Mays v. Kemper

CourtDistrict Court, E.D. Wisconsin
DecidedJuly 21, 2020
Docket2:19-cv-00231
StatusUnknown

This text of Mays v. Kemper (Mays v. Kemper) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, E.D. Wisconsin primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mays v. Kemper, (E.D. Wis. 2020).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN ______________________________________________________________________________ ANTONIO DARNELL MAYS,

Plaintiff, v. Case No. 19-cv-231-pp

PAUL KEMPER,

Defendant. ______________________________________________________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYING FILING FEE (DKT. NO. 2), SCREENING AND DISMISSING COMPLAINT (DKT. NO. 1) AND ALLOWING PLAINITFF TO FILE AMENDED COMPLAINT ______________________________________________________________________________

The plaintiff, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendant violated his civil rights by subjecting him to unconstitutional conditions of confinement. This order resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee, dkt. no. 2, screens and dismisses the plaintiff’s original complaint, dkt. no. 1, and allows the plaintiff to file an amended complaint that complies with the instructions below. I. The plaintiff’s motion to proceed without prepaying the filing fee (Dkt. No. 2) The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this case because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed his complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. The law lets a court allow an incarcerated plaintiff to proceed with his case without prepaying the civil case filing fee if he meets certain conditions. One of those conditions is that the plaintiff pay an initial partial filing fee. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). Once the plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, the court may allow the plaintiff to pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On February 27, 2019, the court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial

partial filing fee of $16.50. Dkt. No. 5. The court received that fee on March 11, 2019. Therefore, the court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and will require him to pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. II. Screening the plaintiff’s complaint The PLRA requires the court to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The court must dismiss a complaint

if the plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). To state a claim, a complaint must contain enough facts, accepted as true, to state a claim “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual

content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, a plaintiff must allege that someone deprived him of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States and that whoever deprived him of that right was acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v. Cty. of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Vill. of N. Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The court

gives a pro se plaintiff’s allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). A. Facts Alleged in the Complaint On October 9, 2018, the plaintiff was housed at the Milwaukee Secure Detention Facility. Id. at 2. The plaintiff states that MSDF was an “inhumane environment” for the following reasons: (1) no smoke alarms within the cells or dayrooms; (2) no carbon monoxide detectors within the cells or dayrooms; (3) no sprinklers in the cells; (4) the cell door keeps jamming; (5) the intercom speaker comes “in and out;” (6) the shower water is so hard that it turns his black skin white; (7) the sink smells like “sewage;” (8) the vents have a lot of dust; (9) there is no fresh air in the building; (10) two-man cells are becoming three-man cells; (11) not enough toilet paper; (12) hot food is served cold; (13) denial of access to the law library; (14) the dayroom is very cold; and (15) clothes are the wrong size and itchy. Id. at 2-4. For relief, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages. Id. at 4. B. Legal Analysis of Alleged Facts The plaintiff’s complaint, as it is currently written, fails to state a claim upon which relief can be granted. First, §1983 limits liability to public employees who are personally responsible for a constitutional violation. Burks

v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592, 593-94 (7th Cir. 2009). “An official satisfies the personal responsibility requirement of section 1983 . . . if the conduct causing the constitutional deprivation occurs at [his] direction or with [his] knowledge and consent.” Gentry v. Duckworth, 65 F.3d 555, 561 (7th Cir. 1995) (quoting Crowder v. Lash, 687 F.2d 996, 1005 (7th Cir. 1982)). He or she “must know about the conduct and facilitate it, approve it, condone it, or turn a blind eye.” Id. (quoting Jones v. City of Chi., 856 F.2d 985, 992 (7th Cir. 1988)). The plaintiff has not alleged that the one defendant he has sued, Paul

Kemper, personally was responsible for any of the conditions he describes. It appears that he sued Kemper because Kemper was the warden at MSDF. But the doctrine of respondeat superior (supervisory liability) does not apply to cases filed under 42 U.S.C. §1983. See Burks, 555 F.3d at 593-94 (“Liability depends on each defendant's knowledge and actions, not on the knowledge or actions of persons they supervise.”). Because the plaintiff has not alleged any facts about what Kemper did or did not do to violate his constitutional rights,

he has not stated a claim for relief against Kemper.

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Related

Estelle v. Gamble
429 U.S. 97 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Gomez v. Toledo
446 U.S. 635 (Supreme Court, 1980)
Erickson v. Pardus
551 U.S. 89 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly
550 U.S. 544 (Supreme Court, 2007)
Ashcroft v. Iqbal
556 U.S. 662 (Supreme Court, 2009)
Thomas Crowder v. Russell E. Lash
687 F.2d 996 (Seventh Circuit, 1982)
Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee
570 F.3d 824 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Burks v. Raemisch
555 F.3d 592 (Seventh Circuit, 2009)
Bruce Giles v. Salvador Godinez
914 F.3d 1040 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)

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Mays v. Kemper, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mays-v-kemper-wied-2020.