May v. duPont

229 A.2d 784, 43 Del. Ch. 334, 1967 Del. LEXIS 272
CourtSupreme Court of Delaware
DecidedApril 27, 1967
StatusPublished
Cited by1 cases

This text of 229 A.2d 784 (May v. duPont) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Supreme Court of Delaware primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
May v. duPont, 229 A.2d 784, 43 Del. Ch. 334, 1967 Del. LEXIS 272 (Del. 1967).

Opinion

HERRMANN, Justice:

This appeal presents the question of whether the respondent co-executor is justified in refusing to join with his two co-executors, petitioners herein, in the distribution of the residuary estate, to themselves [786]*786as testamentary trustees, before final tax clearances.

The basic facts of the case appear in our earlier opinion. See 216 A.2d 870. On July 9, 1965, soon after the earlier appeal was initiated, the petitioners, as a majority of the executors, delivered the residuary assets to the trustees on the ground that, because of 12 Del.C. § 3525,1 a transfer at that time was in the best interests of the beneficiaries.

Following remand in the earlier appeal, the petitioners filed a supplemental petition asserting that the respondent’s refusal to join in the delivery of the residuary assets was arbitrary, contumacious2 and unreasonable; and, on that basis, the petitioners prayed that judgment be entered (1) declaring the respondent’s consent to the transfer unnecessary and the delivery valid and effective when made; or (2) declaring that the respondent is estopped from denying the validity of the delivery; or (3) requiring the respondent to join in the delivery.

The respondent filed a supplemental counter-petition seeking a mandatory order directing the petitioners to return the assets to the executors on the basis of this Court’s rulings in the earlier appeal.

The Chancery Court deferred decision on the respondent’s counter-petition pending trial on the merits of the petition. After trial, the Chancery Court held (1) that the matter was before it not under 12 Del.C. § 2312 but under the Chancery Court’s general jurisdiction over fiduciaries3 ; (2) that the security furnished by the petitioners in connection with the delivery of the assets “is sufficient to fully indemnify the executors, and each of them, against any loss by reason of a possible additional assessment of estate or inheritance taxes”; and (3) that the respondent’s conduct is arbitrary, contumacious, and unreasonable because “he is simply standing upon his legal right to prevent the transfer of the residuary assets.” Thereupon, the Trial Court entered a judgment declaring that the delivery of the residuary assets by the two petitioners was valid and effective; the supplemental counter-petition was dismissed. The respondent appeals.

The keystone of the respondent’s present position is that the transfer of the residuary assets before final tax clearances undermines his duties and powers as executor.

In our earlier opinion (216 A.2d 870, 872), we confirmed the general rule, controlling unless modified by will, that an act not in the regular course of the administration of an estate requires unanimous action by the executors. The will here involved provides that the acts of a majority of the three trustees be binding on all; but there is no such provision as to the executors. Therefore, the general rule applies to the executors in this case.

[787]*787The respondent asserts that the estate is exposed to a potential liability for additional Federal and State taxes, pointing to a recent claim against the estate by the United States for additional taxes in excess of $34,000,000. That claim remains unsettled. The respondent contends that it is his responsibility and his right4 as executor to have an effective voice in the disposition of this and any other tax claim against the estate; that by virtue of the delivery of the assets to the trustees, he will be disenfranchised in such determinations because the trustees will “automatically have the right to make tax determinations”, and they may act without his concurrence under the majority rule governing the trustees.5

The respondent takes the same position regarding the determination of reasonable fees for legal services rendered the estate.

For these reasons, the respondent asserts that he is reasonable in his refusal to join with his co-executors in the transfer of the assets to the trustees; that, therefore, his declination so to do is not arbitrary and contumacious.

The respondent does not now question the sufficiency of the security for the protection of the executors, the subject of much concern in our earlier opinion. The security is contested by the respondent on but two grounds: that it is inconsistent with (1) the provision of the will that taxes shall be paid by the executors from the estate, and (2) the duty of the trustees to make unconditional distributions to the remaindermen. It is manifest on the record that these were not the reasons for the respondent’s refusal to join in the transfer of assets. Therefore, these contentions are irrelevant to the issue now before us.

We find a fundamental fallacy in the respondent’s position: with respect to settlement of tax claims against the estate and the determination of proper fees for legal services to the estate, the respondent has not been relieved or deprived of his duties and powers as executor by the delivery of the assets to the trustees. The powers and duties of the executors did not pass to the trustees by virtue of the transfer of assets; and the trustees may not properly engage in any act or function that falls within the scope of the powers and duties of the executors.

Executors do not become functus officio by delivery of the residuary assets of the estate; indeed, it would appear that, in this State, the office of executor continues even after final settlement of the estate, unless the executor is discharged upon his own request or is removed for cause.

At common law, the office of an executor continued during his lifetime. In Hulburd v. Commissioner of Internal Revenue, 296 U.S. 300, 56 S.Ct. 197, 201, 80 L.Ed. 242 (1935), Justice Cardozo set forth the common law scope and duration of an executor’s powers, duties, and liabilities as follows:

“By the common law of England an executor was deemed to carry forward the persona of the testator. * * * Unless the appointment was qualified in respect of time, it continued during life. * * * There was no such thing as a discharge upon a showing of plene ad-ministravit. There was no such thing as a resignation because of' mere unwillingness to go on. * * * The power to act might be suspended or revoked through the appointment of a committee or a receiver if the executor was found [788]*788to be physically or mentally incapable. * * * There might be like relief if he had become insolvent after probate or had disappeared or had misappropriated the assets or otherwise abused his trust. * * * Nothing short of clear necessity would cause him to be ousted. In the absence of peril to the estate, responsibility and power were not to be renounced when once they had been assumed. So the law of England continues even now.”

See also 3 Woerner, The American Law of Administration, § 571.

In this State, it appears that the common law rule governing the duration of the office of executor remains generally unchanged by statute or judicial decision and is preserved by our practice. While there is statutory provision for the discharge of an executor upon his own request (12 Del.C.

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Jones v. Taylor
348 A.2d 188 (Court of Chancery of Delaware, 1975)

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Bluebook (online)
229 A.2d 784, 43 Del. Ch. 334, 1967 Del. LEXIS 272, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/may-v-dupont-del-1967.