McAlees v. Saul

CourtDistrict Court, D. Alaska
DecidedOctober 21, 2019
Docket3:18-cv-00304
StatusUnknown

This text of McAlees v. Saul (McAlees v. Saul) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Alaska primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McAlees v. Saul, (D. Alaska 2019).

Opinion

IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT

FOR THE DISTRICT OF ALASKA

MANDY M. A. McALEES,

Plaintiff, vs.

ANDREW SAUL1, Commissioner of Social Security,

Defendant. Case No. 3:18-cv-00304-TMB

DECISION AND ORDER On or about February 24, 2014, Mandy M.A. McAlees filed an application for Disability Insurance Benefits (“DIB”) under Title II of the Social Security Act (“the Act”), alleging disability beginning August 18, 2013.2 Ms. McAlees has exhausted her administrative remedies and filed a Complaint seeking relief from this Court.3 On May 8, 2019, Ms. McAlees filed an opening brief.4 The Commissioner filed an Answer and a brief in opposition to Ms. McAlees’s opening brief.5 Ms. McAlees filed a one-paged reply.6 Oral argument was not requested and was not necessary to the

1 Andrew Saul is now the Commissioner of Social Security and is automatically substituted as a party pursuant to Fed. R. Civ. P. 25(d). See also section 205(g) of the Social Security Act, 42 U.S.C. 405(g) (action survives regardless of any change in the person occupying the office of Commissioner of Social Security). 2 Administrative Record (“A.R.”) 149, 606. 3 Docket 1 (Compl.). 4 Docket 15 (McAlees’s Opening Br.). 5 Docket 11 (Answer); Docket 16 (Def.’s Br.). 6 Docket 17 (Reply). Court’s decision. This Court has jurisdiction to hear an appeal from a final decision of the Commissioner of Social Security.7 For the reasons set forth below, Ms. McAlees’s request for relief will be granted. I. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A decision by the Commissioner to deny disability benefits will not be overturned unless it is either not supported by substantial evidence or is based upon legal error.8 “Substantial evidence” has been defined by the United States Supreme Court as “such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion.”9 Such evidence must be “more than a mere scintilla,” but may be “less than a preponderance.”10 In reviewing the agency’s determination, the Court considers the evidence in its entirety, weighing both the evidence that supports and that which detracts from the administrative law judge (“ALJ”)’s conclusion.11 If the evidence is susceptible to more than one rational interpretation, the ALJ’s conclusion must be upheld.12 A reviewing court may only consider the reasons provided by the ALJ in the disability determination

7 42 U.S.C. § 405(g). 8 Matney ex rel. Matney v. Sullivan, 981 F.2d 1016, 1019 (9th Cir. 1992) (citing Gonzalez v. Sullivan, 914 F.2d 1197, 1200 (9th Cir. 1990)). 9 Richardson v. Perales, 402 U.S. 389, 401 (1971) (quoting Consol. Edison Co. v. NLRB, 305 U.S. 197, 229 (1938)). 10 Perales, 402 U.S. at 401; Sorenson v. Weinberger, 514 F.2d 1112, 1119 n.10 (9th Cir. 1975) (per curiam). 11 Jones v. Heckler, 760 F.2d 993, 995 (9th Cir. 1985). 12 Gallant v. Heckler, 753 F.2d 1450, 1453 (9th Cir. 1984) (citing Rhinehart v. Finch, 438 F.2d 920, 921 (9th Cir. 1971)). and “may not affirm the ALJ on a ground upon which he did not rely.”13 An ALJ’s decision will not be reversed if it is based on “harmless error,” meaning that the error “is inconsequential to the ultimate nondisability determination . . . or that, despite the legal error, ‘the agency’s path may reasonably be discerned, even if the agency explains its decision with less than ideal clarity.’”14

II. DETERMINING DISABILITY The Act provides for the payment of disability insurance to individuals who have contributed to the Social Security program and who suffer from a physical or mental disability.15 In addition, SSI may be available to individuals who are age 65 or older, blind, or disabled, but who do not have insured status under the Act.16 Disability is defined in the Act as follows: [I]nability to engage in any substantial gainful activity by reason of any medically determinable physical or mental impairment which can be expected to result in death or which has lasted or can be expected to last for a continuous period of not less than 12 months.17

The Act further provides:

An individual shall be determined to be under a disability only if his physical or mental impairment or impairments are of such severity that he is not only unable to do his previous work but cannot, considering his age, education, and work experience, engage in any other kind of substantial gainful work which exists in the national economy, regardless of whether such work

13 Garrison v. Colvin, 759 F.3d 995, 1010 (9th Cir. 2014). 14 Brown-Hunter v. Colvin, 806 F.3d 487, 492 (9th Cir. 2015) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). 15 42 U.S.C. § 423(a). 16 42 U.S.C. § 1381a. 17 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(1)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(A). exists in the immediate area in which he lives, or whether a specific job vacancy exists for him, or whether he would be hired if he applied for work. For purposes of the preceding sentence (with respect to any individual), “work which exists in the national economy” means work which exists in significant numbers either in the region where such individual lives or in several regions of the country.18

The Commissioner has established a five-step process for determining disability within the meaning of the Act.19 A claimant bears the burden of proof at steps one through four in order to make a prima facie showing of disability.20 If a claimant establishes a prima facie case, the burden of proof then shifts to the agency at step five.21 The Commissioner can meet this burden in two ways: “(a) by the testimony of a vocational expert (“VE”), or (b) by reference to the Medical-Vocational Guidelines at 20 C.F.R. pt. 404, subpt. P, app. 2.”22 The steps, and the ALJ’s findings in this case, are as follows: Step 1. Determine whether the claimant is involved in “substantial gainful activity.” The ALJ found that Ms. McAlees had not engaged in substantial gainful activity since August 18, 2013, the alleged onset date.23 Step 2. Determine whether the claimant has a medically severe impairment or combination of impairments. A severe impairment significantly limits a claimant’s physical

18 42 U.S.C. §§ 423(d)(2)(A), 1382c(a)(3)(B). 19 20 C.F.R. §§ 404.1520(a)(4), 416.920(a)(4). 20 Treichler v. Comm’r of Soc. Sec.

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