruments where a justiciable controversy has arisen."
Hodgdon v. Campbell, 411 A.2d 667, 669 (Me. 1980). The DJA expressly provides: "A
contract may be construed either before or after there has been a breach thereof." 14
M.R.S. § 5955; see also Coastal Ventures v. Alsham Plaza, LLC, 2010 ME 63, CJICJI 1, 10, 1 A.3d
416 (affirming trial court's construction of non-compete agreement prior to breach). To
bring a claim under the DJA, "'[n]o injury need have been suffered nor wrong inflicted
as a predicate to a declaratory judgment action; the very purpose of the declaratory
judgments act is to spare the parties the necessity of doing or suffering wrong before their
legal rights can be construed judicially."' Gamash v. Bank of Am., N.A., No. BCD-CV-2018
17, 2018 Me. Bus. & Consumer LEXIS 51, at *8 (Sept. 10, 2018) (quoting Horton &
McGehee, Maine Civil Remedies § 3-l(c) at 33 (4th ed. 2004)). The Court agrees with
Plaintiffs that, as provided by statute, they are not required to breach the agreement prior
to seeking a declaration as to their rights under the agreement.
CMHC further argues Plaintiffs' claim is unripe and therefore nonjusticiable
because Plaintiffs' breach of the agreement and consequent damages are purely
hypothetical and speculative. See Johnson v. Crane, 2017 ME 113, CJI 10, 163 A.3d 832
("Without a concrete, certain, or immediate legal problem, a controversy is not fit for
judicial consideration" (internal quotes omitted)). To the contrary, Plaintiffs both allege
that they have received job offers to practice medicine within the geographical area
covered by the post-employment restrictions, the acceptance of which would ostensibly
violate their agreements. Plaintiffs also allege that CMHC has expressed an intention to
3 of 5 (
seek to enforce the post-employment restrictions. Without actually breaching the
agreement-as . Plaintiffs are not required to do prior to bringing this declaratory
judgment action-the Court cannot envision how Plaintiffs' claims could be more
concrete. Plaintiffs' claims are ripe for consideration.
B. The arbitration carve-out
CMHC's second argument is that, pursuant to a carve-out in the post-employment
restriction clause, the arbitration clause does not apply to questions raised under the post
employment restriction clause. CMHC's interpretation of the carve-out is overbroad. The
carve-out states: "Notwithstanding the arbitration clause in this Agreement, [CMHC]
may elect to enforce this clause by civil action, in which case the arbitration clause shall
not be applicable." (Pl.'s Mot. to Compel, Ex. A at 5 (emphasis added).) Although CMHC
characterizes the carve-out as an inconsistency or an ambiguity, the Court disagrees. The
carve-out is merely a narrow exception to the arbitration clause; the language is not
ambiguous and does not conflict with any other provision in the agreement. Because this
is an action seeking construction of the agreement, and not an enforcement action, by the
plain language of the agreement, the carve-out does not apply here.
CMHC' s argument that Plaintiffs have engaged in gamesmanship by bringing this
action prior to breaching the contract as a means to circumvent the carve-out is likewise
unpersuasive. As discussed above, the DJA clearly grants Plaintiffs the right to bring this
action prior to breaching the contract, reflecting the policy that, in order to obtain a ruling
as to the interpretation of a contract, a plaintiff should not have to first breach the contract
and thereby risk incurring breach of contract damages that would be available in an
enforcement action. Cf Medimmune, Inc. v. Genentech, Inc., 549 U.S. 118, 129 (2007)
(explaining that a plaintiff should not be required to violate a statute "as a prerequisite to
testing the validity of a law"). If CMHC objects to Plaintiffs' strategy, CMHC should
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consider drafting a broader carve-out for future contracts. In this case, however, by
agreeing to the carve-out, the parties only agreed that CMHC could choose to enforce the
post-employment restriction by a civil action, which in no way negates Plaintiffs' right to
bring this action and demand arbitration at this juncture.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, Defendant CMHC's motion to dismiss is DENIED.
Plaintiffs' motion to compel arbitration is GRANTED. The parties are ORDERED to
submit the question of the construction of the post-employment restriction to arbitration
in accordance with the employment agreement's arbitration clause.
The Clerk is directed to incorporate this Order into the docket by reference
pursuant to Maine Rule of Civil Procedure 79(a).
l(/;g, /; OJ __ Dated: - -7--1---1-___,__,_,___-+1___.__,=f_,___
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