IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT
___________________
No. 96-40226 Summary Calendar
STEVEN EDWARD MAYFIELD, Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JACK A. ELLETT, Sheriff, Panola County, Defendant-Appellee.
________________________________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Texas (6:95-CV-246) ________________________________________________
October 29, 1996 Before GARWOOD, JOLLY and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.*
GARWOOD, Circuit Judge:
Plaintiff-appellant Steven Edward Mayfield (Mayfield), a
former inmate of the Panola County Jail (jail) now confined by the
Texas Department of Criminal Justice (TDCJ) at the Boyd Unit in
Teague, Texas, proceeding pro se and in forma pauperis, filed this
civil rights action under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 complaining of alleged
constitutional violations during his confinement in the jail. The
* Pursuant to Local Rule 47.5, the Court has determined that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent except under the limited circumstances set forth in Local Rule 47.5.4. only named defendant in Mayfield’s action was Jack Ellett, the
sheriff of Panola County, Texas. Mayfield asserted various claims
regarding improper medical treatment, inadequate dietary
accommodations, improper cell lighting, and inadequate outdoor
recreation. Mayfield’s action was referred to a magistrate judge
who conducted an evidentiary hearing. At the evidentiary hearing,
both the treating physician and Panola County’s chief deputy in
charge of the jail testified regarding Mayfield’s claims. Mayfield
cross-examined each witness. The parties consented to jurisdiction
by the magistrate judge. After the hearing, but before final
judgment was entered, the Panola County chief deputy jailor served
Mayfield with an arrest warrant for perjury. Upon consideration of
the pleadings and the evidence presented at the hearing, the
magistrate judge dismissed with prejudice Mayfield’s claims as
frivolous. Mayfield sent a letter to the district court
complaining about the perjury charge and requesting an injunction
of the state court perjury prosecution. Before the magistrate
judge ruled on the injunction, Mayfield filed his notice of appeal
of the earlier dismissal. The magistrate judge subsequently denied
Mayfield’s request for an injunction. For the following reasons we
affirm the magistrate judge’s dismissal of Mayfield’s civil rights
action.
Facts and Proceedings Below
On March 19, 1995, Texas Department of Public Safety (DPS)
2 officers stopped the motor home in which Mayfield was traveling for
a traffic violation. Mayfield was arrested after the DPS officers
and a deputy sheriff from Panola County found marihuana inside the
motor home. According to Mayfield, police officers at the scene
would not permit him to retrieve his spectacles, clothes, or
hypertension medication which were inside a bag in the motor home.
Mayfield testified that the two medications left in the motor home
were Procardia (twenty milligram capsules) and Inderal (eighty
milligram capsules). The officers brought Mayfield to the Panola
County Jail in Carthage, Texas.
Mayfield contends that at the jail he informed the booking
officers of the medication he was taking for hypertension and
tuberculosis. Mayfield further contends that, in addition to the
information he supplied to the booking officer regarding his need
for medication and his medical condition, he made requests for
medication to both John de Presca (de Presca), the chief deputy in
charge of the jail, and the floor deputies. Mayfield also asserts
that he placed phone calls to various citizens of Carthage
requesting that they call the jail on his behalf. Although
contradicted by de Presca, Mayfield claims that he requested to see
a physician virtually every day until March 28, 1995, when he was
finally taken to the Panola County Hospital.
At the Panola County Hospital, Mayfield provided additional
medical information to a receptionist and an attending nurse.
Mayfield’s temperature was taken and he received an
3 electrocardiogram (EKG) test. The treating physician was Dr. Gary
Wynn Swink (Swink). Dr. Swink testified that he prescribed Inderal
and Adalat CC for Mayfield’s heart problems and INH (Isoniazid) for
Mayfield’s tuberculosis. Dr. Swink testified that Adalat CC is
identical to Procardia and is not a generic form; rather, according
to Dr. Swink, Adalat is simply Procardia produced by a different
company——in both cases the generic drug is nifedipine. Dr. Swink
also testified that, although he prescribed Inderal, he gave the
pharmacy permission to substitute a generic form, Propanoil, which
was actually given to Mayfield. According to Mayfield, he informed
Dr. Swink that he had had prior reactions to different forms of
Procardia and requested the capsule form. Dr. Swink told Mayfield
that there was no difference between the drugs and refused to
prescribe the form of Procardia requested. Mayfield concluded that
Dr. Swink’s refusal to prescribe the specific form of Procardia
requested was based solely on cost considerations. Mayfield was
returned to the Panola County Jail where he took the prescribed
medications for about a week. Mayfield testified that he stopped
taking the medication when he experienced a skin reaction.
On April 10, 1995, Mayfield filed this suit against sheriff
Ellett in the Eastern District of Texas alleging improper medical
attention, lack of outside recreation, inadequate dietary
accommodations, improper cell lighting, and the improper refusal of
his request to retrieve his spectacles and clothes from his motor
home when he was initially arrested. Specifically, Mayfield
4 complained that, in addition to his denial of requested medical
treatment, he was forced to inhabit a cell in which a bunk light
designed to “dim” during sleeping hours remained fully illuminated;
was denied a special low salt/low fat diet more appropriate for his
heart condition; was denied outdoor recreation because the
detainees residing in the jail received sunlight only through a
skylight in the indoor gymnasium; and was denied his clothing and
prescription spectacles left in his motor home. The initial
complaint requested only equitable relief.
On April 12, 1995, Mayfield pleaded guilty to possession of
marihuana and was sentenced to five years’ imprisonment.
On April 19, 1995, de Presca ordered Mayfield to be placed in
isolation for medical reasons. At the time of his isolation,
Mayfield had some form of skin rash. Mayfield remained in
isolation until May 1, 1995. On April 20, 1995, a Panola County
deputy again took Mayfield to the Panola County Hospital. Mayfield
informed the nurse that the medication prescribed by Dr. Swink on
March 28, 1995, had caused a severe skin reaction. Mayfield left
the hospital before he could be seen by Dr. Swink because the
deputy escorting him was called away.
On April 24, 1995, a letter from Mayfield dated April 19,
1995, was received by the Eastern District of Texas and assigned to
the magistrate judge responsible for his complaint. The letter
complained of the skin reaction and the magistrate judge construed
it as a motion for preliminary injunctive relief seeking medical
5 treatment.
On April 25, 1995, Mayfield again visited the Panola County
Hospital and was seen by Dr. Swink. Mayfield told Dr. Swink that
he had awakened to blood in his mouth and eye and that his right
cheek was swollen. The nurse, however, found no swelling in that
area. Mayfield told the nurse that he had noticed white spots on
his skin after he began taking the Adalat and the Propanoil and
therefore had stopped taking the medication three weeks earlier.
Dr. Swink testified that he overheard Mayfield’s conversation with
the nurse and called the jail to get Mayfield’s medication records,
which indicated that Mayfield had refused medication for only two
days. According to Dr. Swink, when confronted with the discrepancy
between Mayfield’s earlier contention that he had stopped taking
the medicine three weeks prior to his visit and the medication
records, Mayfield became argumentative and was excused from the
emergency room. Dr. Swink testified that he directed Mayfield to
continue to take the prescribed medication. At the time of
Mayfield’s third visit to the hospital, Dr. Swink observed no
physical side effects on Mayfield’s person.
On May 4, 1995, Mayfield was transferred to the custody of the
TDCJ. While in the custody of the TDCJ, Mayfield has been
prescribed Nitroglycerine, Metro PR, Lasix, Fosinopril, and
Prazosin. Mayfield’s blood pressure has remained high throughout
his custody. Also on May 4, the magistrate judge recommended
denial of Mayfield’s motion for preliminary injunctive relief.
6 On June 15, 1995, the district court adopted the magistrate
judge’s recommendation to dismiss Mayfield’s motion for preliminary
injunctive relief on the grounds that, as Mayfield was no longer in
the Panola County Jail, his request for preliminary injunctive
relief was moot.
On August 8, 1995, the magistrate judge recommended dismissal
of Mayfield’s civil rights action, which also sought solely
equitable and injunctive relief, on the grounds that Mayfield’s
transfer to the TDCJ rendered his action moot. Mayfield thereafter
added a claim for damages in his objections to the magistrate
judge’s recommendation on August 18, 1995. Mayfield’s supplemental
complaint sought $1 million compensatory damages and $1 million
punitive damages.
As a result of Mayfield’s new damage claims, the magistrate
judge withdrew the recommendation for dismissal on October 10,
1995.
A hearing under Spears v. McCotter, 766 F.2d 179 (5th Cir.
1985), was held before the magistrate judge on January 24, 1996, at
which Mayfield, Dr. Swink, and Chief Deputy de Presca testified.
At the Spears hearing, the parties consented to jurisdiction by the
magistrate judge.
On February 5, 1996, a letter from Mayfield was received by
the Eastern District of Texas requesting an injunction of a pending
state perjury prosecution brought by Deputy Sheriff de Presca
7 allegedly in retaliation for Mayfield’s civil rights complaint.
On February 6, 1996, the magistrate judge dismissed with
prejudice Mayfield’s civil rights action on the grounds that the
claims were frivolous. In making her decision, the magistrate
judge construed all testimony given by Mayfield as true and
considered all other testimony only to the extent it did not
contradict that given by Mayfield.
On February 12, 1996, Mayfield filed a complaint seeking the
injunctive relief requested in his letter received by the district
court on February 5, 1996.
On February 20, 1996, Mayfield filed a notice of appeal of the
magistrate judge’s dismissal of his civil rights action.
On February 21, 1996, the magistrate judge denied Mayfield’s
request for injunctive relief.
Before this Court is Mayfield’s appeal from the magistrate
judge’s dismissal of his civil rights complaint.
Discussion
An in forma pauperis complaint is subject to dismissal as
frivolous if it is unsupportable in law or fact. Reeves v.
Collins, 27 F.3d 174, 176 (5th Cir. 1994) (citing Denton v.
Hernandez, 112 S.Ct. 1728, 1733 (1992)). Such a dismissal is
reviewed under the abuse of discretion standard. Id.
As a threshold matter, we recognize that the events and
circumstances that Mayfield asserts violate his constitutional
8 rights largely occurred during the period he resided at the jail as
a pretrial detainee. From his initial arrest and incarceration at
the jail on March 19, 1995, until his guilty plea and conviction on
April 12, 1995, Mayfield was a pretrial detainee rather than a
convicted inmate.
The Panola County Jail houses both pretrial detainees and
convicted prisoners awaiting transfer to the TDCJ. We have long
recognized, however, that each group “look[s] to different
constitutional provisions for their respective rights to basic
needs such as medical care and safety.” Hare v. Corinth, 74 F.3d
633, 639 (5th Cir. 1996) (en banc) (citing Estelle v. Gamble, 97
S.Ct. 285, 291 (1976)). Whereas convicted state prisoners are
protected by the Eighth Amendment’s prohibition on cruel and
unusual punishment and, to a limited degree, substantive due
process, pretrial detainees are protected by the “procedural and
substantive due process guarantees of the Fourteenth Amendment.”
Id. Accordingly, conditions of confinement may “constitute
deprivations of liberty without due process if they amount to
punishment of the detainee.” Harris v. Angelina County, 31 F.3d
331, 334 (5th Cir. 1994); see also Hare, 74 F.3d at 639 (“The State
cannot punish a pretrial detainee.”) (citing Bell v. Wolfish, 99
S.Ct. 1861, 1872 (1979)). A proper determination of whether a
condition of confinement of a pretrial detainee amounts to
punishment “turns on whether ‘the disability is imposed for the
9 purpose of punishment or whether it is but an incident of some
other legitimate governmental purpose.’” Harris, 31 F.3d at 334
(quoting Bell, 99 S.Ct. at 1873); see also Bell, 99 S.Ct. at 1874
(“Thus, if a particular condition or restriction of pretrial
detention is reasonably related to a legitimate governmental
objective, it does not, without more, amount to ‘punishment.’”).
Given the heightened due process protection afforded pretrial
detainees, it is apparent that confinement conditions violative of
the Eighth Amendment are assuredly violative of a pretrial
detainee’s due process rights as well. See Hare, 74 F.3d at 639;
Harris, 31 F.3d at 334.
When a pretrial detainee challenges “general conditions,
practices, rules, or restrictions of pretrial confinement,” the
Bell test applies——the challenged policy or condition must be
reasonably related to a legitimate governmental interest, such as
security. Hare, 74 F.3d at 643. When, however, a pretrial
detainee challenges a jailor’s “episodic acts or omissions, the
Bell test is inapplicable, and hence the proper inquiry is whether
the official had a culpable state of mind in acting or failing to
act.” Id. (adopting a standard of subjective deliberate
indifference as the measure of culpability for episodic acts or
omissions).
We note, as did the magistrate judge, that Mayfield named only
sheriff Jack Ellett in his complaint; no other members of the
10 sheriff’s staff were added and no amended complaint was filed.
Section 1983, of course, does not support respondeat superior
liability. Monell v. Department of Social Svcs., 98 S.Ct. 2018,
2036-38 (1978); Lefall v. Dallas Indep. Sch. Dist., 28 F.3d 521,
525 (5th Cir. 1994); Mouille v. City of Live Oak, 977 F.2d 924, 929
(5th Cir.), cert. denied, 113 S.Ct. 2443 (1993); Thompkins v. Belt,
828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987). Without a showing that Sheriff
Ellett participated personally in the allegedly unconstitutional
treatment, his liability——deriving solely from his capacity as
Panola County’s elected sheriff——requires a finding that he
established or implemented a policy that was itself a repudiation
of constitutional rights and was the “‘moving force of the
constitutional violation.’” Thompkins, 828 F.2d at 304 (quoting
Monell, 98 S.Ct. at 2037). The same is true insofar as Ellett was
sued in his official capacity, that is insofar as the suit may be
regarded as one against the county. Id. Mayfield concedes that he
spoke with sheriff Ellett only once, after the filing of his
action. Mayfield also conceded that his complaint (at least as
respects claimed inadequate medical attention) centers on the
actions of others.
I. Inadequate Medical Attention
In order to prevail on his inadequate medical attention claim,
Mayfield must either establish that there was a condition,
practice, rule, or restriction that prevented adequate medical
11 care, Hare, 74 F.3d at 643, or that an episodic act or omission
resulted from the defendant’s “deliberate indifference,” id. As
Mayfield neither asserts nor offers evidence of such a condition,
practice, rule, or restriction, and, in fact, acknowledges that the
jail had a system designed to gather medical information, alert
officers to the need for medical attention, and provide for free,
accessible medical services and medication, his claim for
inadequate medical attention rests entirely on his ability to
establish deliberate indifference on the part of the defendant
sheriff Ellett.
As this Court instructed in Hare, for challenges to episodic
acts or omissions of jail officials that resulted in inadequate
medical attention, the Farmer standard of deliberate indifference
applies. Hare, 74 F.3d at 643. Farmer held:
“[A] prison official cannot be found liable . . . unless the official knows of and disregards an excessive risk to inmate health or safety; the official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Farmer v. Brennan, 114 S.Ct. 1970, 1979 (1994); see also Reeves, 27 F.3d at 176 (applying Farmer standard to an inadequate medical attention claim).
Under this standard, neither “[u]nsuccessful medical treatment” nor
“‘[m]ere negligence, neglect or medical malpractice’” gives rise to
a section 1983 cause of action. Varnado v. Lynaugh, 920 F.2d 320,
321 (5th Cir. 1991) (citations omitted). We have stated that delay
in medical care can only constitute a cognizable section 1983 claim
12 if the delay in treatment results in substantial harm. See Mendoza
v. Lynaugh, 989 F.2d 191, 195 (5th Cir. 1993) (addressing the issue
in the Eighth Amendment context).
In light of the foregoing principles, we find no merit in
Mayfield’s inadequate medical attention claim and affirm the
magistrate judge’s dismissal. First, assuming as true Mayfield’s
contention that he suffered a nine-day delay in receiving medical
attention, he offered no evidence that it was the delay——rather
than some other factor such as stress, age, or the normal
vicissitudes of life in a detention facility——that caused his
condition to worsen. Second, Mayfield has failed to establish that
he has suffered substantial harm from the purported delay.
Instead, Mayfield’s argument is directed more at the course of
treatment rather than the delay in receiving medical attention. On
three separate occasions Mayfield was taken to the Panola County
Hospital. On two of those visits, he was examined by the attending
physician, Dr. Swink. Dr. Swink presented uncontroverted testimony
that he prescribed medication that he believed to be in the best
interest of Mayfield’s health. Although Mayfield contends that the
medication provided was “wrong,” such an assertion, even if true,
does not affect the merits of his section 1983 claim. And, we note
that Mayfield himself discontinued his medication and refused to
follow the medical course of treatment prescribed by his physician.
Finally, there is no evidence tending to establish the necessary
13 connection to Ellett (or the county) in respect to the matters
complained of, as required by Tomkins as discussed above;
respondeat superior simply does not suffice. Accordingly, we find
that the magistrate judge was well within her discretion to dismiss
the inadequate medical attention claim.
II. Outdoor Recreation
Mayfield’s second claim asserts that the failure of the Panola
County Jail to offer pretrial detainees outdoor recreation amounts
to an unconstitutional punishment. Presumably, Mayfield relies on
the statement in this Court’s opinion in Miller v. Carson, 563 F.2d
741 (5th Cir. 1977), that:
“We find that the continuous incarceration of presumably innocent persons in an institution designed to punish, where outdoor recreation is reasonably possible, is unnecessarily restrictive and therefore punishes the innocent in violation of procedural due process.” Id. at 750.
From the outset, we note that the facts presented in Miller are
starkly different from the facts here presented. First, Miller was
a “totality-of-conditions” case involving shockingly inhumane
overall conditions that warranted general, systemic remedies beyond
the redress of specific constitutional violations. See id. at 745,
751. Second, Miller was decided before Bell, 99 S.Ct 1861, and its
broad characterization of the right to outdoor recreation would
seem, at the very least, to be tempered by the Supreme Court’s
articulation of the standard for evaluating the constitutionality
14 of pretrial confinement conditions.1
In assessing the merit of Mayfield’s claim that he was denied
outdoor exercise in contravention of his constitutional rights, we
must return to the guiding principles set forth in Bell. More than
anything else, Bell warned that, when “determining whether
restrictions or conditions are reasonably related to the
Government’s interest in maintaining security and order and
operating the institution in a manageable fashion,” Bell, 99 S.Ct.
at 1875 & n.23, federal courts should weigh heavily the axiom that
“‘[s]uch considerations are peculiarly within the province and
professional expertise of corrections officials, and, in the
absence of substantial evidence in the record to indicate that the
officials have exaggerated their response to these considerations,
courts should ordinarily defer to their expert judgment in such
matters,’” id. (citation omitted). Bell went on to consider
1 The panel opinion in Jones v. Diamond, 594 F.2d 997, 1013 (5th Cir. 1979), vacated on reh’g, 636 F.2d 1364 (5th Cir.) (en banc), cert. dismissed, 102 S.Ct. 27 (1981), noting that Miller stated that pretrial detainees “may not be continuously incarcerated in an institution designed to punish, where outdoor recreation is reasonably possible,” held that “[t]his does not reach so far as to hold that every pretrial detainee in every jail is automatically entitled as a matter of constitutional right to outdoor exercise.” On rehearing, the en banc court was evenly divided on the issue, resulting in an affirmance of the district court’s denial of relief. Jones, 636 F.2d at 1376. In Green v. Ferrell, however, we reversed a magistrate judge’s injunction requiring a jail to provide outdoor exercise in the absence of specific findings of medical harm, 801 F.2d 765, 771-72 (5th Cir. 1986) (noting that pretrial detainees in the detention facility, who were included in the plaintiff class, spent, on average, only ten days in the jail).
15 several factors in evaluating the restrictions there at issue.
First, the Court observed that nearly all of the detainees were
released within sixty days of their incarceration. Id. at 1876.
Second, the Court stated that, although pretrial detainees retain
certain constitutional rights, these rights were subject to
restrictions and limitations. Id. at 1877. Third, the Court
observed that “maintaining institutional security and preserving
internal order and discipline” may require circumscription of the
retained constitutional rights of convicted prisoners and pretrial
detainees alike. Id. at 1878 (noting that there “is no basis for
concluding that pretrial detainees pose any lesser security risk
than convicted inmates. Indeed, it may be that in certain
circumstances they present a greater risk to jail security and
order.”); see also Block v. Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. 3227, 3231 (1984)
(“The very fact of nonrelease pending trial thus is a significant
factor bearing on the security measures that are imperative to
proper administration of a detention facility.”).
In light of the factors considered, Bell proceeded to uphold
the federal detention facility’s “publisher only” rule regarding
the permissible receipt of reading materials, id. at 1881; the
restriction limiting the receipt of personal packages to food items
at Christmas, id. at 1882; the facility’s “shakedown” procedures
prohibiting inmates from observing cell searches, id. at 1883-84;
and, finally, the facility’s strip search procedures requiring body
16 cavity searches after each contact visit, id. at 1884-85. The
Court held that the restrictions imposed were of limited duration
and that the complainants failed to meet their “heavy burden of
showing that the[] officials have exaggerated their response to the
genuine security considerations that actuated these restrictions
and practices.” Id. at 1886.
Mayfield testified that, although he was permitted regular
access to the dayroom and the jail gymnasium, he was never afforded
outdoor recreation. Mayfield concedes that the gymnasium had a
frosted skylight, but argues, without any indication of supporting
evidence, that this was inadequate. Chief Deputy de Presca
testified that the Panola County Jail has no outdoor recreation
facility and that the skylight was installed in the gymnasium in
1985 to meet the state requirement that inmates be given access to
sunlight. De Presca further testified that inmates, including
Mayfield, were given access to the gymnasium at least three times
weekly, at least one hour at a time. Mayfield did not dispute
this.
Given the physical constraints of the Panola County Jail
facility, we are convinced that the facts alleged by Mayfield would
not even arguably suffice to sustain a finding that he was
unconstitutionally punished within the meaning of the Fourteenth
Amendment. As Bell recognized that ensuring security and order at
detention facilities is a permissible nonpunitive objective, we
17 cannot say that the scheme employed at the Panola County Jail
facility does not strike a permissible balance between meeting that
permissible objective and affording inmates needed recreation and
sunlight to the extent reasonably——and practically——available.2
See Block v. Rutherford, 104 S.Ct. at 3234 (stating that a federal
court’s “balancing” of a detention facility’s security measures
against the importance of family visits resulted in impermissible
substitution of the court’s views regarding prison administration).
Whatever remains of the general language set forth in Miller after
Bell and Green, we are quite certain that it does not confer a
constitutional right to exercise in unfiltered sunlight in an
otherwise acceptable custodial facility regardless of the
facility’s physical constraints. To hold otherwise would fly in
the face of Bell’s admonition against becoming enmeshed in the
minutiae of prison operations.
Accordingly, we hold that the magistrate judge did not abuse
her discretion by dismissing Mayfield’s claim regarding inadequate
outdoor recreation as frivolous.
III. Inadequate Diet Accommodations
In his initial complaint, Mayfield asserted that the Panola
County Jail violated his constitutional rights by denying him a
2 We also note that Mayfield did not testify or adduce any evidence that he ever requested outdoor exercise. In addition, Mayfield’s heart condition, provided it was as serious as claimed, may well have precluded any exercise during his stay at the Panola County Jail.
18 special diet. In his brief, Mayfield does not elaborate on his
position other than to assert that he requested a special diet.
The magistrate judge’s opinion concluded that Mayfield was not
entitled to a special diet because his treating physician
determined that it was not medically necessary, citing Cupit v.
Jones, 835 F.2d 82, 86 (5th Cir. 1987). Mayfield has failed to
adequately raise any issue on appeal in this respect. See Lott v.
Hargett, 80 F.3d 161, 166 (5th Cir. 1996); R.A.M. Al-Ra’id v.
Ingle, 69 F.3d 28, 31 (5th Cir. 1995); Brinkman v. Dallas County
Deputy Sheriff Abner, 813 F.2d 744, 748 (5th Cir. 1987).
IV. Injunction of the State Perjury Prosecution
Mayfield argues that the magistrate judge abused her
discretion by her denial of his motion for an injunction of the
state court perjury prosecution. The issue, however, is not before
the Court and we therefore decline to address Mayfield’s
contention.
A timely notice of appeal is a jurisdictional prerequisite for
this Court to consider an appeal. See Robbins v. Maggio, 750 F.2d
405, 408 (5th Cir. 1985) (citing Fed. R. App. P. 4(a)). Mayfield’s
notice of appeal is dated February 16, 1996, and was filed on
February 20, 1996. It has never been amended. Mayfield has filed
no other notice of appeal. The February 16, 1996, notice of
appeal, filed February 20, refers exclusively to the magistrate
judge’s February 6, 1996, denial of Mayfield’s civil rights action.
19 The magistrate judge’s order denying Mayfield’s request for
injunctive relief was filed and entered on the docket on February
21, 1996.
This Court therefore lacks jurisdiction to consider the
propriety of the magistrate judge’s order denying injunctive relief
as to the state perjury prosecution.3
V. Other claims
Mayfield does not appeal, and we do not address, the
magistrate judge’s dismissal of his claims regarding his cell
lighting, his spectacles, and his clothing.
Conclusion
Because the magistrate judge was well within her discretion to
dismiss Mayfield’s civil rights action as frivolous, and because
the denial of Mayfield’s motion for injunctive relief is not before
this Court, we AFFIRM.
3 Although a “‘notice of appeal typically divests the district court of jurisdiction,’” Resolution Trust Co. v. Smith, 53 F.3d 72, 76 (5th Cir. 1995), (quoting Alberti v. Klevenhagen, 46 F.3d 1347, 1358 (5th Cir. 1995)), a “‘district court maintains jurisdiction as to matters not involved in the appeal.’” id. (quoting Farmhand, Inc. v. Anel Eng’g Indus., 693 F.2d 1140, 1145 (5th Cir. 1982)). Accordingly, as Mayfield’s notice of appeal was filed before the magistrate judge’s denial of his motion for injunctive relief, it failed to divest the magistrate judge of jurisdiction of that matter.