Mayor of Baltimore v. Rowe

2 Balt. C. Rep. 445
CourtBaltimore City Circuit Court
DecidedDecember 17, 1906
StatusPublished

This text of 2 Balt. C. Rep. 445 (Mayor of Baltimore v. Rowe) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Baltimore City Circuit Court primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mayor of Baltimore v. Rowe, 2 Balt. C. Rep. 445 (Md. Super. Ct. 1906).

Opinion

NILES, J.—

In 1818 the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore acquired in fee simple the bed of Liffy Street (now West Falls Avenue). This street then bordered upon the Falls, was described as “bounding on and with the water of said Falls and extending therefrom westwardly for breadth forty feet,” and ran southwardly “to the water of the Basin.”

By the same deed the Mayor and City Council of Baltimore was granted “the exclusive right to charge and receive any wharfage, tonnage or other duties on said street,” and a letter attached to the deed shows that it was the understanding that “the corporation might, if they should deem it advisable, widen the said street or any part thereof by extending the same on the east side into the Falls.”

[446]*446Between 1818 and 1856, by accretions and artificial improvements, there had been formed considerable land to the east of Liffy Street and at the south end thereof. Out of such accretions the bed of what is now known as Block Street to the present drawbridge was formed, but the rest of the land so formed by accretion, etc., was not used either as street or wharf, but, in or about the said year of 1856, it was subdivided into ten lots and leased to various persons.

The most northerly lot, triangular in shape, with its apex toward the north, was leased to predecessors in title of the defendants in this ease, and to 'certain other of such predecessors in title was conveyed the ground rent reserved by the above-mentioned lease, and now the defendants have a conceded title to that portion of the land so made, designated on the plat filed with the agreed statement of facts as Exhibit No. 1 by the letters B, C, D, E, and marked with the number 631.

This lot is composed in part of land made between 1818 and 1856, and in part of land so made since 1S56. At present it is 54 feet 6 inches wide at its northern boundary, and 73 feet 1% inches in its southern boundary, and has a frontage of 44 feet 7 inches on West Palls Avenue, but it is only to a small wedge of this on the western side coming to a point at the northern end that the defendants have paper title under the lease before alluded to, the balance being that which they or their predecessors obtained by accretion only. But their present fee-simple title in all this lot is undisputed, or was so when it was taken by the city for dock improvements and the money allowed therefor paid to them.

When this lot, which we will hereafter call “Lot 631,” was being- extended to the east there was being formed by the very same process a triangle of land to the north much resembling in shape the southerly lot as it was whén conveyed' in 1856. This northerly triangle was formed in part by accretions and in part by the filling in incident to the erection of the improvement known as the “Jones Palls Retaining- Wall.”

In 1904 this, which we will hereafter call “Lot No. 630A,” had a frontage of 174 feet 2 inches on the West Palls Avenue, a base line of 54 feet 6 inches, running to the retaining wall of the Palls, and a frontage on .that retaining wall of 176 feet 6 inches to the beginning. It was also taken by the city for dock improvements, but title to it was claimed by both the city and the defendants in this case.

The damages allowed were paid into this court, an agreed statement of facts was filed - in this case, and it was agreed that the fund should be distributed according to the rights of the parties.

The question now before the court is: “Who was the owner of Lot 630A at the time of its condemnation a few months ago?” The main claim of the defendants is that they had title to the whole of Lot 630A by adverse possession. They also make claim that even should they have no such title there was error in apportioning the made land between Lot 631 and Lot 630A.

To sustain this latter claim they invoke, as governing this case, the rule that where there has been a change of shore line by the recession of the waters of a navigable stream, the new land is to be divided between the adjacent riparian owners extending the lines from the corners of their lots as they bounded on the original shore line, at right angles to the present current of the stream.

The defendants claim that if the lines were so run instead of in the manner actually adopted by the city, they would bo entitled to about 400 additional square feet of land.

In the view of the court upon the whole question, this claim becomes unImportant, and may, therefore, be disposed of here in a few words. The court does not understand the above to be the general rule, but only a subsidiary rule, adopted in some cases to give effect to the general rule, which is, that where there has been a change of shore line by reason of the recession of the waters of a navigable stream, the new shore line will be divided so that, as far .as possible, the relative holdings of each of the riparian owners shall be the same upon the new shore line as they were upon the old.

By the method of running the lines adopted by the city this object is almost exactly accomplished; and it is moreover, the method adopted by the owners of Lot 631 and the lot immediately south of it in the conventional [447]*447division between them of the “made” ground adjoining their holdings.

On the other hand the method of running the lines contended for by the defendants would produce considerable inequality in the relative lengths of the old and the new shore lines, as between Lot (¡31 and G30A.

For these reasons, were a decision necessary, the lines as run by the city would be held correct.

To the main contention of the defendants that they have acquired Lot G30A by adversary possession, the city makes two replies.

First. That the land so formed is simply an extension of a street or wharf; and, as against this public use, no title can be acquired by adverse possession, no matter what its character, or how long continued.

Second. Assuming that title might be so acquired, the facts contained in the “Agreed Statement” are not sufficient to prove it.

First. It seems to be law in this State, that where land is dedicated to a public use, like a street, no private person can by adverse possession acquire ownership thereof; although by disuser, abandonment and other acts and omissions, llie public may equitably ('stop itself from asserting its rights.

But in this case this court holds that these accretions never formed a street or a wharf, either in whole or in part.

It is true that the city, by its deed of 1818, had the “right" to widen the street “by extending the same eastward into the Falls,” and probably exercised this right in forming Block Street. But it never exercised this right as to the “made land” to the north of Block Street. On the contrary, in 185(5, by the leases referred to, it trea ted all the “made land” north of Block Street as subject to no public use whatever, and conveyed it to private parties.

It would seem unreasonable to hold, in the face of this action — finally settling the width of West Falls Avenue and indicating that the city considered these accretions simply as land subject to no imblic use, and to oe disposed of to the best advantage — that land subsequently made, in precisely similar manner and similarily situated, should be held a public street or wharf, although as matter of fact it was never used as either, and there is no proof in (he agreed statement of facts that it could be so used.

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Bluebook (online)
2 Balt. C. Rep. 445, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mayor-of-baltimore-v-rowe-mdcirctctbalt-1906.