In the Missouri Court of Appeals Eastern District DIVISION TWO
M.B., ) No. ED110291 ) Appellant, ) Appeal from the Circuit Court ) of St. Louis County vs. ) ) Honorable Thomas C. Albus LIVE NATION WORLDWIDE, INC., and ) LESLIE RAMSEY, ) ) Respondents. ) FILED: August 9, 2022
Introduction
M.B. appeals from the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Live Nation
Worldwide, Inc. (“Live Nation”) and Leslie Ramsey (“Ramsey”) (collectively, “Respondents”).
M.B. raises three points on appeal. Point One argues the circuit court erred in finding
Respondents had no legal duty to M.B. because M.B. adduced sufficient facts that Respondents
assumed a legal duty to her while attending a concert at the Hollywood Casino Amphitheater
operated by Live Nation. Point Two maintains the circuit court erred in finding any breach of
duty was too attenuated and unforeseeable to support a finding that Respondents proximately
caused M.B.’s damages. Point Three asserts the circuit court erred in finding that Respondents
cannot be held liable for any medical negligence claim because M.B. brought no medical
malpractice claim. As a general rule, businesses have no duty to protect an invitee from third-
party criminal acts. The summary-judgment record does not establish the special facts and circumstances required to create a duty for Respondents to protect M.B. from an off-premise
sexual assault as an exception to this general rule. Accordingly, we deny Point One. Because
M.B. cannot prevail on her negligence claim absent a duty of care, Point One is dispositive of the
appeal, and we deny Points Two and Three. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit court’s grant of
summary judgment.
Factual and Procedural History
On July 17, 2016, M.B. and A.R. attended a concert together at the Hollywood Casino
Amphitheater, owned and operated by Live Nation. M.B. had met A.R. earlier that year and
agreed to go to the concert as friends. A.R. met M.B. at her apartment, where M.B. consumed
one vodka mixed drink. A.R. then drove them to the concert in his truck. Approximately 13,000
people attended the concert, and it was a hot summer day. At the concert, M.B. drank two beers.
Both beers were poured in front of M.B., and she never saw anyone place anything in the drinks
while she consumed them. At some point, M.B. became very ill. M.B.’s head became foggy,
and she felt extremely intoxicated. M.B. recalled vomiting near a shaved ice stand. M.B.
suspected she was given a date rape drug, either by A.R. or someone else.
M.B. told A.R. that she felt sick and wanted to leave the concert early. A.R. went to get
his truck from the parking lot to pick her up at the front gate. M.B. did not remember that
conversation and only remembered bits and pieces of the remainder of the day because she felt
drugged and kept blacking out.
While A.R. was getting his truck, M.B. was treated at the medical tent by registered nurse
Chelsea Nolan (“Nurse Nolan”), who was employed by Priority EMS, an independent contractor
providing services at the concert venue. Although Nurse Nolan did not specifically recall
treating M.B. that day, the first-aid log completed by Nurse Nolan stated that M.B. was
overheated and had overconsumed alcohol. Nurse Nolan treated M.B. with air conditioning, a 2 cold towel, and water. After determining M.B. was fit to leave the concert, Nurse Nolan released
M.B., who signed herself out on the first-aid log. M.B. did not remember receiving medical
treatment from Nurse Nolan or anyone else at the concert, and believed that her ability to
communicate at the concert was severely compromised.
M.B. recalled sitting in a security tent located next to the medical tent. Ramsey was
employed by Live Nation as its operations director and was responsible for security that day.
Someone from security asked M.B. if her friend drove a truck, and M.B. said yes. Although
M.B. did not recall doing so, she walked to the front gate and got into A.R.’s truck. A.R. drove
them from the concert venue to M.B.’s apartment, where M.B. alleged A.R. raped her. M.B.’s
friend later arrived at the apartment and believed M.B. was too impaired to have consented to
sex. A.R. maintains the sex was consensual.
M.B. filed suit in the circuit court against Respondents and A.R. on August 1, 2019. A.R.
was dismissed as a defendant because the circuit court found M.B.’s claim was time-barred by
the statute of limitations. M.B. alleged Respondents were liable for A.R.’s sexual assault at her
apartment because Respondents assumed a duty to prevent M.B. from leaving the concert with
A.R. while she was under an extremely intoxicated and impaired state. Specifically, M.B.
alleged that Respondents assumed a duty to provide adequate security for M.B. and to ensure she
was capable of caring for her own safety before releasing her to A.R. M.B. reasoned that such
legal duty included interviewing and vetting A.R. before permitting M.B. to leave with him.
M.B. claimed Respondents are liable for the physical and mental damages resulting from A.R.’s
alleged sexual assault at M.B.’s apartment.
During discovery, Live Nation produced its protocols related to guest safety at the venue.
The protocols included providing guests with access to independently-contracted medical staff,
3 maintaining a “bullpen” area designed to temporarily hold people for security reasons, including
extreme intoxication, and completing incident reports for situations in which a guest requires
medical attention or is taken to the security office for violating venue rules. Live Nation’s
security personnel did not prepare an incident report relating to M.B.’s medical treatment. M.B.
submitted deposition testimony from an expert witness in the security field opining that
Respondents breached their duty of care to M.B.
Live Nation moved for summary judgment, contending that Respondents owed M.B. no
duty to prevent the alleged crime that occurred at her apartment. Following briefing and
argument, the circuit court granted summary judgment to Respondents. M.B. now appeals.
Points on Appeal
Point One posits the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of
Respondents because the circuit court improperly held that Respondents owed no legal duty to
M.B. where M.B. properly pleaded and provided sufficient facts in the record to support the
existence of an assumed duty by Respondents. Point Two argues the circuit court erred in
granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents because the circuit court wrongly found
that any breach of duty by the Respondents was too attenuated and unforeseeable to support a
finding that Respondents proximately caused M.B.’s injuries and damages. Point Three asserts
the circuit court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Respondents because the circuit
court wrongly held that Respondents cannot be held liable for medical negligence for the conduct
of Priority EMS’s registered nurse who provided care to M.B. where no such medical
malpractice claim was raised by M.B.
Standard of Review
4 We review a circuit court’s grant of summary judgment de novo. Green v.
Fotoohighiam, 606 SW 3d 113, 115 (Mo. banc 2020); see also Rule 74.04.1 Summary judgment
is proper if the moving party establishes that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that
the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Id. (quoting Goerlitz v. City of Maryville,
333 S.W.3d 450, 452 (Mo. banc 2011)).
We view the summary-judgment record in the light most favorable to the non-moving
party, and we grant the non-moving party all reasonable inferences from the record. Id. at 116
(quoting Goerlitz, 333 S.W.3d at 453). We “are not factfinders, cannot weigh evidence, and
must view inferences against the movant.” Morphis v. Bass Pro Grp., LLC, 622 S.W.3d 188,
192 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021) (internal quotation omitted). We accept as true the facts contained in
affidavits or otherwise in support of the motion, unless contradicted by the non-moving party’s
responses. Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d at 116. “In addition, the non-movant must support
denials with specific references to discovery, exhibits, or affidavits demonstrating a genuine
factual issue for trial.” Bacon v. Friedman, 621 S.W.3d 170, 175 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (quoting
Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d at 116 (citing Rule 74.04(c)(2), (c)(4))). “Facts not properly
supported under Rule 74.04(c)(2) or (c)(4) are deemed admitted.” Id.
The movant establishes a right to summary judgment by showing: (1) facts negating any
one of the non-movant’s elements; (2) that the non-movant, after an adequate period of
discovery, has not been able and will not be able to produce evidence sufficient to allow the trier
of fact to find the existence of any one of the non-movant’s elements; or (3) that there is no
genuine dispute as to the existence of each of the facts necessary to support the movant’s
properly-pleaded affirmative defense. O’Donnell v. PNK (River City), LLC, 619 S.W.3d 162,
1 All Rule references are to Mo. R. Civ. P. (2021).
5 166–67 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal citation omitted). If the moving party is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law, we will affirm the circuit court’s grant of summary judgment.
Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d at 115 (quoting Goerlitz, 33 S.W.3d at 452).
Discussion
I. Point One—Duty of Care2
The primary issue dispositive of this appeal is Respondents’ duty of care to M.B. as a
patron and invitee of Hollywood Casino Amphitheater. M.B. maintains Respondents were not
entitled to summary judgment because the circuit court erred in finding M.B. failed to establish
the requisite duty of care to support her negligence claim. Specifically, M.B. contends
Respondents assumed a duty to protect M.B. from the criminal actions of A.R. by undertaking to
assist her while in an intoxicated state at the Hollywood Casino Amphitheater and then releasing
M.B. to A.R. while she remained in an intoxicated, vulnerable condition such that A.R. could
2 Live Nation suggests we should dismiss the appeal because M.B.’s points relied on do not conform with Rule 84.04(d)(1) and thus preserve nothing for review. See Murphree v. Lakeshore Estates, LLC, 636 S.W.3d 622, 624 (Mo. App. E.D. 2021) (internal citation omitted). Rule 84.04(d)(1) provides that a point on appeal must: “(A) Identify the trial court ruling or action that the appellant challenges; (B) State concisely the legal reasons for the appellant’s claim of reversible error; and (C) Explain in summary fashion why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error.” Here, each of M.B.’s points relied on identifies the challenged ruling and states the legal issue but fails to explain why, in the context of the case, those legal reasons support the claim of reversible error. See Rule 84.04(d)(1); see also Murphree, 636 S.W.3d at 624 (internal quotation omitted) (“Given that a template is specifically provided for in Rule 84.04(d)(1), appellants simply have no excuse for failing to submit adequate points relied on.”). M.B. also fails to follow Rule 84.04(d)(5), which requires that “[i]mmediately following each ‘Point Relied On,’ the appellant shall . . . include a list of cases, not to exceed four, and the constitutional, statutory, and regulatory provisions or other authority upon which that party principally relies.” M.B. further neglects to include the required statement of preservation for each point as required by Rule 84.04(e). We have discretion to review deficient points on appeal that are readily understandable in context of the appellant’s argument sections without improperly becoming the appellant’s advocate. Scott v. King, 510 S.W.3d 887, 892 (Mo. App. E.D. 2017) (internal citation omitted). “[W]e cautiously exercise this discretion because each time we review a noncompliant brief ex gratia, we send an implicit message that substandard briefing is acceptable. It is not.” Id. Despite the lack of contextual support from the summary-judgment record required by Rule 84.04(d)(1), we find M.B. provided this Court and Respondents adequate notice of the issues raised in the argument sections and therefore choose to exercise our discretion to review the appeal on its merits. See id. Respondents’ request for dismissal is denied.
6 take her from the concert venue and later sexually assault her in her apartment. The limited issue
on appeal is whether Respondents had a duty to protect M.B. from A.R.’s criminal act.3
“In any action for negligence, a plaintiff must establish the defendant owed a duty of care
to the plaintiff, the defendant breached that duty, and the defendant’s breach proximately caused
the plaintiff’s injury.” Wieland v. Owner-Operator Servs., Inc., 540 S.W.3d 845, 848 (Mo. banc
2018) (citing L.A.C. ex rel. D.C. v. Ward Parkway Shopping Ctr. Co., 75 S.W.3d 247, 257 (Mo.
banc 2002)). Thus, in order to prove liability in a negligence action, a plaintiff must first
establish that the defendant owed the plaintiff a duty of care that “arises out of circumstances in
which there is a foreseeable likelihood that particular acts or omissions will cause harm or
injury.” L.A.C., 75 S.W.2d at 257 (quoting Madden v. C & K Barbecue Carryout, Inc., 758
S.W.2d 59, 62 (Mo. banc 1988)). Whether there exists a duty is a question of law. Id. (internal
quotation omitted). Even “[w]here the existence of a duty is established, however, it is not one
to protect against every possible injury which might occur.” Id. (quoting Hoover’s Dairy, Inc. v.
Mid-America Dairymen, Inc., 700 S.W.2d 426, 431 (Mo. banc 1985)).
“Missouri follows the ‘no duty’ rule” in that under the common law, the general rule is
that a business has no duty to protect an invitee from criminal acts of third persons.4 Elkins v.
Acad. I, LP, 633 S.W.3d 529, 537 (Mo. App. S.D. 2021) (citing Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at
848; K.L.S. v. Union Pac. R.R., 575 S.W.3d 259, 265 (Mo. App. W.D. 2019)); Scales v.
Whitaker, 615 S.W.3d 425, 437 (Mo. App. E.D. 2020) (quoting Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 848);
3 We take M.B.’s allegations of sexual assault by A.R. as true for purposes of analyzing Respondents’ duty of care. 4 After the 2016 incident at issue, Missouri enacted the Business Premises Safety Act, which codifies the general common-law rule that a business has no duty “to guard against criminal acts or harmful acts on the premises unless the business knows or has reason to know that such acts are being committed or are reasonably likely to be committed in a particular area of the premises and sufficient time exists to prevent such crime or injury.” Section 537.787.1, RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2018). The statute further outlines affirmative defenses, such as that the business had implemented reasonable security measures.
7 Hudson v. Riverport Performance Arts Ctr., 37 S.W.3d 261, 264 (Mo. App. E.D. 2000) (internal
citation omitted); Keenan v. Miriam Found., 784 S.W.2d 298, 301 (Mo. App. E.D. 1990) (citing
Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 61) (additional citations omitted). “A duty to protect against the
criminal acts of third parties is generally not recognized because such activities are rarely
foreseeable.” Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 848 (quoting L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257). Indeed, “[t]he
touchstone for the creation of a duty is foreseeability.” Id. (quoting L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257
(quoting Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62)); Scales, 615 S.W.3d at 436 (quoting Lopez v. Three Rivers
Elec. Co-op., Inc., 26 S.W.3d 151, 156 (Mo. banc 2000) (“[T]he concept of foreseeability is
paramount in determining whether a duty exists.”)). “Foreseeability is defined as the presence of
some probability or likelihood of harm sufficiently serious that ordinary persons would take
precautions to avoid it.” Scales, 615 S.W.3d at 436 (internal quotation omitted). “A mere
probability is insufficient; rather, there must be the existence of a probability which would cause
a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid it.” Id. (internal quotation omitted).
“Accordingly, while ‘[i]t is true that in some circumstances, one may be charged with a duty of
care to take precautions to protect others from . . . criminal . . . or reckless conduct of third
persons[,]’ such conduct and resulting injuries must be foreseeable.” Id. (internal quotation
omitted).
Relevant to this appeal, the Supreme Court of Missouri has recognized “two ‘special facts
and circumstances’ exceptions to the rule that businesses generally have no duty to protect
invitees from criminal acts of third persons.” Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 848 (quoting L.A.C., 75
S.W.3d at 257). These exceptions are the “special-relationship exception” and the “special-
circumstance exception.” Stafford v. Drury Inns, Inc., 165 S.W.3d 494, 496 (Mo. App. E.D.
2005) (internal citation omitted).
8 The first exception “involves a special relationship between the parties, where one party
is entrusted to the protection of another and relies on that party for safety.” Elkins, 633 S.W.3d
at 537 (internal citation omitted); Stafford, 165 S.W.3d at 496 (internal citation omitted). “Such
relationships include innkeeper-guest, common carrier-passenger, school-student, and sometimes
employer-employee, but do not include the landlord-tenant relationship.” Keenan, 784 S.W.2d
at 302 (internal citations omitted). The special-relationship exception is grounded in Missouri
case law recognizing that a defendant may assume a duty by contract or through its conduct,
such that the defendant becomes “liable for injuries caused by the unsafe performance of that
assumed duty.” Scales, 615 S.W.3d at 438–39 (internal quotation omitted) (finding a business
did not assume a duty to keep the decedent safe from being hit by a drunk driver on a public road
by its conduct of providing him with social services relating to ongoing housing and mental
illness issues); State v. Gargus, 462 S.W.3d 417, 424 (Mo. App. E.D. 2013) (internal citation
omitted) (finding in a case of criminal negligence involving elder abuse that the defendant
assumed a duty to victim by voluntarily becoming her caretaker on whom she was entirely
dependent and thus had a duty to act reasonably in providing that care); see also Keenan, 784
S.W.2d at 305 (internal quotation omitted) (noting “Missouri case law supports the proposition
that one who acts gratuitously or otherwise is liable for the negligent performance of the act,
even though there was no duty to act”).
Under the special-relationship exception, a “duty may arise when a person, known to be
violent, is present on the premises or an individual is present who has conducted himself so as to
indicate danger and sufficient time exists to prevent injury.” Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 849
(quoting L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257). Critical to the special-relationship exception, no duty arises
9 unless “a business knows or has reason to know a specific third person is both (1) on its premises
and (2) dangerous[.]” Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 849 (internal citations omitted).
Turning to the second exception, “the special[-]circumstances exception deals with the
foreseeability of crimes based on past incidents to create a duty of care[.]” Stafford, 165 S.W.3d
at 496 (internal citation omitted). The exception applies “when a business knows or has reason
to know the third person is harming or about to harm an invitee on the business’s premises.”
Elkins, 633 S.W.3d at 537 (quoting Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 848–49). This exception focuses on
prior similar incidents and whether the business has taken precautionary measures. Wieland, 540
S.W.3d at 849 (quoting L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 258). Under this exception, a duty is found if the
plaintiff can prove that a reasonable and prudent defendant had notice of prior acts of similar
crimes such that precautions should have been taken. L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 259. The Supreme
Court outlined this common-law approach in Madden, holding that where a plaintiff was
kidnapped from a restaurant parking lot and later sexually assaulted, “[t]he restaurant was found
to have a duty to protect its business invitees, because over the three-year period preceding the
assault, numerous crimes were committed on the premises.” Id. at 257–58 (citing Madden, 758
S.W.2d at 60); see also Richardson v. QuikTrip Corp., 81 S.W.3d 54, 62–63 n.9 (Mo. App. W.D.
2002) (en banc) (finding that Madden further established that courts may consider the totality of
the circumstances in assessing the foreseeability of the criminal acts under the special-
circumstances exception).
Here, M.B. argues the special-relationship exception applied and created a duty of care
for Respondents to M.B. Specifically, Respondents cared for M.B. when she was in an
extremely intoxicated and vulnerable condition while on the premises of the Hollywood Casino
Amphitheater, and thereby assumed a duty to protect M.B. against A.R.’s sexual assault, which
10 occurred later at her apartment. M.B.’s argument is unavailing because the summary-judgment
record, even construed favorably towards M.B.’s negligence claim, does not establish a duty on
the part of Respondents to protect M.B. from A.R.’s subsequent off-premises criminal act. See
Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 848 (internal citation omitted).
In particular, the summary-judgment record contains no evidence from deposition
testimony, affidavits, or other discovery suggesting that Respondents had notice that A.R. was or
was likely to become a threat to M.B. as required to meet the special-relationship exception to
the general no-duty rule. See Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 849 (internal citations omitted) (finding
no duty arises under the special-relationship exception unless “a business knows or has reason to
know a specific third person is both (1) on its premises and (2) dangerous”). The uncontroverted
facts show that M.B. voluntarily attended the concert with A.R. as a friend, and did not report
any misconduct by A.R. to Respondents or to Priority EMS, who treated her on-site for
overheating and overconsumption of alcohol. The record lacks any evidence that any other
concertgoer reported A.R. to Live Nation security for any conduct related activity. We recognize
that M.B.’s friend testified by affidavit that when she went to M.B.’s apartment after the sexual
assault occurred, M.B. was in no condition to have validly consented to sex. However, the
summary-judgment record contains no evidence of indicators that would have put Respondents
on notice as to A.R.’s current or potential misconduct while on Respondents’ premises. See id.
M.B. testified she saw her two beers being poured and did not observe A.R. or anyone else put
anything in her drinks. M.B. signed herself out from Priority EMS after being treated by Nurse
Nolan. When M.B. was with security, Respondents asked M.B. whether her friend drove a truck.
M.B. said yes, and then walked to A.R.’s truck at the front gate and voluntarily left the concert
with him. The summary-judgment record contains no evidence from deposition testimony,
11 incident reports, police reports, hospitalization records, or phone records, which suggests that
Respondents reasonably could have foreseen a need to take precautions to protect M.B. from
leaving the concert with A.R. See Bacon, 621 S.W.3d at 175 (quoting Fotoohighiam, 606
S.W.3d at 116) (noting the non-movant must support denials with specific references to
discovery, exhibits, or affidavits demonstrating a genuine factual issue to withstand summary
judgment); Scales, 615 S.W.3d at 436 (internal quotation omitted) (requiring some probability of
harm which would cause a reasonable person to take precautions to avoid it in order to establish
a duty). While a business under special facts and circumstances may assume a duty of care to
protect an individual from the criminal conduct of a third person, “such conduct and resulting
injuries must be foreseeable.” Scales, 615 S.W.3d at 436 (internal quotation omitted) (emphasis
added).
M.B. suggests that the case at bar is similar to Keenan. See 784 S.W.2d at 304–05. We
view the facts here as clearly distinguishable from those in Keenan, which affirmed a judgment
for the plaintiff following a jury trial in which the plaintiff proved the business specifically
directed her to drive to its back lot to make her delivery, where she was then assaulted and had
her purse stolen. See id. In Keenan, the plaintiff demonstrated the business affirmatively
directed and invited her to an area it claimed was safe, but which in fact was a place where the
business knew or should have known attacks were likely to occur, given evidence introduced
into the record through police reports of prior crimes. Id. Under the vastly different facts in the
summary-judgment record before us, we are not persuaded that the alleged criminal conduct and
resulting injuries were foreseeable here. See Scales, 615 S.W.3d at 436 (internal quotation
omitted). Foreseeability of the criminal conduct and resulting injuries is the touchstone for
establishing a duty on the part of Respondents to protect M.B. from A.R.’s criminal conduct
12 under the relevant common law. See Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 848 (quoting L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at
257); Scales, 615 S.W.3d at 436 (internal quotation omitted). Although M.B. alleges that
Respondents should have vetted and interviewed A.R. before allowing M.B. to leave with him,
the summary-judgment record contains no affirmative evidence that Respondents had any
knowledge or notice of any dangerous tendencies of A.R. such that Respondents assumed or
reasonably should have assumed a duty to protect M.B. from him. See L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257
(quoting Hoover’s, 700 S.W.2d at 431). The Supreme Court has found no such duty is
established where “[t]here [wa]s no evidence in the record to establish that [the] defendants knew
the assailant to be a violent individual or a particular threat to the safety of other persons prior to
th[e] incident.” Id. at 257–58 (citing Madden, 758 S.W.2d at 62). Consequently, no duty arises
under the special-relationship exception absent some evidence to withstand summary judgment
that Respondents knew or had a reason to know that M.B. was at risk of being drugged and
sexually assaulted by A.R. See Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 849 (internal citations omitted); L.A.C.,
75 S.W.3d at 257 (internal citation omitted).
To the extent M.B.’s claim of error is predicated upon judicial authority outside the scope
of a business’s liability for a third party’s criminal acts, we reject any such other theories of
negligence where the legal framework for liability for criminal acts of third parties is well-
established in Missouri law. See A.R.R. v. Tau Kappa Epsilon Fraternity, Inc., No. WD84545,
2022 WL 1085753, at *7 n.10 (Mo. App. W.D. Apr. 12, 2022) (“[W]e are not at liberty to start
afresh in a landlord tenant/premises liability case where the elements which create a duty of care
in such cases have already been established.”). Missouri jurisprudence has developed a clear
framework to recognize two exceptions to the general rule that a business has no duty to protect
a plaintiff from a third party’s criminal acts. This well-established jurisprudence has
13 subsequently been codified. See Section 537.787, RSMo (Cum. Supp. 2018). We reject M.B.’s
invitation to extend the law and find that Respondents owed a legal duty to M.B. under the
special-relationship exception given the facts of this case. See Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 849
(internal citations omitted). Respondents are entitled to judgment as a matter of law because the
summary judgment evidence before the trial court did not present sufficient facts to establish a
duty on the part of Respondents to M.B. in relation to A.R. See Fotoohighiam, 606 S.W.3d at
115 (quoting Goerlitz, 33 S.W.3d at 452). Point One is denied.
Because a finding of no duty precludes a claim of negligence, Point One is dispositive of
the appeal. See Wieland, 540 S.W.3d at 848 (quoting L.A.C., 75 S.W.3d at 257). Points Two
and Three are denied.
Conclusion
The judgment of the circuit court is affirmed.
_________________________________ KURT S. ODENWALD, Judge
Lisa P. Page, P.J., concurs. Thomas C. Clark II, J., concurs.