Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed July 2, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D25-0660 Lower Tribunal No. 24-5211-FC-04
Maylen Oramas, Petitioner,
vs.
Alejandro Eduardo Pichs Asencio, et al., Respondents.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Samantha Ruiz Cohen, Judge.
Francisco J. Vargas, Esq., P.A., and Francisco J. Vargas; Claudia L. Pernudi, Esq., P.A., and Claudia L. Pernudi, for petitioner.
Miguel San Pedro, for respondent Alejandro Eduardo Pichs Asencio.
Before MILLER, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
GORDO, J. Maylen Oramas (“Maternal Aunt”), a non-party, seeks a writ of certiorari
to quash an order denying her motion for a protective order to prevent
disclosure of financial records pursuant to an amended subpoena duces
tecum. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2). We grant the petition
for writ of certiorari and quash the order denying the Maternal Aunt’s motion
for a protective order.
I.
This action arises out of a petition filed by Yailin Oramas (“Mother”) in
the Family Division,1 seeking sole parental responsibility of her minor child who
is severely autistic and requires special care. In response, the minor child’s
father, Alejandro Asencio (“Father”), filed a counter-petition seeking shared
parental responsibility in all aspects of the minor child’s care. The Maternal
Aunt has provided childcare to the parties’ autistic minor child since 2022.
The Father served the Maternal Aunt, a non-party, with a subpoena
duces tecum for deposition seeking all documents and records (including text
messages, calendars, etc.), bank statements and tax statements for the years
2021 to the present relating to the Maternal Aunt’s care for the minor child.
1 There are two open cases involving these parties. Related case no. 2015- 28055-FC04 is in the Child Support Division and the instant case, no. 2024- 5211-FC04, is in the Family Division. Child Support Division case no. 2015- 28055 involves the Mother’s petition for child support. In that case, the Father’s current guidelines child support obligation has been established at $1,700.71/month. 2 The Mother sought a protective order seeking to prohibit the Father from
deposing, or requesting any documents from, the Maternal Aunt “on the
grounds that discovery targeted at [the Maternal Aunt] is meant to significantly
annoy, embarrass or cause undue expense to the Mother while having little or
no relevance to the issue of parental responsibility in this case.” Alternatively,
the Mother requested that discovery be limited to issues relevant to parental
responsibility only.
The Family Division court entered an order on the Mother’s motion for
protective order, allowing the Father to depose the Maternal Aunt. That order,
however, limited the deposition to issues relevant to parental responsibility
only, and specified that “no questions as to finances shall be permitted as there
are no financial issues in this case.” It did not address the financial discovery
documents that were subpoenaed.
The Maternal Aunt subsequently filed a motion for protective order,
asserting that the documents the Father seeks are irrelevant to his child
support obligations which were previously determined and were not at issue in
this case and the request is overly burdensome, overly broad and infringes on
the Maternal Aunt’s privacy. The Maternal Aunt further contended that the
Family Division’s order allowing her deposition also limited the deposition to
issues relevant to parental responsibility only, and that “no questions as to
finances shall be permitted as there are no financial issues in this case.” 3 At the hearing on the Maternal Aunt’s motion, the trial court expressed
its concern that child support had not been raised in the pleadings, and the
court was unsure that the financial issue was properly before the Family
Division, rather than the Child Support Division. It is also apparent from the
record that the trial court sought to ascertain the relevance of the Maternal
Aunt’s finances to the parental responsibility issue, and whether there were
less intrusive means of acquiring the information. Nevertheless, the trial court
accepted the Father’s theory that the Mother is receiving child support for
childcare for which she is not paying or properly documenting. The trial court
denied the Maternal Aunt’s motion for a protective order, concluding the
requested financial documents were relevant and there are no other less
restrictive means of obtaining the information. This petition followed.
II.
“Certiorari review of the order denying a protective order is threefold: we
must determine whether (1) the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of the law, (2) the petitioner will suffer a material injury, and (3)
there is no other adequate remedy.” Gay v. Gay, 367 So. 3d 1273, 1274 (Fla.
5th DCA 2023). “The last two requirements are often combined into the
concept of irreparable harm, which must be found before an appellate court
may even consider whether there has been a departure from the essential
requirements of the law.” Id. at 1274-75 (quoting Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. 4 v. Dumigan, 151 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
An order compelling production of documents containing private financial
information regarding a non-party is reviewable by certiorari because the non-
party has no adequate remedy by appeal. Rowe v. Rodriguez-Schmidt, 89 So.
3d 1101, 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Borck v. Borck, 906 So. 2d 1209, 1211
(Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Kauffman v. Duran, 165 So. 3d 805, 806 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015). The production of financial information, by its very nature and without
a showing of relevancy to the underlying lawsuit, causes irreparable harm.
Rowe, 89 So. 3d at 1103-04. “[T]hird party financial records . . . are of the
utmost sensitivity and are not discoverable unless the party seeking discovery
establishes a need for the discovery sufficient to overcome the privacy rights
of the third party.” Rousso v. Hannon, 146 So. 3d 66, 69-70 (Fla. 3d DCA
2014). “This heightened standard is necessary because the disclosure of
personal financial information may cause irreparable harm to a person forced
to disclose it, in a case in which the information is not relevant[.]” Id. at 70
(internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Borck, 906 So. 2d at 1211
(“Article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution protects the financial
information of persons if there is no relevant or compelling reason to compel
disclosure.”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280.
Privacy interests may be overcome, and sensitive information produced, 5 if the information is relevant to the lawsuit. Relevancy is established by the
pleadings or evidence. Inglis v. Casselberry, 200 So. 3d 206, 210-11 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2016); see also Elsner v. E-Com.
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Third District Court of Appeal State of Florida
Opinion filed July 2, 2025. Not final until disposition of timely filed motion for rehearing.
No. 3D25-0660 Lower Tribunal No. 24-5211-FC-04
Maylen Oramas, Petitioner,
vs.
Alejandro Eduardo Pichs Asencio, et al., Respondents.
A Writ of Certiorari to the Circuit Court for Miami-Dade County, Samantha Ruiz Cohen, Judge.
Francisco J. Vargas, Esq., P.A., and Francisco J. Vargas; Claudia L. Pernudi, Esq., P.A., and Claudia L. Pernudi, for petitioner.
Miguel San Pedro, for respondent Alejandro Eduardo Pichs Asencio.
Before MILLER, GORDO and BOKOR, JJ.
GORDO, J. Maylen Oramas (“Maternal Aunt”), a non-party, seeks a writ of certiorari
to quash an order denying her motion for a protective order to prevent
disclosure of financial records pursuant to an amended subpoena duces
tecum. We have jurisdiction. Fla. R. App. P. 9.030(b)(2). We grant the petition
for writ of certiorari and quash the order denying the Maternal Aunt’s motion
for a protective order.
I.
This action arises out of a petition filed by Yailin Oramas (“Mother”) in
the Family Division,1 seeking sole parental responsibility of her minor child who
is severely autistic and requires special care. In response, the minor child’s
father, Alejandro Asencio (“Father”), filed a counter-petition seeking shared
parental responsibility in all aspects of the minor child’s care. The Maternal
Aunt has provided childcare to the parties’ autistic minor child since 2022.
The Father served the Maternal Aunt, a non-party, with a subpoena
duces tecum for deposition seeking all documents and records (including text
messages, calendars, etc.), bank statements and tax statements for the years
2021 to the present relating to the Maternal Aunt’s care for the minor child.
1 There are two open cases involving these parties. Related case no. 2015- 28055-FC04 is in the Child Support Division and the instant case, no. 2024- 5211-FC04, is in the Family Division. Child Support Division case no. 2015- 28055 involves the Mother’s petition for child support. In that case, the Father’s current guidelines child support obligation has been established at $1,700.71/month. 2 The Mother sought a protective order seeking to prohibit the Father from
deposing, or requesting any documents from, the Maternal Aunt “on the
grounds that discovery targeted at [the Maternal Aunt] is meant to significantly
annoy, embarrass or cause undue expense to the Mother while having little or
no relevance to the issue of parental responsibility in this case.” Alternatively,
the Mother requested that discovery be limited to issues relevant to parental
responsibility only.
The Family Division court entered an order on the Mother’s motion for
protective order, allowing the Father to depose the Maternal Aunt. That order,
however, limited the deposition to issues relevant to parental responsibility
only, and specified that “no questions as to finances shall be permitted as there
are no financial issues in this case.” It did not address the financial discovery
documents that were subpoenaed.
The Maternal Aunt subsequently filed a motion for protective order,
asserting that the documents the Father seeks are irrelevant to his child
support obligations which were previously determined and were not at issue in
this case and the request is overly burdensome, overly broad and infringes on
the Maternal Aunt’s privacy. The Maternal Aunt further contended that the
Family Division’s order allowing her deposition also limited the deposition to
issues relevant to parental responsibility only, and that “no questions as to
finances shall be permitted as there are no financial issues in this case.” 3 At the hearing on the Maternal Aunt’s motion, the trial court expressed
its concern that child support had not been raised in the pleadings, and the
court was unsure that the financial issue was properly before the Family
Division, rather than the Child Support Division. It is also apparent from the
record that the trial court sought to ascertain the relevance of the Maternal
Aunt’s finances to the parental responsibility issue, and whether there were
less intrusive means of acquiring the information. Nevertheless, the trial court
accepted the Father’s theory that the Mother is receiving child support for
childcare for which she is not paying or properly documenting. The trial court
denied the Maternal Aunt’s motion for a protective order, concluding the
requested financial documents were relevant and there are no other less
restrictive means of obtaining the information. This petition followed.
II.
“Certiorari review of the order denying a protective order is threefold: we
must determine whether (1) the trial court departed from the essential
requirements of the law, (2) the petitioner will suffer a material injury, and (3)
there is no other adequate remedy.” Gay v. Gay, 367 So. 3d 1273, 1274 (Fla.
5th DCA 2023). “The last two requirements are often combined into the
concept of irreparable harm, which must be found before an appellate court
may even consider whether there has been a departure from the essential
requirements of the law.” Id. at 1274-75 (quoting Holmes Reg’l Med. Ctr., Inc. 4 v. Dumigan, 151 So. 3d 1282, 1284 (Fla. 5th DCA 2014)) (internal quotation
marks omitted).
An order compelling production of documents containing private financial
information regarding a non-party is reviewable by certiorari because the non-
party has no adequate remedy by appeal. Rowe v. Rodriguez-Schmidt, 89 So.
3d 1101, 1103 (Fla. 2d DCA 2012); Borck v. Borck, 906 So. 2d 1209, 1211
(Fla. 4th DCA 2005); Kauffman v. Duran, 165 So. 3d 805, 806 (Fla. 3d DCA
2015). The production of financial information, by its very nature and without
a showing of relevancy to the underlying lawsuit, causes irreparable harm.
Rowe, 89 So. 3d at 1103-04. “[T]hird party financial records . . . are of the
utmost sensitivity and are not discoverable unless the party seeking discovery
establishes a need for the discovery sufficient to overcome the privacy rights
of the third party.” Rousso v. Hannon, 146 So. 3d 66, 69-70 (Fla. 3d DCA
2014). “This heightened standard is necessary because the disclosure of
personal financial information may cause irreparable harm to a person forced
to disclose it, in a case in which the information is not relevant[.]” Id. at 70
(internal quotations and citation omitted); see also Borck, 906 So. 2d at 1211
(“Article I, section 23, of the Florida Constitution protects the financial
information of persons if there is no relevant or compelling reason to compel
disclosure.”); Fla. R. Civ. P. 1.280.
Privacy interests may be overcome, and sensitive information produced, 5 if the information is relevant to the lawsuit. Relevancy is established by the
pleadings or evidence. Inglis v. Casselberry, 200 So. 3d 206, 210-11 (Fla. 2d
DCA 2016); see also Elsner v. E-Com. Coffee Club, 126 So. 3d 1261, 1264
(Fla. 4th DCA 2013) (finding no departure from the essential requirements of
law where the financial information requested was relevant to the issues as
framed by the pleadings and the complaint provided a reasonable evidentiary
basis for the financial discovery).
III.
Under the circumstances of this case, the Maternal Aunt has met the
initial “irreparable harm” hurdle for certiorari relief. Neither the Father’s
pleadings nor the record in this case establishes the relevancy of the Maternal
Aunt’s financial records to the Father’s counter-petition for shared parental
responsibility. Thus, the Maternal Aunt has shown irreparable harm based on
the principle that production of financial information from a non-party, by its
very nature and without a showing of relevancy to the underlying lawsuit,
causes harm that cannot be remedied on appeal. See Carter v. Carter, 3 So.
3d 397, 398 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009) (holding although personal financial
information is subject to discovery when it is relevant, “it may cause irreparable
harm to a person who is forced to disclose it when the information is not
relevant” (citing Friedman v. Heart Inst. of Port St. Lucie, Inc., 863 So. 2d 189
(Fla. 2003))). 6 The burden of proving relevancy of the Maternal Aunt’s private financial
information is on the Father, the party seeking the information. See Spry v.
Pro. Emp. Plans, 985 So. 2d 1187, 1188-89 (Fla. 1st DCA 2008). The Father’s
pleadings in this case do not mention the Maternal Aunt or his speculation that
the Mother and the Maternal Aunt have somehow conspired to misapply his
child support payments. The trial court also made no findings to support its
conclusion that the requested documents were relevant or unavailable by less
intrusive means. “When confidential information is sought from a non-party,
the trial court must determine whether the requesting party establishes a need
for the information that outweighs the privacy rights of the non-party.” Rousso,
146 So. 3d at 70 (quoting Westco, Inc. v. Scott Lewis’ Gardening & Trimming,
Inc., 26 So. 3d 620, 622 (Fla. 4th DCA 2009)). None of the issues as framed
by the Father’s counter-petition are sufficient to justify intrusion into non-party
Maternal Aunt’s private financial records. Certainly, the current standing order
in the Family Division precludes the Father from inquiring into any financial
issues and limits his inquiry to issues of parental responsibility only.
Although the Maternal Aunt’s showing of irreparable harm is sufficient,
we observe that the record also clearly shows that there are less intrusive
means available to the Father for obtaining the Mother’s records of childcare
payments to the Maternal Aunt. See Berkeley v. Eisen, 699 So. 2d 789, 792
(Fla. 4th DCA 1997) (“[M]eans less intrusive than the release of confidential 7 information should be used where available.”). The parties acknowledged, and
the record indicates, the Mother already provided check stubs documenting
some of her payments to the Maternal Aunt for childcare. Whatever
documentation remains outstanding can be sought directly from the Mother.
Accordingly, we grant the petition for writ of certiorari and quash the order
denying the Maternal Aunt’s motion for a protective order.
Petition granted; order quashed.