McAdoo v. Hanway

109 A. 446, 135 Md. 656, 1920 Md. LEXIS 18
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJanuary 16, 1920
StatusPublished

This text of 109 A. 446 (McAdoo v. Hanway) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
McAdoo v. Hanway, 109 A. 446, 135 Md. 656, 1920 Md. LEXIS 18 (Md. 1920).

Opinion

Pattison, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

The suit in this case was brought in the Circuit Court for Harford County by the appellees to recover from the appellant, the Director General of Railroads, the value of t-heir stock of goods in the storehouse at Aberdeen, in said county, that was destroyed by fire on the 5th of February, 1918.

The plaintiffs alleged in their declaration that they were engaged in the general mercantile business and had at the time of the fire a large stock of goods and merchandise in the *659 storehouse occupied by them at the southwest comer of Front street and Belair avenue in said town and county; that said store was located about three hundred and fifty feet from the track of, the Philadelphia, Baltimore and Washington Railroad Company, which road runs through the town of Aberdeen, and at such time was managed and operated by the defendant.

It further alleges that on the 5th day of February

“there was a fire raging in said town of Aberdeen, and when said fire reached a point at the northwest corner of said Front street and Bel Air avenue, and was burning the building there located, the plaintiffs had secured a hose of the volunteer fire company of said town of Aberdeen which they had connected with a fireplug which was part of the water system of said town of Aberdeen on the southeast side and across the tracks of the said railroad managed and operated by said defendant, as aforesaid, from the building of the plaintiffs, and that said hose was stretched across the tracks of said railroad, in the public street crossing said tracks, and the water had just begun to run through said hose from said fireplug on to the building in which was located the said store goods of the plaintiffs, which said water was sufficient in volume to extinguish the ñames about then catching the said building, when a train managed and operated by the defendant, willfully, maliciously and negligently driven by his servants, ran over and cut said hose and shut off from the plaintiffs their supply of water; that the plaintiffs at once spliced said hose, when a second time a train, managed and operated as aforesaid, and driven as aforesaid, ran over and cut said hose; that the plaintiffs were thereby deprived of the water to fight said fire, so that the said store and the contents belonging to said plaintiffs were burned to the ground and were a total loss; that the defendant and its servants were notified of said fire in time to stop the said trains, but willfully, maliciously and negligently, as above set forth, and regardless of the rights of tb* *660 plaintiffs, failed to stop the said trains; that if said hose had not heen cut, as aforesaid, and the defendant had used due care and diligence and stopped the said trains, the store goods of the plaintiffs, of great value, would not have been burned and lost to the plaintiffs.”

The defendant demurred to the declaration. The demurrer was overruled and the defendant filed his plea that he did not commit the wrong alleged.

The ease was then heard by a jury in said Court, which rendered a verdict in favor of the plaintiffs, and upon that verdict a judgment was entered. It is from that judgment this appeal is taken.

We will first consider’ the action of the Court in its ruling on the demurrer.

In the case of the Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg R. R. Co., 109 Mass. 277, the facts are quite similar to those in the case before us. It was necessary in that case to lay a hose across the railroad in order to obtain an available supply of water' to throw upon the burning building. The water’ from the hose was applied to the fire and it had diminished and would probably have- extinguished it, but servants of the railroad company ran a train over the hose, and severed it, and thereby cut off the water from the fire, which then consumed the building. They had notice about the hose, and might have stopped the train to permit the hose to be uncoupled.

In that case, quoting from the syllabus, which seems to state correctly what was decided therein, the Court held in an action brought by the owner’ of the building against the railroad corporation “that the firemen had a right at common law to lay the hose across the railroad; * * * that the severing of the hose was the approximate cause of the destruction of the building and that the defendants were liable for the negligence of their servants in severing the hose.”

In Shearman & Redfield on Negligence, Vol. 2, Section 464, it is said that the railroad company is liable for injuries *661 to property so caused, where it is seasonably warned to stop its train but fails to- do so.

In Concordia Fire Insurance Co. v. Simmons Co., 167 Wis. 541, where the defendant, a private Corporation, in driving piles for a building, negligently pierced the intake pipe, thereby rendering useless the city’s water work’s system, and building of the plaintiff was burned, because of a lack of water to extinguish the fire, it was said, “if it shall appear from the evidence, that defendant’s negligence so interfered with or interrupted the service which the municipality had been rendering, and was ready and willing on its part to> continue to render, to the householder whose house was destroyed by fire, that it could properly he held the proximate cause of the loss of the dwelling, we see no' reason why the defendant should not respond in damages.”

In Louisville & Nashville R. R. Co. v. Scruggs, 161 Ala. 97, 23 L. R. A. (N. S.) 184, the Court said: “If the fire hose had bean laid from the hydrant, across the tracks of the defendant, to the fire, and thei defendant’s servants, with knowledge of the existing conditions as to the fire and the laying of the hose, had wilfully or negligently run the train of cars over the hose, destroying it, and thereby prevented the extinguishing of the fire, a legal liability for such conduct would have arisen.” See also the cases of American, Sheet & Tin Plate Co. v. Pittsburg & Lake Erie R. R. Co., 75 C. C. A. 47, 143 Fed. 789; Little Rock Traction & Electric Co. v. McCaskill, 75 Ark. 133, 70 L. R. A. 680; Atkinson v. Newcastle & Gateshead Water Works Co., L. R. 6 Exch. 404.

Upon the principles contained in the authorities cited, the allegations in the plaintiffs? declaration, if true, are sufficient to render the defendant liable for the loss and injury complained of. Consequently the Oourt acted properly in overruling the demurrer.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the Court granted the plaintiffs’ second and fifth prayers as offered, and after modi *662 fication granted their first prayer. The defendant offered six prayers. The first, second, third, fourth and sixth were refused. His fifth prayer was granted, as modified.

We will next consider the action of the Court in its ruling upon the prayers.

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Related

Metallic Compression Casting Co. v. Fitchburg Railroad
109 Mass. 277 (Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court, 1872)
Little Rock Traction & Electric Co. v. McCaskill
70 L.R.A. 680 (Supreme Court of Arkansas, 1905)
Louisville & Nashville Railroad v. Scruggs & Echols
49 So. 399 (Supreme Court of Alabama, 1909)
Concordia Fire Insurance v. Simmons Co.
168 N.W. 199 (Wisconsin Supreme Court, 1918)

Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
109 A. 446, 135 Md. 656, 1920 Md. LEXIS 18, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mcadoo-v-hanway-md-1920.