McAllen Work Rehabilitation Center D/B/A McAllen Wellness Center v. Ricardo Gomez
This text of McAllen Work Rehabilitation Center D/B/A McAllen Wellness Center v. Ricardo Gomez (McAllen Work Rehabilitation Center D/B/A McAllen Wellness Center v. Ricardo Gomez) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Texas primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.
Opinion
MCALLEN WORK REHABILITATION CENTER
D/B/A MCALLEN WELLNESS CENTER, Appellant,
v.
RICARDO GOMEZ, Appellee.
On appeal from the County Court at Law No. 5
of Hidalgo County, Texas.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
I. Background
In July 2002, Gomez was injured at work, and he was referred to the Center for a "work hardening program," which included Tai Chi classes. During one of the classes, the instructor asked Gomez to hold a striking cushion while the instructor demonstrated an offensive strike against Gomez. While standing, Gomez held the cushion in front of him as the instructor kicked it. The kick knocked Gomez back, and he fell on his back and injured his head on a window sill.
On December 31, 2003, Gomez sued the Center for, among other things, premises liability claims and respondeat superior claims regarding his "therapy and treatment." (1) In his "therapy and treatment" claims, Gomez alleged that the Center was negligent by:
Failing to ensure that its agents, servants, employees, subcontractors, and/or anyone whom Defendant allowed to train, assist, provide therapy or any type of treatment to those individuals who were referred to Defendant for work hardening, were properly trained to provide such therapy or treatment in a safe manner that would not injure the participants, such as Plaintiff, RICARDO GOMEZ;
. . . .
Creating an unreasonable risk of harm by failing to ensure that its agents, servants, employees, subcontractors, and/or anyone whom Defendant allowed to train, assist, provide therapy or any type of treatment to those individuals who were referred to Defedant for work hardening, were properly trained to provide such therapy or treatment in a safe manner that would not injure the participants, such as Plaintiff, RICARDO GOMEZ;
Prescribing a treatment module that injured Plaintiff as part of the Chiropractic Rehabilitation Services.
On April 25, 2007, the Center filed a motion to dismiss Gomez's claims because it believed that they were health care liability claims, which required an expert medical report. See id. § 74.351(a) (Vernon Supp. 2007). In its motion, the Center argued that Gomez had failed to timely file an expert medical report and that his claims should therefore be dismissed. See id. § 74.351(b).
Gomez responded by arguing that his suit contained only premises liability claims and could not be characterized as a health care liability action. Gomez argued that the expert report requirement therefore, did not apply. He posited that the Center's motion should be treated as a motion for summary judgment and should be denied because fact issues remained. As a procedural alternative, Gomez moved to abate the case if the trial court construed his suit as a health care liability action, so that he could send proper notice and file an expert report. See id. § 74.051 (Vernon 2005) (providing that a health care liability claimant must given written notice of his claims sixty days before filing suit).
The Center's motion to dismiss was heard on June 11, 2007. On June 26, the trial court signed an order denying the Center's dismissal motion and abating the case for sixty days. Gomez filed a second amended petition on June 27. In his second amended petition, Gomez asserted premises liability and respondeat superior claims, without mentioning any sort of treatment or therapy. This interlocutory appeal ensued. See id. § 51.014(a)(9).
II. Discussion
By its first issue, the Center contends that Gomez's claims include health care liability claims, which are subject to the expert medical report requirement. Gomez contends that his claims are not health care liability claims, and even if they were, he "dropped" any claims that could arguably be considered medical liability claims in his second amended petition.
A. Standard of Review
Generally, we review a district court's ruling on a motion to dismiss under section 74.351 for an abuse of discretion. See Am. Transitional Care Ctrs. of Tex., Inc. v. Palacios, 46 S.W.3d 873, 877-78 (Tex. 2001). However, when the issue, as in this case, involves the applicability of chapter 74 to the plaintiff's claims and requires an interpretation of the statute, we apply a de novo standard of review. Buck v. Blum, 130 S.W.3d 285, 290 (Tex. App.-Houston [14th Dist.] 2004, no pet.); Ponce v. El Paso Healthcare Sys., Ltd., 55 S.W.3d 34, 36 (Tex. App.-El Paso 2001, pet. denied).
B. Applicable Law
A health care liability claim is statutorily defined as:
a cause of action against a health care provider or physician for treatment, lack of treatment, or other claimed departure from accepted standards of medical care, or health care, or safety or professional or administrative services directly related to health care, which proximately results in injury to or death of a claimant, whether the claimant's claims or cause of action sounds in tort or contract.
Tex. Civ. Prac. & Rem. Code Ann. § 74.001(a)(13). To constitute a health care liability claim, the plaintiff's cause of action must be based on a claimed departure from an accepted standard of medical care, health care, or safety or professional administrative services directly related to healthcare. See id.
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McAllen Work Rehabilitation Center D/B/A McAllen Wellness Center v. Ricardo Gomez, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcallen-work-rehabilitation-center-dba-mcallen-wel-texapp-2008.