Mayen v. Countrywide Home Loans, Inc.

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
• Decided: June 4, 2026
• Docket: 24-6421
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JUN 4 2026 MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK U.S. COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT

JULIO MAYEN, No. 24-6421 D.C. No. Plaintiff - Appellant, 3:23-cv-01915-RBM-AHG v. MEMORANDUM*

COUNTRYWIDE HOME LOANS, INC.; MORTGAGE ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION SYSTEMS, INC.; THE BANK OF NEW YORK MELLON, as Trustee for the Certificate Holders of CWMBS, Inc. formerly known as The Bank of New York; CHL MORTGAGE PASS- THROUGH TRUST 2005-07; MORTGAGE PASS-THROUGH CERTIFICATES SERIES 2005-07; NEWREZ, LLC, doing business as Shellpoint Mortgage Servicing,

Defendants - Appellees.

Appeal from the United States District Court for the Southern District of California Ruth Bermudez Montenegro, District Judge, Presiding

Submitted May 29, 2026**

* This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3. ** The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2). Before: RAWLINSON, FRIEDLAND, and VANDYKE, Circuit Judges.

Plaintiff-Appellant Julio Mayen appeals from the district court’s judgment

dismissing, based on judicial estoppel, his claims against Defendants-Appellees for

breach of fiduciary duty, breach of contract, alleged securities-regulation and

consumer-protection violations, and declaratory relief. He also appeals the district

court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration of the dismissal order. We have

jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291, and we affirm.

We review for abuse of discretion the district court’s application of the

doctrine of judicial estoppel. Ah Quin v. Cnty. of Kauai Dep’t of Transp., 733 F.3d

267, 270 (9th Cir. 2013). We review de novo constitutional claims. Guerrier v.

Garland, 18 F.4th 304, 308 (9th Cir. 2021). “Ordinarily, we review a district court’s

decision to deny a party leave to amend its complaint for an abuse of discretion,” but

“if a district court denies leave to amend based on the futility of the amendment …,

we review the decision de novo.” Kroessler v. CVS Health Corp., 977 F.3d 803, 807

(9th Cir. 2020). We review for abuse of discretion a district court’s denial of a

motion to reconsider. See Sch. Dist. No. 1J, Multnomah Cnty. v. ACandS, Inc., 5

F.3d 1255, 1262 (9th Cir. 1993).

1. The district court did not abuse its discretion in holding that Mayen’s

claims were barred by judicial estoppel. The Supreme Court has “listed three factors

that courts may consider in determining whether to apply the doctrine of judicial

2 24-6421 estoppel.” Hamilton v. State Farm Fire & Cas. Co., 270 F.3d 778, 782 (9th Cir.

2001). “First, a party’s later position must be clearly inconsistent with its earlier

position.” New Hampshire v. Maine, 532 U.S. 742, 750 (2001) (citation modified).

“Second, courts regularly inquire whether the party has succeeded in persuading a

court to accept that party’s earlier position, so that judicial acceptance of an

inconsistent position in a later proceeding would create ‘the perception that either

the first or the second court was misled.’” Id. (quoting Edwards v. Aetna Life Ins.

Co., 690 F.2d 595, 599 (6th Cir. 1982)). “A third consideration is whether the party

seeking to assert an inconsistent position would derive an unfair advantage or impose

an unfair detriment on the opposing party if not estopped.” Id. at 751. Although

these factors do not amount to “inflexible prerequisites or an exhaustive formula for

determining the applicability of judicial estoppel,” id., the Ninth Circuit “has

restricted the application of judicial estoppel to cases where the court relied on, or

‘accepted,’ the party’s previous inconsistent position,” Hamilton, 270 F.3d at 783.

Here, all three New Hampshire factors favor the district court’s application of

judicial estoppel. Mayen does not contest the district court’s conclusion on the first

factor: that Mayen “asserted inconsistent positions in his three bankruptcy cases and

the instant case by not disclosing any claims against the [d]efendants in his

bankruptcy schedules.” And the district court did not abuse its discretion in

determining, with respect to the second and third factors, that “the bankruptcy court

3 24-6421 accepted [Mayen]’s position by granting automatic stays for the duration of his three

bankruptcies” and that Mayen “derived an unfair advantage by receiving the benefit

of automatic stays without disclosing all of his potential assets.” That Mayen did

not obtain plan confirmation or discharge in his bankruptcy cases, does not mean

that the district court abused its discretion in this respect. See Hamilton, 270 F.3d at

784–85.

Mayen’s heavy reliance on Ah Quin is misplaced. Essential to the Ah Quin

decision was the “key factor” that the plaintiff in that case “reopened her bankruptcy

proceedings and filed amended bankruptcy schedules that properly listed [the claim

at issue] as an asset.” 733 F.3d at 272. Here, Mayen concedes he never sought to

reopen his bankruptcy proceedings to file amended bankruptcy schedules.

2. Mayen’s constitutional arguments—that the district court’s disposition of

the case violated the Seventh Amendment and that the district court used judicial

estoppel “to extinguish jury-triable, property-based claims without due process of

law”—lack merit. Dismissal based on valid procedural grounds without a jury trial

does not violate the Seventh Amendment. See, e.g., In re U.S. Fin. Sec. Litig., 609

F.2d 411, 422 & n.34 (9th Cir. 1979). And the record does not support Mayen’s

contention that he was deprived of “adequate process.”

3. The district court did not err in denying leave to amend. Given the district

court’s conclusion that Mayen’s claims were “barred by judicial estoppel,” the

4 24-6421 district court’s conclusion that “amendment would be futile” was not erroneous.

Mayen cites to no authority to support the proposition that dismissal based on

judicial estoppel must be without prejudice, and we have found none.

4. For the reasons discussed above—and because Mayen failed to show any

grounds for reconsideration independent of his arguments regarding the merits of

the district court’s dismissal—the district court did not abuse its discretion in

denying reconsideration.

AFFIRMED.1

1 Mayen’s motions for judicial notice (Dkt. Nos. 3, 44) are denied.

5 24-6421