Mayor of Baltimore v. Scott

101 A. 674, 131 Md. 228, 1917 Md. LEXIS 12
CourtCourt of Appeals of Maryland
DecidedJune 28, 1917
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 101 A. 674 (Mayor of Baltimore v. Scott) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Maryland primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mayor of Baltimore v. Scott, 101 A. 674, 131 Md. 228, 1917 Md. LEXIS 12 (Md. 1917).

Opinion

Constable, J.,

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This ease is a sequel to that of Stubbs v. Scott, reported in 127 Md. 86, wherein the appellant in that case, as Inspector of Buildings of Baltimore City was directed, by the writ of mandamus, to issue to the appellee a permit to erect a building as prayed for.

The present appeal is from an order dismissing the bill of complaint of the appellant in the present case, praying for an injunction to restrain the appellees from using the building, erected under the aforesaid permit, in the manner they are now doing.

It appears from the record that Walter Scott, one of the appellees, on the 18th day of June, 1915, filed his petition in the Superior Court of Baltimore City, praying that the writ of mandamus be directed to the Building Inspector of Baltimore City, requiring him to issue to the petitioner a permit for a building, to which we will refer more in detail later. The petitioner recited therein that “in or about the month of February, 1915, desiring to erect and conduct a salesroom and service station for the sale of automobiles, and for the other purposes incident to the business of such establishments,” he applied to the defendant for a permit to erect a building suitable for that business, on the lot of ground situated on the east side of St. Paul street, between Mt. Royal avenue on the north, and Preston street on the south, having a frontage on said street of one hundred and ten feet *230 ' and a depth of one hundred and twenty-two feet and six inches bach to an alley running parallel with said St. Paul street and of a width of twenty feet. It was then recited that the said permit was not granted, and that “subsequently, your petitioner, being still anxious to secure a location on said lot for the sale of automobiles, abandoned the idea of establishing a service station at the place named, and purchased said lot of ground from the owners of the same and now owns said property,” and that he again made application to the defendant “for a permit to erect on said lot four stores for general business purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the plat and specifications herewith filed. * * * That your petitioner proposes to use one of said stores for the purpose of exposing for sale, and for selling automobiles. That the other stores he proposes to rent, or if it proves to be expedient so to do to sell them when they will be used for such purposes as stores so located may be profitably used.” This application was also-refused.

The Court, after hearing the testimony, in which the petitioner fully explained the purposes for which he intended to use the building under his first application as well as under his second application, directed the writ of mandamus to issue. This Court on appeal affirmed that decree.

Chibe Judge Boyd, in delivering the opinion of the Court, on that appeal, said: “He (Stubbs) admitted that he was influenced by the facts that the plan of the building was susceptible of being used as a garage, and that the second applicant was the same person as the first applicant. He also admitted that he discredited Mr. S'cott’s good faith and his statement that he wanted it now for stores. ■* * * As we have seen, the petitioner in this case asked for a mandamus to compel the respondent to issue a permit To erect on said lot four stores for general business purposes, in accordance with the provisions of the plat and specifications herewith filed.’ The order of the lower Court directed That the writ of mandamus be forthwith issued in manner and form as prayed in said petition,’ and we can not admit, as we understood it to *231 be suggested at the argument by counsel for appellant, that the petitioner can obtain a permit, through the aid of the Court, to erect a building for purposes set out in his petition, and then after he has erected the building make use of it for purposes such as he is not entitled to use it for without first obtaining the approval of the Mayor, particularly for such purposes as his petition shows he first asked a permit for, which was refused. That would he a fraud on the Court which granted him the relief prayed for, and any attempt to perpetuate it could and should promptly he checked. We are not now called upon to1 pass on the validity of the ordinance, in so far as the particular provisions applicable to garages, etc., and numbered 5, are concerned, inasmuch as if the petitioner desired to attack the ordinance he could have done so, but, practically conceding it to be valid, abandoned further effort to get that permit and now seeks one for another avowed purpose. Hence we say he would not he permitted to erect a building, under a permit obtained by the help of the Court, for the purpose stated in the petition, and then use it for other purposes which were denied him. We do not mean to say he can not use a. store to exhibit automobiles for1 sale, as he says his intention is, but. be can not under the permit to he granted under this petition use it as a garage or service station, such as he first applied for.”

All that remains for us to determine, upon this appeal, is whether or not there has been such a use of the building as to evidence a total disregard of the reasons expressed by this Court, as to why the permit should be granted. And for this purpose, no better method can he employed than to examine the testimony of Scott, given during the1 trial of the petition for the mandamus, in reference as to what purpose he had intended to put. the building to when he first applied for the permit, and what he said his intention was on his application for the second permit, and to contrast that testimony with that in the present appeal.

“Q. Did you ever apply to the authorities in Baltimore for a permit to erect and conduct a salesroom and service station *232 for the sale of automobiles ou St. Paul street ? A. Yes, sir. Q. When was that? A. That was early in the spring, or late winter. Q. What did you contemplate having there at that time? A. A service department. Q. What is a service station ? A. It is a- service department. It is a place where you take care of cars you sell and keep them in running order, if anything gets out of order and needs attention, it is the place where you give it to ..them; they get attention there. Q. You have workmen for the purpose of repairing ? A. Yes, sir. Q. Some-blacksmithing is done?' A. No. Q. Is not that an incident to repairs that take place? A. It could but we don’t run it that way; most of the parts we get from the factory. Q. You do have hammering and noises of that kind incident to making repairs ? A. Yes, sir. Q. This peculiarity of a service station is different from some other kind of station, is it not? A. I don’t exactly get that. Q. A service station is where you repair automobiles? A. Yes; give them whatever attention is required. Q. As they come in, do you take them on storage? A. No, sir. Q. That is not an incident of a service station? A. We do not, but probably some other places do. 'Q. Is not that one of the incidents of a service station also taking them on storage? A. That is optional with the man, of course, some do.”

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Cite This Page — Counsel Stack

Bluebook (online)
101 A. 674, 131 Md. 228, 1917 Md. LEXIS 12, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mayor-of-baltimore-v-scott-md-1917.