Mays v. Bebo

District Court, E.D. Wisconsin·Decided October 1, 2020·No. 2:20-cv-00105·Unknown

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT EASTERN DISTRICT OF WISCONSIN

ANTONIO MAYS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No. 20-cv-0105-bhl

SGT. CHAPMAN, et al.,

Defendants.

SCREENING ORDER

Plaintiff Antonio Mays, a Wisconsin state prisoner who is representing himself, filed a complaint under 42 U.S.C. §1983, alleging that the defendants violated his civil rights. This order resolves the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee and screens the complaint. (ECF Nos. 1-2.) THE PLAINTIFF’S MOTION FOR LEAVE TO PROCEED WITHOUT PREPAYMENT OF THE FILING FEE The Prison Litigation Reform Act (“PLRA”) applies to this action because the plaintiff was incarcerated when he filed the complaint. 28 U.S.C. §1915. The law allows a prisoner- plaintiff to proceed with a case in federal court without prepaying the civil case filing fee, provided he meets certain conditions. 28 U.S.C. §1915(b). One of those conditions is that he pay an initial partial filing fee. Id. Once the plaintiff pays the initial partial filing fee, he must pay the balance of the $350 filing fee over time, through deductions from his prisoner account. Id. On February 6, 2020, the Court ordered the plaintiff to pay an initial partial filing fee of $2.93. (ECF No. 6.) The plaintiff paid that fee on February 27, 2020. Therefore, the Court will grant the plaintiff’s motion for leave to proceed without prepayment of the filing fee. He must pay the remainder of the filing fee over time in the manner explained at the end of this order. SCREENING THE COMPLAINT The PLRA requires the Court to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against a governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(a). The Court must dismiss a complaint if the plaintiff raises claims that are legally “frivolous or malicious,” that fail to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, or that seek monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such relief. 28 U.S.C. §1915A(b). In determining whether the complaint states a claim, the Court applies the same standard that it applies when considering whether to dismiss a case under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 12(b)(6). See Cesal v. Moats, 851 F.3d 714, 720 (7th Cir. 2017) (citing Booker-El v. Superintendent, Ind. State Prison, 668 F.3d 896, 899 (7th Cir. 2012)). To state a claim, a complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, “that is plausible on its face.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (quoting Bell Atlantic Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007)). “A claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows a court to draw the reasonable inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Id. (citing Twombly, 550 U.S. at 556). To state a claim under 42 U.S.C. §1983, the plaintiff must allege that: 1) he was deprived of a right secured by the Constitution or laws of the United States; and 2) the defendant was acting under color of state law. Buchanan-Moore v. County of Milwaukee, 570 F.3d 824, 827 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Kramer v. Village of North Fond du Lac, 384 F.3d 856, 861 (7th Cir. 2004)); see also Gomez v. Toledo, 446 U.S. 635, 640 (1980). The Court gives a pro se plaintiff’s allegations, “however inartfully pleaded,” a liberal construction. See Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 106 (1976)). FACTS ALLEGED The plaintiff is an inmate at the Green Bay Correctional Institution (“GBCI”). (ECF No. 1 at 1.) The defendants are Sgt. Chapman, CO Jensen, and John Doe Correctional Officers #1-5. (Id.) The plaintiff’s complaint involves two separate incidents at GBCI. (Id. at 2.) During the first incident, between December 11, 2019 and December 15, 2019, the plaintiff asked John Doe Correctional Officers #3-5 (on first shift) to “please cut the heat up” because it had been “very cold” in his cell and in the cell hall “for days.” (Id. at 2-3.) These individuals refused, and the plaintiff got sick for nine days. (Id. at 2.) During the second incident, on January 11, 2020, the plaintiff notified Sgt. Chapman, CO Jensen, and John Doe Correctional Officers #1-2 that the power went off inside his cell at about 3:00 p.m. (Id.) The plaintiff told these individuals that he and his cellmate had been in the dark for hours, that they “can barely see in front of [them,]” and that they “could not see inside this cellroom.” (Id. at 3.) The plaintiff asked these individuals to turn the power back on so that the and his cellmate could see better. (Id.) All of these individuals ignored the plaintiff and refused to turn the lights back on. (Id.) Sgt. Chapman “got disrespectful[]” towards the plaintiff. (Id.) The plaintiff thinks that the correctional officers ignored him because he was yelling loudly out of his cell. (Id.) The plaintiff states that the lights didn’t turn back on until 10:00 p.m. that evening. (Id.) For relief, the plaintiff seeks monetary damages. (Id. at 4.) LEGAL ANALYSIS The Eighth Amendment prohibits the states from subjecting prisoners to cruel and unusual punishment. The plaintiff must allege (1) “a deprivation that is, from an objective standpoint, sufficiently serious that it results ‘in the denial of the minimal civilized measures of life’s necessities,’” and (2) that prison officials were deliberately indifferent towards the conditions that caused the deprivation. Gray v. Hardy, 826 F.3d 1000, 1005 (7th Cir. 2016) (quoting Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994)). “[E]xtreme deprivations are required to make out a conditions-of-confinement claim.” Giles v. Godinez, 914 F.3d 1040, 1051 (7th Cir. 2019). Conditions-of-confinement are judged in accordance with “contemporary standards of decency.” Id. “If under contemporary standards the conditions cannot be said to be cruel and unusual, then they are not unconstitutional.” Id. “To the extent that such conditions are restrictive and even harsh, they are part of the penalty that criminal offenders pay for their offenses against society.” Id. The Seventh Circuit has held that exposing inmates to extreme temperatures can deny them the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.

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