Mayor, Etc., of City of N.Y. v. . Davenport

92 N.Y. 604, 1883 N.Y. LEXIS 184
CourtNew York Court of Appeals
DecidedJune 5, 1883
StatusPublished
Cited by35 cases

This text of 92 N.Y. 604 (Mayor, Etc., of City of N.Y. v. . Davenport) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering New York Court of Appeals primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mayor, Etc., of City of N.Y. v. . Davenport, 92 N.Y. 604, 1883 N.Y. LEXIS 184 (N.Y. 1883).

Opinion

Finch, J.

The causes of action pleaded were tested by a demurrer, which the courts below have sustained. The city alleged two wrongs inflicted by the State. The first was an unjust and in correct determination of taxable values by the board of equalization, which imposed upon the city more than its due share of the aggregate State tax. The second was a compulsory payment by the city, running through a period of twenty years, of taxes which could not be collected from the *610 persons assessed. Such deficiencies exceeded two millions of dollars, for which the city claimed credit as against the State.

Both causes of action encounter preliminary difficulties before the merits are reached. The right of the city to sue is denied, upon the ground that, as a municipal corporation, it has no actual interest which can be affected; that it neither owns the money which may be, nor that which has been, collected from the tax payers; that its right to receive the State tax is solely for the purposS of paying it over, and it cannot turn its agency into an ownership; and that its issue of revenue bonds is authorized only for the purpose of enabling payment to be made to the State at the same time with the other counties, and in no respect confers new or different rights upon the city. It is further objected that the relief sought, though in form against the comptroller, is in fact against the State; that the latter is in reality the substantial defendant, and cannot thus be sued; and that equity will not interpose to prevent the collection of a tax, basing its refusal upon grounds of public policy and a due regard for the necessities of the State.

These questions are all interesting, and have been elaborately argued on both sides. But we deem it better to waive their consideration, since upon other grounds we have reached the conclusion that neither cause of action can be maintained.

The first is a collateral attack upon the decision of the State board of equalization, and rests wholly upon the theory that the action of that tribunal was without adequate foundation, and both unjust and erroneous. Whether in this collateral way, through a complaint against the comptroller, to which the board is not even a party, its conclusions can be reviewed, is the primary question to be determined. The process of equalization begins with the separate counties, and through the action of their boards of supervisors. The assessors of the several towns first make out their rolls and determine the valuations. In this respect they act judicially, and any erroneous decision can only be corrected by a direct review- of their proceedings, whenever they have kept within their jurisdiction. If they have so acted, their conclusions cannot be assailed either by a *611 suit at law against them, or against those'who take the further steps toward collection based upon their action. (Barhyte v. Shepherd, 35 N. Y. 238 ; Swift v. City of Poughkeepsie) 37 id. 511; Buffalo & S. L. R. R. Co. v. Supervisors of Erie Co., 48 id. 93; People v. Trustees of Ogdensburgh) id. 390.) The assessors deliver their rolls to the supervisors, who are thereupon required to equalize the valuations between the several towns so that they shall bear a just relation to each other. This duty is also judicial. The precise question was deter-* mined in Bellinger v. Gray (51 N. Y. 610). And what their duty is as between the towns of their county is exactly the duty of the State board as between the several counties. That duty is, therefore, of a judicial character, and if they have acquired jurisdiction, any error in their judgment, or mistake in their conclusions can be asserted only in some direct proceeding for a review.

The State board is composed oí the State assessors and' the commissioners of the land office. (Laws of 1859, chap. 312.) The former are required to visit every county in the State once in two years for the purpose of ascertaining the character of the valuations, and the real value of lands assessed. They are authorized to swear and examine witnesses ; all papers and records are open to their scrutiny; and local officials are required to furnish them every needed information. The knowledge thus acquired they are directed to put in the form of a written digest for the use of the board of equalization, and the latter, acting upon its own knowledge, and that thus obtained, is required, on the first Tuesday in September in each year, to meet in the city of Albany, for “ the purpose of examining and revising the valuations of the real and personal estate of the several counties as returned to the office of the comptroller, and fixing the aggregate amount of assessment for each county, on which the comptroller shall compute the State tax.” The board, legally constituted, met at the appointed date. The county valuations returned to the comptroller were before them, and they thus had jurisdiction to revise and examine the valuations so returned. The defects *612 pointed out by the complaint were in no respect jurisdictional, and the action of the board was not even shown to be irregular. It was alleged that the board “ had before it no written digest of facts prepared by the State assessors.” The law did not so require. It did command that the assessors should make such a digest; and the complaint does not allege that it was not made. The purpose of it is declared to be to “ aid ” the board “ in the discharge of its duties.” Clearly this could not be a condition precedent to jurisdiction, for it assumes a duty entered upon in the performance of which the written digest may assist. Nothing in the complaint forbids the presumption that the digest was in fact made; that the assessors who made it were familiar with its details; that the other members of the board had seen and studied it, and thus prepared themselves for their duties ; and that it gave to each member of the hoard precisely the aid which the statute contemplated. Assuming these things, as we must, the absence of the written digest at the meeting of the board was not a matter of the least consequence.

It is further alleged that the board increased the valuation' of the city without evidence. If this means that they did not swear and examine witnesses upon the subject, that is true but immaterial. The law did not require it, and contemplated no such means of information. The State assessors had been doing that, and exhausting in each county the knowledge thus obtainable. The hoard came to the performance of its duty with adequate preparation, and exactly of the character and from the sources which the statute contemplated. If the complaint means that such information was wanting, the allegation is neutralized by the distinct admission that they had “ the general information possessed by members of the board in their acquaintance with the property contained in the State, and such oral general information as was conveyed to them by the State assessors, who had previously visited the various counties of the State,” and by the legal presumption of the proper performance of pflacial duty. It is thus sufficiently apparent that the hoard *613 had and acted upon the kind of evidence and information which the law contemplated.

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Bluebook (online)
92 N.Y. 604, 1883 N.Y. LEXIS 184, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mayor-etc-of-city-of-ny-v-davenport-ny-1883.