MILDRED MAZGAJ; MARIAN Case No.: 3:24-cv-00777-JAH-MSB ANTHONY, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ Plaintiffs, v. RECONSIDERATION
JASON CHARLES, [ECF No. 10] Defendant. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mildred Mazgaj’s and Plaintiff Marian Anthony’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Reconsideration. ECF No. 10 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Mot. at 1. The Court has determined it can rule on Plaintiffs’ Motion without responsive briefing. Upon careful review of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED, and Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED not to file further motions in this matter. On May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs—proceeding pro se—filed a Complaint against Defendant Jason Charles (“Defendant”) alleging a myriad of claims ranging from criminal wire fraud and perjury to civil defamation. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, amongst others, to re-litigate Plaintiff Anthony’s state court dissolution and custody proceedings. As the Court previously explained: Plaintiff Anthony “is the petitioner in a family court dissolution matter pending in the San Diego County Superior Court—Marian Anthony v. Corina Galvez, Case No. 19FL005322N (filed May 2, 2019)[.]” Anthony v. Segura, 2024 WL 3315996 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2024). Plaintiff has filed two additional lawsuits in this judicial district relating to the family court dissolution matter: (1) id. (where Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sued the Honorable Daniel Segura, who presided over Plaintiff Anthony’s child custody proceedings in state court); and (2) Mildred Mazgaj and Marian Anthony v. Corina Galvez, et al., Case No. 3:24-cv- 00776-JAH-AHG (where Plaintiffs filed a complaint against his current or former wife and other defendants for claims arising out of the state court dissolution and custody proceedings). Similarly, here, as best as the Court can determine from the Complaint, Plaintiffs are suing Defendant because of his involvement as an adverse witness in Plaintiff Anthony’s state court proceedings. See Compl. at 7. ECF No. 8 (“Order”) at 2. Defendant—also proceeding pro se—filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 3. The Court granted Defendant’s motion in its entirety. See Order at 7. The Court found Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue criminal causes of action because Plaintiffs, as private individuals, “lack[] a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution … of another.” Id. at 5 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). The Court found Plaintiffs similarly “lack standing to sue Defendant for any causes of action arising out of his involvement as a witness in Plaintiff Anthony’s dissolution and/or child custody proceedings” under the doctrine of witness immunity. Id. at 6. Finally, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice because the deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ Complaint cannot be cured. Id. at 6-7. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for reconsideration. However, where reconsideration of a non-final order is sought, the court has “inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke it.” United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000). “The authority of district courts to reconsider their own orders before they become final, absent some applicable rule or statute to the contrary, allows them to correct not only simple mistakes, but also decisions based on shifting precedent, rather than waiting for the time-consuming, costly process of appeal.” Id. at 1049. Thus, Civil Local Rule 7.1(i) permits motions for reconsideration “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any judge ... has been refused in whole or in part.” CivLR 7.1(i). However, the party seeking reconsideration must show “what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application.” Id. Local Rule 7.1(i)(2) permits motions for reconsideration within “30 days of the entry of the ruling.” A motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to a Local Rule may also be construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). In Osterneck, the Supreme Court stated that “a post- judgment motion will be considered a Rule 59(e) motion where it involves ‘reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.’” Id. at 174 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employ't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). Rule 59(e) grants district courts the authority to reconsider and amend a previous order, but “the rule offers an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)). In the interests of judicial economy and the finality of judgments, “a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945 (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding there exists a “compelling interest in the finality of judgments which should not lightly be disregarded”). Additionally, a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona, 229 F.3d at 890 (citation omitted). Where a motion for reconsideration claims the district court clearly erred, “[m]ere doubts or disagreement about the wisdom of a prior decision . . . will not suffice . . . . To be clearly erroneous, a decision must [be] more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” A-Tek Mech., Inc. v. KHW Servs., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-01974, 2022 WL 18635745, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2022). Therefore, “[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden[.]” United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). The district courts have discretion to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). As far as the Court can determine from Plaintiffs’ briefing, Plaintiffs claim reconsideration is proper for three reasons: (1) Plaintiffs claim new evidence in the form of an affidavit from a “Jane Doe” reveals Defendant conspired wit
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MILDRED MAZGAJ; MARIAN Case No.: 3:24-cv-00777-JAH-MSB ANTHONY, ORDER DENYING PLAINTIFFS’ Plaintiffs, v. RECONSIDERATION
JASON CHARLES, [ECF No. 10] Defendant. Pending before the Court is Plaintiff Mildred Mazgaj’s and Plaintiff Marian Anthony’s (collectively, “Plaintiffs”) Motion for Reconsideration. ECF No. 10 (“Motion” or “Mot.”). Plaintiffs seek reconsideration of the Court’s Order Granting Defendant’s Motion to Dismiss. Mot. at 1. The Court has determined it can rule on Plaintiffs’ Motion without responsive briefing. Upon careful review of Plaintiffs’ Motion for Reconsideration, the relevant law, and for the reasons set forth below, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED, and Plaintiff is HEREBY ORDERED not to file further motions in this matter. On May 1, 2024, Plaintiffs—proceeding pro se—filed a Complaint against Defendant Jason Charles (“Defendant”) alleging a myriad of claims ranging from criminal wire fraud and perjury to civil defamation. See generally ECF No. 1 (“Compl.”). Plaintiffs filed this lawsuit, amongst others, to re-litigate Plaintiff Anthony’s state court dissolution and custody proceedings. As the Court previously explained: Plaintiff Anthony “is the petitioner in a family court dissolution matter pending in the San Diego County Superior Court—Marian Anthony v. Corina Galvez, Case No. 19FL005322N (filed May 2, 2019)[.]” Anthony v. Segura, 2024 WL 3315996 (S.D. Cal. July 3, 2024). Plaintiff has filed two additional lawsuits in this judicial district relating to the family court dissolution matter: (1) id. (where Plaintiffs unsuccessfully sued the Honorable Daniel Segura, who presided over Plaintiff Anthony’s child custody proceedings in state court); and (2) Mildred Mazgaj and Marian Anthony v. Corina Galvez, et al., Case No. 3:24-cv- 00776-JAH-AHG (where Plaintiffs filed a complaint against his current or former wife and other defendants for claims arising out of the state court dissolution and custody proceedings). Similarly, here, as best as the Court can determine from the Complaint, Plaintiffs are suing Defendant because of his involvement as an adverse witness in Plaintiff Anthony’s state court proceedings. See Compl. at 7. ECF No. 8 (“Order”) at 2. Defendant—also proceeding pro se—filed a Motion to Dismiss for failure to state a claim. ECF No. 3. The Court granted Defendant’s motion in its entirety. See Order at 7. The Court found Plaintiffs lack standing to pursue criminal causes of action because Plaintiffs, as private individuals, “lack[] a judicially cognizable interest in the prosecution … of another.” Id. at 5 (quoting Linda R.S. v. Richard D., 410 U.S. 614, 619 (1973)). The Court found Plaintiffs similarly “lack standing to sue Defendant for any causes of action arising out of his involvement as a witness in Plaintiff Anthony’s dissolution and/or child custody proceedings” under the doctrine of witness immunity. Id. at 6. Finally, the Court dismissed Plaintiffs’ Complaint with prejudice because the deficiencies in Plaintiffs’ Complaint cannot be cured. Id. at 6-7. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure do not expressly provide for motions for reconsideration. However, where reconsideration of a non-final order is sought, the court has “inherent jurisdiction to modify, alter or revoke it.” United States v. Martin, 226 F.3d 1042, 1048-49 (9th Cir. 2000). “The authority of district courts to reconsider their own orders before they become final, absent some applicable rule or statute to the contrary, allows them to correct not only simple mistakes, but also decisions based on shifting precedent, rather than waiting for the time-consuming, costly process of appeal.” Id. at 1049. Thus, Civil Local Rule 7.1(i) permits motions for reconsideration “[w]henever any motion or any application or petition for any order or other relief has been made to any judge ... has been refused in whole or in part.” CivLR 7.1(i). However, the party seeking reconsideration must show “what new or different facts and circumstances are claimed to exist which did not exist, or were not shown, upon such prior application.” Id. Local Rule 7.1(i)(2) permits motions for reconsideration within “30 days of the entry of the ruling.” A motion for reconsideration filed pursuant to a Local Rule may also be construed as a motion to alter or amend judgment under Rule 59(e) or Rule 60(b). See Osterneck v. Ernst & Whinney, 489 U.S. 169, 174 (1989); In re Arrowhead Estates Development Co., 42 F.3d 1306, 1311 (9th Cir. 1994). In Osterneck, the Supreme Court stated that “a post- judgment motion will be considered a Rule 59(e) motion where it involves ‘reconsideration of matters properly encompassed in a decision on the merits.’” Id. at 174 (quoting White v. New Hampshire Dep't of Employ't Sec., 455 U.S. 445, 451 (1982)). Rule 59(e) grants district courts the authority to reconsider and amend a previous order, but “the rule offers an ‘extraordinary remedy, to be used sparingly in the interests of finality and conservation of judicial resources.’” Carroll v. Nakatani, 342 F.3d 934, 945 (9th Cir. 2003) (quoting 12 JAMES WM. MOORE ET AL., MOORE’S FEDERAL PRACTICE § 59.30[4] (3d ed. 2000)). In the interests of judicial economy and the finality of judgments, “a motion for reconsideration should not be granted, absent highly unusual circumstances, unless the district court is presented with newly discovered evidence, committed clear error, or if there is an intervening change in the controlling law.” Carroll, 342 F.3d at 945 (quoting Kona Enters., Inc. v. Est. of Bishop, 229 F.3d 877, 890 (9th Cir. 2000)); Rodgers v. Watt, 722 F.2d 456, 459 (9th Cir. 1983) (holding there exists a “compelling interest in the finality of judgments which should not lightly be disregarded”). Additionally, a motion for reconsideration “may not be used to raise arguments or present evidence for the first time when they could reasonably have been raised earlier in the litigation.” Kona, 229 F.3d at 890 (citation omitted). Where a motion for reconsideration claims the district court clearly erred, “[m]ere doubts or disagreement about the wisdom of a prior decision . . . will not suffice . . . . To be clearly erroneous, a decision must [be] more than just maybe or probably wrong; it must be dead wrong.” A-Tek Mech., Inc. v. KHW Servs., Inc., No. 3:21-cv-01974, 2022 WL 18635745, at *2 (S.D. Cal. Oct. 13, 2022). Therefore, “[a] party seeking reconsideration must show more than a disagreement with the Court’s decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party’s burden[.]” United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F.Supp.2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001) (internal quotations omitted). The district courts have discretion to grant or deny a motion for reconsideration. Navajo Nation v. Confederated Tribes & Bands of the Yakama Indian Nation, 331 F.3d 1041, 1046 (9th Cir. 2003). As far as the Court can determine from Plaintiffs’ briefing, Plaintiffs claim reconsideration is proper for three reasons: (1) Plaintiffs claim new evidence in the form of an affidavit from a “Jane Doe” reveals Defendant conspired with Plaintiff Anthony’s ex-wife to provide false testimony at the child custody hearing in state court; (2) Plaintiffs argue the Court clearly erred in finding Plaintiffs have no standing for their claims; and (3) Plaintiffs argue the Court’s decision to dismiss the action with prejudice was overly harsh in light of Plaintiffs’ pro se status. Mot. at 7-8. As for the “Jane Doe” affidavit, Plaintiffs fail to submit any exhibits to the Court in support of their Motion—and even if they did—Plaintiffs would still be barred from suing Defendant for his involvement as a witness in the state court custody proceedings. See Safouane v. Fleck, 226 F.Appx. 753, 762 (9th Cir. 2007) (“[t]he mere allegation of a conspiracy to affect the outcome [of a court proceeding] is insufficient to defeat immunity”). Likewise, Plaintiffs make no attempt in their Motion to demonstrate how their civil claims overcome witness immunity. See generally Mot. Ultimately, a party seeking reconsideration must show “more than a disagreement with the Court's decision, and recapitulation of the cases and arguments considered by the court before rendering its original decision fails to carry the moving party's burden.” United States v. Westlands Water Dist., 134 F. Supp. 2d 1111, 1131 (E.D. Cal. 2001); see also United States v. Rezzonico, 32 F.Supp.2d 1112, 1116 (D. Ariz. 1998) (motions for reconsideration may not “be used to ask the Court to rethink what it has already thought”). Plaintiffs have failed to show more than a disagreement with the Court’s Order. Finally, Plaintiffs argue “procedural” unfairness with regard to the Court’s decision to dismiss the action with prejudice. Mot. at 8-9. Plaintiffs contend the Court’s ruling “is overly harsh and constitutes manifest injustice….” Id. at 9. It is true the Court should give leave to amend freely where justice so requires, and “[t]his policy is applied even more liberally to pro se litigants.” Eldridge v. Block, 832 F.2d 1132, 1135 (9th Cir. 1987). However, dismissal with prejudice is proper where—as here—it is “plainly unlikely that the plaintiff[s] will be able to cure the standing problem.” Fieldturf, Inc. v. Sw. Recreational Industries, Inc., 357 F.3d 1266, 1269 (Fed. Cir. 2004). This case falls under the line of cases described by District Judge Irving Hill as: Having been defeated in state court proceedings and being unhappy and somewhat humiliated and frustrated by the results of such proceedings, these persons lash out at judges, attorneys, witnesses, court functionaries, newspapers and anyone else in convenient range, terming all of them corruptly evil and charging them with perjury and conspiracy in a last desperate effort to re-litigate the issues on which they have once lost and hoping to secure sizeable damages to boot.”
Shakespeare v. Wilson, 40 F.R.D. 500, 502 (S.D. Cal. 1966). The law prohibits Plaintiffs’ attempt to use this Court as a vehicle for retribution against Defendant merely because he testified against them in a state court custody proceeding. See Lisker v. City of Los Angeles, 780 F.3d 1237, 1241-42 (9th Cir. 2015) (explaining witnesses are “absolutely immune from liability for testimony at trial” and “[a]bsolute witness immunity also extends to preparatory activities ‘inextricably tied’ to testimony, such as conspiracies to testify falsely”). The Court finds no clear error in its Order. Accordingly, Plaintiffs’ Motion is DENIED. Accordingly, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED: 1. Defendant’s Motion for Reconsideration is DENIED. 2. Plaintiffs shall not file any further motions in this matter. } DATED: March 25, 2025
D JOHN A. HOUSTON // UNITED STATES DISTRICT JUDGE