M.B. v. Springfield School District No. 19

CourtDistrict Court, D. Oregon
DecidedSeptember 23, 2020
Docket6:19-cv-01150
StatusUnknown

This text of M.B. v. Springfield School District No. 19 (M.B. v. Springfield School District No. 19) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, D. Oregon primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
M.B. v. Springfield School District No. 19, (D. Or. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT DISTRICT OF OREGON EUGENE DIVISION

M.B., Case No.: 6:19-cv-01150-MK

Plaintiff, OPINION AND ORDER1

v.

SPRINGFIELD SCHOOL DISTRICT NO. 19,

Defendant.

KASUBHAI, Magistrate Judge: Plaintiff, a student (“Student”) of Springfield School District 19 (“Defendant” or the “District”), seeks judicial review of the Final Order issued by an administrative law judge (“ALJ”) denying all requested remedies under the Individuals with Disabilities Education Act (“IDEA”) and Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act of 1973 (“Section 504”)2. Compl., ECF No. 1; Ex. 1, Final Order 1, 89, ECF No. 1-1. For the reasons set forth below, the Court affirms the ALJ’s Final Order.

1 The parties consent to jurisdiction by a U.S. Magistrate Judge. ECF No. 12. 2 While Plaintiff’s due process complaint was also filed under Title II of the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) and several Oregon statutes, the Final Order only addressed Plaintiff’s request for remedies under the IDEA and Section 504. Transmittal of Entire Record and Transcript, 207; Compl., Ex. 1, Final Order 1, 89-90, ECF No. 1-1. BACKGROUND Student enrolled with the District beginning from the 8th grade, for the school years of 2014-2015, 2015-2016, 2016-2017, and 2017-2018. Pl.’s Br. 6, ECF No. 21; Def.’s Br. 1, ECF No. 22; Compl. ¶¶ 18, 25, 33, 43, ECF No. 1; see Tr. Vol. I 124:5-8. On May 21, 2015, the District found Student eligible for special education services under the category of Other Health

Impaired (“OHI”) pursuant to the IDEA. Compl., Ex. 1, Final Order, ¶ 23, ECF No. 1-1 (citing Tr. Vol. I 152:7-153:4, 155:21-156:19; Ex. D20). The District’s eligibility team also drafted an Individualized Education Program (“IEP”). Id. On January 10, 2018, Student’s parent (“Parent”) requested the District to convene an official IEP meeting for the purpose of amending the then current IEP. Ex. D246, 3. On January 29, 2018, Ms. Taubenfeld, school psychologist, prepared an evaluation report, Assessment Summary Form 220B, as a record review in preparation for Student’s three-year evaluation. Ex. D261; Ex. D266; see, Ex. D292, 2; see also, Tr. Vol. IX 1794:8-1795:10. Based on the review, Ms. Taubenfeld believed that Student continued to qualify for special education under the

category of OHI. Tr. Vol. VII 1435:16-1438:5; Ex. D292, 2-4; see also, Ex. D266, 1. On February 1, 2018 at the planning meeting, Parent elected not to sign off on Student’s three-year re-eligibility paperwork. Tr. Vol. VII 1458:16-1459:1. On May 29, 2018, when the District convened an IEP and evaluation plan meeting, Parent requested an evaluation of Student under the eligibility category of Emotional Disturbance (“ED”). Ex. D341, 1-2; Ex. D343, 2-3. The meeting continued on June 13, 2018. Ex. D341; Compl. Ex. 1, Final Order ¶¶ 178, 182, ECF No. 1-1. At the June 13, 2018 meeting, the District presented a detailed evaluation plan under the eligibility category of ED. Ex. D341, 26- 27; Ex. D361, 1-2. Parent indicated that she would withhold her consent to evaluate Student under the category of ED until September 2018, more than 60 calendar days from the meeting. Ex. D359, 2; Compl., Ex. 1, Final Order ¶ 185, ECF No. 1-1. On September 13, 2018, Parent provided written consent for the ED evaluation the District proposed. Ex. D362. On October 15, 2018, Parent filed a complaint on behalf of Student requesting a due process hearing, alleging substantive and procedural violations of the IDEA, Section 504 and the

Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”) by the District. Transmittal of Entire Record and Transcript, 224; see Compl., Ex. 1, Final Order, 1, ECF No. 1-1. On November 5, 2018, Student’s IEP team met to discuss the results of the ED evaluation and assessment conducted by the District. Compl., Ex. 1 Final Order ¶ 214, ECF No. 1-1. After reviewing the medical documentation and assessment information related to the most recent evaluation of Student, the team determined that Student was eligible for special education under the categories of ED and OHI. Id. ¶¶ 215-21. Parent agreed with this determination. Id.; Ex. D408. The District issued a Special Education Placement Determination, determining that online tutoring is the least restrictive environment for Student. Ex. D416.

After a due process hearing, the ALJ issued the Final Order on April 26, 2019, denying Parent’s request for relief. Compl., Ex. 1, Final Order 89, 90, ECF No. 1-1. Parent appealed to this Court pursuant to 20 U.S.C. § 1415(i)(2). STANDARD OF REVIEW When a court reviews an IDEA action, “the [reviewing] court [] (i) shall receive the records of the administrative proceedings; (ii) shall hear additional evidence at the request of a party; and (iii) basing its decision on the preponderance of the evidence, shall grant such relief as the court determines is appropriate.” 20 U.S.C.A. § 1415(e)(2). “[T]he standard of review in IDEA actions has been characterized as modified de novo review.” Ashland Sch. Dist. v. Parents of Student R.J., 585 F. Supp. 2d 1208, 1212 (D. Or. 2008), aff’d, 588 F.3d 1004 (9th Cir. 2009). Courts have held that the language of § 1415(e) confers broad discretion on the district court. Ojai Unified Sch. Dist. v. Jackson, 4 F.3d 1467, 1471 (9th Cir., 1993); see, e.g., Kerkam v. McKenzie, 862 F.2d 884, 887 (D.C.Cir.1988) (“the district court's authority under § 1415(e) to

supplement the record below with new evidence, as well as Congress’s call for a decision based on the ‘preponderance of the evidence,’ plainly suggests less deference than is conventional [in the review of agency actions]”); Town of Burlington v. Department of Educ., 736 F.2d 773, 791 (1st Cir.1984) (“Congress intended courts to make bounded, independent decisions—bounded by the administrative record and additional evidence, and independent by virtue of being based on a preponderance of the evidence before the court”), aff’d sub nom. Sch. Comm. v. Department of Educ., 471 U.S. 359, 105 S.Ct. 1996, 85 L.Ed.2d 385 (1985). However, courts should not “substitute their own notions of sound educational policy for those of the school authorities which they review.” Ashland Sch. Dist., 585 F. Supp. 2d at 1212.

“How much deference to give state educational agencies, [] is a matter for the discretion of the courts[.]” Gregory K. v. Longview Sch. Dist., 811 F.2d 1307, 1311 (9th Cir. 1987) (emphasis in original). District courts should “give deference to the state hearing officer’s findings, particularly when they are thorough and careful.” Livingston Sch. Dist. Nos. 4 & 1 v. Keenan, 82 F.3d 912, 915 (9th Cir. 1996). A “hearing officer’s findings are ‘thorough and careful’ when the officer participates in the questioning of witnesses and writes a decision contain[ing] a complete factual background as well as a discrete analysis supporting the ultimate conclusions.” R.B. v. Napa Valley Unified Sch. Dist., 496 F.3d 932, 942 (9th Cir. 2007). DISCUSSION I.

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