MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co.

321 F. App'x 146
CourtCourt of Appeals for the Third Circuit
DecidedApril 10, 2009
Docket07-4338
StatusUnpublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 321 F. App'x 146 (MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Third Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
MBIA Insurance Corp. v. Royal Indemnity Co., 321 F. App'x 146 (3d Cir. 2009).

Opinion

*147 OPINION OF THE COURT

CHAGARES, Circuit Judge.

Royal Indemnity Company (Royal) appeals from the District Court’s grant of summary judgment to Wells Fargo Bank, N.A. (Wells Fargo) on Royal’s breach of contract claim. We will affirm.

I.

Student Finance Corporation (SFC) borrowed money from banks to make loans to vocational school students. SFC insured those loans through Royal. That is, Royal would pay the banks if the students defaulted. SFC then “securitized” the loans. It created a series of trusts, named Wells Fargo trustee, and then conveyed the loans to the trusts. The trusts sold shares of their loan portfolio via notes called “certificates.” SFC arranged for Royal to insure the trust corpus, and SFC named Wells Fargo as the beneficiary. If any students defaulted, Royal would make sure Wells Fargo had enough resources to pay any certificateholders looking to cash out.

SFC used Student Loan Servicing (SLS) to service the loans. SLS opened a lock-box account for the trusts and instructed student debtors to deposit payments into that account. It collected those payments and transmitted them to Wells Fargo. SLS also produced four computer files: (1) a monthly spreadsheet, called the “Delinquency Aging Report,” listing each delinquent loan, the name of the debtor, how much principal is owed, and the date by which that balance must be paid, see, e.g., Appendix (App.) 2087-2208; (2) another monthly spreadsheet, called the “Default Schedule,” listing each defaulted loan, the name of the debtor, how much principal is owed, and how much interest is owed, see, e.g., App. 2086; (3) a monthly database listing each loan, the debtor’s contact information, the principal and interest owed, the principal and interest already paid, and dates and amounts of principal and interest payments made that month, see, e.g., App. 2217-80; and (4) a weekly database listing similar information, but only as to loans with activity during that week, see, e.g., App. 1984-2085. SLS sent the first two files to Wells Fargo Corporate Trust, a Wells Fargo affiliate in Minneapolis. It sent the second two files to back-up servi-cers — entities that could have taken over SLS’s duties should Royal have elected to replace SLS at any time during the life of the contract. The first back-up servicer was FINOVA in Salt Lake City, and the second was Wells Fargo Financial, a Wells Fargo affiliate in Des Moines. SLS also produced a monthly “Servicer Report” that contained aggregate balance information for all current, delinquent, and defaulted loans. See, e.g., App. 3327-29.

Royal received the Servicer Report but not the computer files, and it was not content to take that report on faith. It wanted some assurance that the numbers in the report were not simply plucked from thin air. Wells Fargo agreed to vet the Servicer Report numbers, but only to a limited extent. Wells Fargo would not look behind the data provided by SLS. See, e.g., App. 817 (“Trustee may conclusively rely and shall be fully protected in acting or refraining from acting upon any ... statement, ... report, ... or other paper or document believed by it to be genuine and to have been signed or presented by the proper party or parties”) (§ 8.4(a)), (“Trustee shall not be required to make any ... examination of any documents or records related to the Student Loans for the purpose of establishing the presence or absence of defects ... ”) (§ 8.4(g)). It would instead check portions of the Servi-cer Report against certain computer files and bring inconsistencies to Royal’s attention. Specifically, § 8.19 of the securitization contract obligated Wells Fargo to

*148 (a) in accordance with Section 3.8(b) hereof, not later than 12:00 noon Minneapolis time on the second Business Day-preceding each Servicer Report Date, accept delivery of the Tape 1 used to calculate the information contained in the Servicer Report and shall accept delivery from the Servicer of a hard copy of the Servicer Report;
(b) compare the information received on Tape from the Servicer to the same received on the Servicer Report with respect to delinquencies, ratios and the aggregate principal balance of the Student Loans; [and]
(d) inform the Insurer [Royal], MBIA, the Servicer, and the Certificateholders as to any discrepancy on such Servicer Report....

App. 826 (footnote added).

And § 8.21(d) provided that Wells Fargo ... shall receive an electronic transmission of all servicing and/or Student Loan File information (including all relevant Obligor contact information, such as address and telephone numbers, as well as Student Loan principal balance and payment information, including any comment histories and collection notes) and shall review such Student Loan File information to ensure that it is in readable
form and verify that the data balances conform to the trial balance reports received from the Servicer. In addition, the Trustee shall store such Student Loan File information and verify certain information contained in each Servicer Report. The Trustee shall receive the data referenced in this paragraph on a weekly basis.... 2

App. 828 (footnote added). Section 8.20, however, expressly disclaimed trustee liability in connection with review conducted pursuant to § 8.21:

The Trustee ... shall monitor the performance of the Servicer on behalf of the Certificateholders as set forth in Section 8.21 hereof; provided, however, that the Trustee shall not have any liability in connection with the malfeasance or nonfeasance by the Servicer or for monitoring the Servicer....

App. 827.

As it turned out, the loans were not performing as well as SFC had hoped. Students were missing payments in large numbers, making insuring the loans an increasingly risky proposition for Royal. So, SFC used its own funds to make up the shortfalls. These “forbearance payments,” as SFC internally called them, gave the impression that the loans were performing up to par and therefore that *149 insuring them was a reasonable risk. SFC executed seven more securitizations, creating a total of eight trusts. SFC continued to make payments, and Royal continued to insure new trusts.

Wells Fargo never discovered this problem during the course of its data reviews. It compared loan-specific data given in the Delinquency Aging Report with the aggregate data given in the Servicer Report and found no discrepancies. See App. 2727-38, 5832-35. It also examined the monthly and weekly databases to make sure they were computer-readable and contained the right categories of information in the event Wells Fargo had to step in for SLS and contact student debtors, and found no problems.

Eventually, SFC’s forbearance payment procedure crumbled, exposing Royal to hundreds of millions of dollars worth of liability on certificates that SFC no longer had the resources to cover.

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321 F. App'x 146, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mbia-insurance-corp-v-royal-indemnity-co-ca3-2009.