Mayfield v. Mayfield

CourtCourt of Appeals of Tennessee
DecidedJuly 30, 1998
Docket03A01-9803-CV-00112
StatusPublished

This text of Mayfield v. Mayfield (Mayfield v. Mayfield) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals of Tennessee primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mayfield v. Mayfield, (Tenn. Ct. App. 1998).

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF TENNESSEE AT KNOXVILLE FILED July 30, 1998

Cecil Crowson, Jr. Appe llate Court C lerk KENNETH RAY MAYFIELD, SR. ) BRADLEY CIRCUIT ) Plaintiff/Appellee ) NO. 03A01-9803-CV-00112 ) v. ) HON. JOHN B. HAGLER, JR. ) JUDGE NANCY PRECELLA MAYFIELD, ) ) Defendant/Appellant ) AFFIRMED

D. Mitchell Bryant, Cleveland, for the Appellant. Appellee filed no brief and made no appearance.

MEMORANDUM O P I N I O N 1

INMAN, Senior Judge

Nancy Precella Mayfield [“Wife”] appeals from the judgment of the trial

court granting her a divorce based upon the inappropriate marital conduct of

Kenneth Ray Mayfield, Sr. [ “Husband”]. She contends on appeal that the

settlement agreement was obtained through threats and coercion.

Wife appeared before the court with counsel on June 2, 1997 for a

hearing on a motion for temporary support. She again appeared on September

5, 1997 with counsel and, under oath, testified that she and Husband had

reached a settlement agreement.

On October 7, 1997, Wife filed a “Motion to Set Aside Previously

Announced Agreement” in which she alleged that Husband had coerced her into

agreeing to the settlement of September 5, 1997.

1 Affirm ance W ithout O pinion - M emor andum Opinio n. (b) The Court, w ith the con currenc e of all judges participating in the case, may affirm, reverse or modify the actions of the trial court by memorandum opinion when a formal opinion would have no precedential value. When a case is decided by memorandum opinion it shall be designated “MEMORA NDUM OPINION ,” shall not be published, and shall not be cited or relied on fo r any reas on in a su bseque nt unrelate d case. [A s amen ded by order filed April 22 , 1992.] On October 27, 1997, the trial court entered a Final Decree of divorce

which adopted and incorporated the terms of the marital dissolution agreement.

On appeal, Wife asks this Court to set aside the final decree and alleges

that Husband, on the evening of September 4, 1997, coerced her to appear in

court the following morning and agree to the terms of the divorce.

As stated, at the time of the hearing, the trial judge placed both parties

under oath and each testified that the marital dissolution agreement was their

agreement. Wife and her counsel had ample opportunity at that time to retract

her agreement and complain that it had been obtained through duress. She

testified otherwise under oath, and will not be heard now to refute her own

testimony. See, Meadows v. Meadows, slip op., No. 1102 (Tenn. App. May 13,

1987).

The judgment of the trial court is affirmed at the cost of the appellant.

_______________________________ William H. Inman, Senior Judge CONCUR:

_______________________________ Herschel P. Franks, Judge

_______________________________ Don T. McMurray, Judge

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