Mayberry v. Schlarf

CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Indiana
DecidedSeptember 24, 2024
Docket3:23-cv-00064
StatusUnknown

This text of Mayberry v. Schlarf (Mayberry v. Schlarf) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Indiana primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mayberry v. Schlarf, (N.D. Ind. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT NORTHERN DISTRICT OF INDIANA SOUTH BEND DIVISION

TIMOTHY MARCUS MAYBERRY,

Plaintiff,

v. CAUSE NO. 3:23-CV-64-JD-JEM

JENNA SCHLARF,

Defendant.

OPINION AND ORDER Timothy Marcus Mayberry, a prisoner without a lawyer, is proceeding in this case “against Jenna Schlarf in her individual capacity for compensatory and punitive damages for retaliating against him for filing a lawsuit and prison complaint against her by refusing to mail his outgoing legal correspondence, reopening some of his legal correspondence and placing them in different envelopes, improperly tampering with his remittance slips for legal mail postage causing the postage to be denied, taking three of his books from his cell, and issuing a false conduct report against him in September 2022, in violation of the First Amendment[.]” ECF 9 at 4-5. Caseworker Schlarf filed a motion for summary judgment, arguing Mayberry did not exhaust his administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit. ECF 36. Mayberry filed a response, and Caseworker Schlarf filed a reply. ECF 54, ECF 55, ECF 56, ECF 57. The summary judgment motion is now fully briefed and ripe for ruling. Summary judgment must be granted when “there is no genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(a). A genuine issue of material fact exists when “the evidence is such that a reasonable [factfinder] could [find] for the nonmoving party.”

Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). To determine whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, the court must construe all facts in the light most favorable to the non-moving party and draw all reasonable inferences in that party’s favor. Heft v. Moore, 351 F.3d 278, 282 (7th Cir. 2003). A party opposing a properly supported summary judgment motion may not rely merely on allegations or denials in its own pleading but must “marshal and present the court with the evidence she contends will

prove her case.” Goodman v. Nat’l Sec. Agency, Inc., 621 F.3d 651, 654 (7th Cir. 2010). Prisoners are prohibited from bringing an action in federal court with respect to prison conditions “until such administrative remedies as are available are exhausted.” 42 U.S.C. § 1997e(a). “[A] suit filed by a prisoner before administrative remedies have been exhausted must be dismissed; the district court lacks discretion to resolve the

claim on the merits, even if the prisoner exhausts intra-prison remedies before judgment.” Perez v. Wisconsin Dep’t of Corr., 182 F.3d 532, 535 (7th Cir. 1999); see also Chambers v. Sood, 956 F.3d 979, 984-85 (7th Cir. 2020). “Failure to exhaust is an affirmative defense that a defendant has the burden of proving.” King v. McCarty, 781 F.3d 889, 893 (7th Cir. 2015).

The law takes a “strict compliance approach to exhaustion.” Lockett v. Bonson, 937 F.3d 1016, 1025 (7th Cir. 2019) (citing Dole v. Chandler, 438 F.3d 804, 809 (7th Cir. 2006)). To exhaust remedies, “a prisoner must file complaints and appeals in the place, and at the time, the prison’s administrative rules require.” Id. (citing Pozo v. McCaughtry, 286 F.3d 1022, 1025 (7th Cir. 2002)). However, a prisoner can be excused from failing to exhaust if the grievance process was effectively unavailable. Woodford v. Ngo, 548 U.S.

81, 102 (2006). “A prisoner is required to exhaust only available administrative remedies and a remedy is not available if essential elements of the procedure for obtaining it are concealed.” Hurst v. Hantke, 634 F.3d 409, 411 (7th Cir. 2011) (quotation marks and citation omitted). Moreover, when prison staff hinder an inmate’s ability to use the administrative process, administrative remedies are not considered “available.” Kaba v. Stepp, 458 F.3d 678, 684 (7th Cir. 2006). In essence, “[p]rison officials may not take unfair

advantage of the exhaustion requirement . . . and a remedy becomes ‘unavailable’ if prison employees do not respond to a properly filed grievance or otherwise use affirmative misconduct to prevent a prisoner from exhausting.” Dole, 438 F.3d at 809. In her summary judgment motion, Caseworker Schlarf argues Mayberry did not exhaust his available administrative remedies before filing this lawsuit because he

submitted a relevant grievance but did not appeal the grievance office’s denial of that grievance. ECF 37. In his response, Mayberry concedes he didn’t fully exhaust any relevant grievance but argues his administrative remedies were unavailable because the Grievance Specialist didn’t properly respond to his “Emergency Grievance.” ECF 55. The parties provide evidence showing the following facts: On September 28,

2022, Mayberry submitted an “Emergency Grievance” complaining that Caseworker Schlarf entered his cell and unjustly confiscated several books. ECF 36-3 at 5. At the top of the grievance, Mayberry wrote “EMERGENCY: I am being targeted by IDOC staff member Schlarf.” Id. On October 13, 2022, Mayberry submitted a “Request for Interview” form to the Grievance Specialist informing him he hadn’t received any receipt or response to his Emergency Grievance. ECF 54-1 at 9. On October 20, 2022,

before Mayberry received any receipt or response to his Emergency Grievance, he filed this lawsuit. ECF 3. On October 31, 2022, the grievance office registered Mayberry’s Emergency Grievance as Grievance 146650 and issued a receipt, indicating it had “received” the grievance on October 28, 2022. Id.1 On November 29, 2022, the grievance office denied Grievance 146650 on its merits because Caseworker Schlarf had a valid reason for confiscating the books. Id. at 3. Mayberry never appealed this response, but

instead sent a response to the grievance office that “this response is out of time frame and therefore moot.” Id. at 1; ECF 36-1 at 7-8; ECF 36-4 at 3. Here, it is undisputed Mayberry didn’t fully exhaust Grievance 146650. But Mayberry argues his administrative remedies were unavailable because the grievance office did not properly respond to Grievance 146650 as an Emergency Grievance, which

left him without any available remedies. ECF 55 at 6-9. The Offender Grievance Process defines an “Emergency Grievance” as “The resolution of a grievance that, if subjected to the normal time limits, could cause the grievant substantial risk of personal injury or irreparable harm.” ECF 36-2 at 2. It is undisputed Mayberry labeled Grievance 146650 as an Emergency Grievance, and

Caseworker Schlarf does not dispute that designation. ECF 57.2

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Related

Elrod v. Burns
427 U.S. 347 (Supreme Court, 1976)
Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc.
477 U.S. 242 (Supreme Court, 1986)
Woodford v. Ngo
548 U.S. 81 (Supreme Court, 2006)
Goodman v. National Security Agency, Inc.
621 F.3d 651 (Seventh Circuit, 2010)
Hurst v. Hantke
634 F.3d 409 (Seventh Circuit, 2011)
Dole v. Chandler
438 F.3d 804 (Seventh Circuit, 2006)
Marshall King v. Robert McCarty
781 F.3d 889 (Seventh Circuit, 2015)
Jeremy Lockett v. Tanya Bonson
937 F.3d 1016 (Seventh Circuit, 2019)
Jonathan Chambers v. Kul Sood
956 F.3d 979 (Seventh Circuit, 2020)

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Mayberry v. Schlarf, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mayberry-v-schlarf-innd-2024.