Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc.

767 F. Supp. 697, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8875, 1991 WL 123124
CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Pennsylvania
DecidedJune 27, 1991
DocketCiv. A. 85-6494
StatusPublished
Cited by4 cases

This text of 767 F. Supp. 697 (Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc.) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Pennsylvania primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mazur v. Merck & Co., Inc., 767 F. Supp. 697, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8875, 1991 WL 123124 (E.D. Pa. 1991).

Opinion

OPINION

DITTER, District Judge.

In this case, a manufacturer is charged with failing to warn that the use of its vaccine might lead to serious consequences. Before me is the supplemental motion of defendant Merck & Co., Inc., for summary judgment and to exclude expert testimony. 1 Plaintiffs Lisa Marie Mazur and her parents, Anthony and Edna Mazur, claim that Lisa contracted subacute sclerosing panencephalitis (“SSPE”), a severe, often terminal, illness of the central nervous system, as a result of an inoculation with a measles, mumps, and rubella vaccine (“MMR II”) manufactured by Merck.

Merck’s first motion for partial summary judgment was denied in part and granted in part. Mazur v. Merck, 742 F.Supp. 239, 266 (E.D.Pa.1990). I denied Merck’s motion as to the federal preemption and statute of limitations issues. Id. After a lengthy discussion of the many other matters raised by the parties, I found that additional discovery and briefing was necessary and gave the parties time to conduct both. Id. Specifically, I invited the parties to address whether or not:

a. Merck acted in accordance with due care when it contracted with the Center for *699 Disease Control (“CDC”) to ensure the presence of a physician at inoculation or an adequate warning of the risks associated with vaccination was conveyed to recipients or to their parents or guardians, id. at 261;

b. the school nurse who supervised the MMR II inoculation was a learned intermediary, id. at 255;

c. the package circular contained an adequate warning of the revaccination risks, id. at 258;

d. the proximate cause element of a duty to warn claim had been satisfied, 2 id. at 262-63; and

e. the cause-in-fact element of a duty to warn claim had been satisfied, 3 id. at 266 and n. 33.

Merck’s supplemental motion for summary judgment will be granted. Merck satisfied its duty to exercise reasonable care to inform the Mazurs of the vaccine’s risks. Even though no doctor was present, Edith Frederick, the nurse who supervised the administration of the vaccine to Lisa Mazur, was a qualified learned intermediary. She was provided with a sufficient warning of the risks associated with MMR II inoculation. The package circular contained an adequate warning of vaccination risks and accurately reflected the medical evidence available in 1982. Therefore, Merck cannot be held liable for Lisa’s illness.

1. Facts

The facts of this case are described in great detail in my prior opinion. See Mazur, 742 F.Supp. at 243-45. I will briefly summarize them here.

In response to a measles epidemic among school children in Philadelphia in the late 1970’s, the City of Philadelphia, Department of Public Health (“health department”) proposed a regulation, which was later adopted by the School Board of Health (“school board”), requiring all children attending a school in Philadelphia to be vaccinated against a variety of pediatric diseases. The school board’s medical director, Dr. Robert G. Sharrar, selected Merck’s MMR II vaccine for the simultaneous immunization against measles, mumps, and rubella. Affidavit of Robert G. Sharrar, M.D., (“Sharrar aff.”), K 8, attached as Merck’s exhibit J.

MMR II was packaged in containers which included an insert describing the risks and benefits associated with its use. 4 The school board purchased the MMR II vaccines from the CDC which had, in turn, purchased them from Merck. The Merck-CDC purchase contract stated the CDC would assure that a physician be present at each inoculation or that the CDC would provide MMR II recipients or their parents with what Merck and it believed to be an adequate warning of the risks associated with MMR II immunization. Opting to proceed under the latter clause, the CDC drafted an “Important Information Statement” to be sent to all parents of school-age children. Affidavit of William B. Freilich, (“Freilich aff.”), H 22 and exhibit 6, attached as Merck’s exhibit E. The Important Information Statement was sent to parents via their children.

*700 Lisa Mazur received the MMR II vaccine on February 26, 1982. The vaccine was administered at Lisa’s school under the supervision of Edith B. Frederick, a registered nurse. Mrs. Mazur claims she never gave her consent for her daughter’s vaccination. She denies receiving an Important Information Statement or any other warning about MMR II’s risks. She did, however, become aware of the scheduled immunization, protested Lisa’s vaccination to the school board, and so she would not be vaccinated kept Lisa out of school for a week prior to the date of the vaccination.

On November 2, 1983, Lisa was diagnosed as having SSPE. 5

II. Duty to Warn

A. The Manufacturer’s Duty to Warn.

In my prior opinion in this case, I described and explained the nature and scope of a vaccine manufacturer’s duty to warn. See Mazur, 742 F.Supp. at 251-53. I need not go into such a thorough review here, but a few comments are necessary.

The standard of care which applies in this case is set forth in Restatement (Second) of Torts § 388. 6 “Under this section, the supplier has a duty to exercise reasonable care to inform those for whose use the article is supplied of the facts which make it likely to be dangerous.” Incollingo v. Ewing, 444 Pa. 263, 282 A.2d 206, 219 n. 9 (1971) (emphasis added). Because MMR II is a prescription drug product, Merck can satisfy its duty to warn the vaccine recipient by exercising reasonable care to provide an adequate warning to a medical professional who acts as a “learned intermediary.” Reyes v. Wyeth Laboratories, 498 F.2d 1264, 1276 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 1096, 95 S.Ct. 687, 42 L.Ed.2d 688 (1974). The “learned intermediary rule” recognizes that a medical professional is qualified by knowledge, experience, and preparation to exercise his “individual medical judgment bottomed on a knowledge of both patient and palliative.” Id.

If the vaccine is “dispensed to all comers at mass immunization clinics without an individualized balancing by a physician of the risks involved ..., [i]t is the responsibility of the manufacturer to see that warnings reach the consumer, either by giving warning itself or by obligating the purchaser to give warning.” Davis v. Wyeth Laboratories, 399 F.2d 121

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Bluebook (online)
767 F. Supp. 697, 1991 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 8875, 1991 WL 123124, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mazur-v-merck-co-inc-paed-1991.