Maysa Shouman v. Ossama Salama

• Court: District Court of Appeal of Florida
• Decided: March 10, 2025
• Docket: 6D2023-2585
• Status: Published

Opinion

SIXTH DISTRICT COURT OF APPEAL STATE OF FLORIDA _____________________________

Case No. 6D2023-2585 Lower Tribunal No. 2020-DR-008575-O _____________________________

MAYSA SHOUMAN,

Appellant,

v.

OSSAMA SALAMA,

Appellee. _____________________________

Appeal from the Circuit Court for Orange County. Michael Deen, Judge.

March 10, 2025

NARDELLA, J.

Maysa Shouman (“Former Wife”) appeals the final judgment which dissolved

her marriage to Ossama Salama (“Former Husband”) and argues, among other

things, that the trial court erred in calculating her need for alimony as well as her

Former Husband’s ability to pay. As this argument has merit, we reverse the denial

of alimony but affirm as to all other grounds raised.

Section 61.08(2), Florida Statutes (2020), sets forth a two-step process for

determining whether to award alimony in a divorce. In the first step, the court must “make a specific factual determination as to whether either party has an actual need

for alimony or maintenance and whether either party has the ability to pay alimony

or maintenance.” § 61.08, Fla. Stat. The first determination—the parties’ respective

need for and ability to pay alimony—must be based on the parties’ net incomes after

deducting reasonable expenses. Reese v. Reese, 363 So. 3d 1202, 1211 (Fla. 6th

DCA 2023); see also Ogle v. Ogle, 334 So. 3d 699, 702 (Fla. 1st DCA 2022) (“To

determine a party’s ability to pay, net income (after expenses), not gross, must be

considered.”).

Once the first step is completed, and provided the trial court finds that there

is a need for alimony and an ability to pay by the other party, then the statute instructs

the trial court to proceed to the second step. In the second step, the trial court is

tasked with “determining the proper type and amount of alimony or maintenance”

which requires consideration of “all relevant factors” including, but not limited to,

those set forth in section 61.08(2)(a)–(j), Florida Statutes. Relevant to the second

step, the trial court identified three factors it considered: “[t]he age and the physical

and emotional condition of each party,” “[t]he financial resources of each party,

including the nonmarital and the marital assets and liabilities distributed to each,”

and “[t]he earning capacities, educational levels, vocational skills, and employability

of the parties . . . .” § 61.08(2)(c), (d), (e), Fla. Stat. This alone was not error.

2 Rather, the trial court erred in mixing steps one and two, which led to

contradictory conclusions on the determination of need. In calculating the Former

Wife’s need, the trial court declared that “based on the testimony and exhibits

present[ed], the Wife’s reasonable monthly need is $4,000 a month.” That need

determination was then immediately contradicted by the trial court’s following

conclusion that the “Wife did not meet her burden of showing a need for alimony

based on her being able bodied, capable of working, and receiving a significant

amount from equitable distribution.” The latter conclusion conflated the separate

steps of the analysis.

The first step, which requires the trial court to determine the Former Wife’s

need for alimony, is not the proper place for the trial court to consider the second-

step factors set forth in section 61.08(2)(c), (d), and (e). That is so because being

able bodied, capable of working, and receiving a large sum in equitable distribution

might, in appropriate circumstances, be considered at the second step of the process

in determining whether to award alimony and the amount of alimony to be awarded,

but they do not affect the calculation of need for alimony which is based on net

income and reasonable expenses. Thus, the trial court could not find that Former

Wife had no need for alimony, when its own calculations determined she had a

monthly need of $4,000.

3 In addition to having erred in determining need, the trial court also erred in

determining ability to pay. Whether there is an ability to pay is also part of the first

step and, like the need for alimony, is based on net income after reasonable expenses.

See Reese, 363 So. 3d at 1211. Here, the trial court found that Former Husband

lacked the ability to pay after concluding that he has a net monthly income of

$2,980.58 but runs a deficit each month of approximately $3,800 to pay for his

reasonable expenses. The problem with this finding is that although these numbers

are found in Former Husband’s financial affidavit, it was undisputed that the

expenses the trial court deducted from his income to find the deficit are not being

personally paid by Former Husband but are instead being paid by his business. In

fact, a note on his own financial affidavit which was entered into evidence states,

“[a]ll of the Husband’s expenses are being paid through the business.” Accordingly,

his $2,980.58 in monthly income, from which he pays no expenses, is surplus

income from which he has an ability to pay alimony.

In light of these errors made in the first step of the scheme set forth in section

61.08(2), Florida Statutes, we reverse the denial of alimony and remand to the trial

court for reconsideration consistent with this opinion. Because we reverse on this

point, we must also reverse the award of child support for recalculation should

alimony ultimately be awarded to Former Wife. See, e.g., Storey v. Storey, 979 So.

2d 1057, 1058 (Fla. 2d DCA 2008).

4 REVERSED and REMANDED.

TRAVER, C.J., and WHITE, J., concur.

Marcia K. Lippincott, of Marcia K. Lippincott, P.A., Lake Mary, for Appellant.

Mark A. Skipper, of Law Office of Mark A. Skipper, P.A., Orlando, and Debra Johnson, of Law Office of Debra Johnson, P.A., Orlando, for Appellee.

NOT FINAL UNTIL TIME EXPIRES TO FILE MOTION FOR REHEARING AND DISPOSITION THEREOF IF TIMELY FILED