Maxine Collova and Cheryl Saul v. HV Global Management Corporation

• Court: District Court, N.D. California
• Decided: June 24, 2026
• Docket: 7:26-cv-04216
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 8 NORTHERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 9

10 MAXINE COLLOVA and CHERYL SAUL, Case No. 26-cv-04216-NC 11 Plaintiffs, ORDER GRANTING 12 PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION TO v. REMAND UNDER 28 U.S.C. § 13 1447(C) HV GLOBAL MANAGEMENT 14 CORPORATION, Re: ECF 15 15 Defendant.

16 17 Defendant HV Global Management removed this case to this Court from the 18 California Superior Court, Monterey County. ECF 1. Plaintiffs Maxine Collova and 19 Cheryl Saul then moved to remand this case to state court. ECF 15. Defendant HV Global 20 Management opposed Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. ECF 17. The issue is whether the 21 removal was timely. The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand because the Court 22 is not persuaded that the Notice of Removal was timely filed. ECF 1; ECF 15. 23 I. PROCEDURAL BACKGROUND 24 Plaintiffs Collova and Saul filed a Complaint against Defendants Marriott Vacations 25 Worldwide Corporation, HV Global Management, and Does 1–100 on June 2, 2025, in the 26 California Superior Court, Monterey County. ECF 1, Exh. A. Plaintiffs served the 27 Complaint to HV Global Management on October 16, 2025. ECF 1, Exh. D. Plaintiffs 1 on February 3, 2026. ECF 12, Lucia Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs later dismissed Marriott 2 Vacations Worldwide, leaving HV Global Management as the sole defendant. ECF 1, 3 Exh. K ¶ 5. Plaintiffs then submitted discovery responses to HV Global Management’s 4 (Defendant) Request for Statement of Damages on March 24, 2026, and to Defendant’s 5 Request for Admission on April 7, 2026. ECF 9 at 3. 6 Prior to being served with Plaintiffs’ Complaint, Defendant’s Insurance Claims 7 Specialist wrote in email to Plaintiffs’ counsel on August 4, 2025, that if Plaintiffs assert 8 an amount in controversy over $75,000, the case will be removed to federal court pursuant 9 to diversity jurisdiction based on Plaintiffs’ Arizona residence. ECF 12, Exh. 4. 10 On May 7, 2026, Defendant removed the case to federal court pursuant to diversity 11 jurisdiction. ECF 1. On May 12, 2026, this Court issued an Order to Show Cause (OSC), 12 ordering Defendant to explain why the removal was timely, specifically why it could not 13 “first be ascertained” that the case was removable when Defendant was served with 14 Plaintiffs’ responses to Defendant’s Request for Statement of Damages on March 24, 15 2026. ECF 8 at 2. Plaintiffs were also given the opportunity to respond. Id. Defendant 16 timely filed an OSC response on May 19, 2026. ECF 9. Plaintiffs also timely filed an 17 OSC response on May 26, 2026. ECF 12. On June 3, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a Motion to 18 Remand. ECF 15. On June 17, 2026, Defendant filed an opposition to Plaintiffs’ Motion 19 to Remand. ECF 17. On June 24, 2026, Plaintiffs filed a reply to Defendant’s opposition. 20 ECF 18. 21 All parties have consented to U.S. magistrate judge jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 22 636(c). ECF 11; ECF 13. 23 II. LEGAL STANDARD 24 A. Removal 25 An action is removable to a federal court only if it might have been brought there 26 originally. See 28 U.S.C. § 1441(a). “The burden of establishing federal jurisdiction is 27 upon the party seeking removal, and the removal statute is strictly construed against 1 Removal can be based on diversity jurisdiction where the amount in controversy exceeds 2 $75,000 and the case is between citizens of different states. 28 U.S.C. § 1332(a)(1). 3 The notice of removal must be filed “within 30 days after the receipt by the 4 defendant . . . of a copy of the initial pleading,” or if the case stated by the initial pleading 5 is not removable, then “within 30 days after receipt by the defendant . . . of an amended 6 pleading . . . from which it may first be ascertained” that the case is removable. 28 U.S.C. 7 § 1446(b)(2), (3). 8 B. Remand 9 “A motion to remand is the proper procedure for challenging removal.” Moore- 10 Thomas v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 553 F.3d 1241, 1244 (9th Cir. 2009) (citing 28 U.S.C. § 11 1447(c)). Removal statutes are “strictly construed, and any doubt about the right of 12 removal requires resolution in favor of remand.” Id. (citing Gaus v. Miles, Inc., 980 F.2d 13 564, 566 (9th Cir. 1992)). This strong presumption against removal jurisdiction means that 14 “the defendant always has the burden of establishing that removal is proper.” Gaus, 980 15 F.2d at 566. 16 III. ANALYSIS 17 Plaintiffs move to remand because they argue Defendant failed to file its Notice of 18 Removal “within 30 days” of, when Defendant could have first ascertained removability 19 under diversity jurisdiction, which Plaintiffs allege occurred upon receipt of the Statement 20 of Damages on March 24, 2026.1 ECF 15 at 2–3. Defendant argues that it could not have 21 ascertained removability until it received Plaintiffs’ April 7, 2026, discovery responses, 22 and thus, its May 7, 2026, removal was timely. ECF 17 at 2. The Court assesses when 23 Defendant could have first ascertained an amount in controversy exceeding $75,000 and 24 25

26 1 The parties do not dispute, and the Court agrees, that diversity jurisdiction exists. ECF 1 at 2 (Defendant alleging complete diversity and that the amount in controversy exceeds 27 $75,000); ECF 12 at 4–6 (Plaintiffs not disputing complete diversity or the amount in 1 complete diversity, and finds that Defendant failed to prove that the Notice of Removal 2 was timely filed. 3 A. Amount in Controversy 4 Plaintiffs assert that the amount in controversy exceeding $75,000 is apparent from 5 the First Amended Complaint served to Defendant on February 3, 2026. ECF 12 at 4, 6 Lucia Decl. ¶ 13. Plaintiffs also allege that Defendant was aware of the damages upon 7 receipt of the Statement of Damages on March 24, 2026. ECF 12 at 4–5. Defendant 8 agrees that the Statement of Damages from March 24, 2026, put it on notice of the amount 9 in controversy. ECF 9 at 7. 10 The Court agrees with Plaintiffs that the amount in controversy was established “no 11 later than when Plaintiffs’ Statement of Damages were served on March 24, 2026.” ECF 12 12 at 5. As such, setting aside the issue of diversity, Defendant was required to file its 13 Notice of Removal within 30 days of March 24, 2026, which was April 23, 2026. 28 14 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2), (3). 15 B. Complete Diversity 16 There is no dispute that Defendant is domiciled in Delaware, and Defendant was put 17 on notice of this by the Complaint served to Defendant on October 16, 2025. ECF 1 at 6, 18 Exh. A at 2, Exh. D. Although the parties agree that Plaintiffs are domiciled in Arizona, 19 they disagree over the date Defendant could have first ascertained Plaintiffs’ domiciles to 20 establish complete diversity. ECF 9 at 5–7; ECF 12 at 5–6. 21 Plaintiffs argue that Defendant was able to ascertain Plaintiffs’ domiciles by 22 October 16, 2025, when it was served with Plaintiffs’ Complaint, but Defendant counters 23 that Plaintiffs’ Complaint was not enough to ascertain their domiciles because it only 24 alleges residence and not “domicile, citizenship, or intent to remain in Arizona.” ECF 9 at 25 2; ECF 12 at 5–6. Defendant argues instead that Plaintiffs’ discovery responses on April 26 7, 2026, “were the first papers that supplied a record to confirm Plaintiffs’ Arizona 27 domicile,” and therefore, Defendant’s May 7, 2026, Notice of Removal was timely. ECF 9 1 The Ninth Circuit has determined that citizenship of a natural person depends on 2 domicile, not residence. Kanter v. Warner-Lambert Co., 265 F.3d 853, 857 (9th Cir. 3 2001). However, the Ninth Circuit also explicitly disagreed that “evidence of residency 4 can never establish citizenship.” Mondragon v. Capital One Auto Fin., 736 F.3d 880, 886 5 (9th Cir. 2013). It found that “district courts are permitted to make reasonable inferences 6 from facts in evidence” based on “‘the entire record’ to determine whether evidence of 7 residency can properly establish citizenship.” Id. It also held that “determination of an 8 individual’s domicile involves a number of factors (no single factor controlling), including: 9 current residence, . . . location of spouse and family.” Lew v. Moss, 797 F.2d 747, 750 (9th 10 Cir. 1986). The Court therefore considers the entire record and makes reasonable 11 inferences to determine whether allegations of Plaintiffs’ residence in the Complaint and 12 First Amended Complaint were enough to make removability “unequivocally clear and 13 certain.” Dietrich v. Boeing Co., 14 F.4th 1089, 1091 (9th Cir. 2021). 14 The Court finds that Defendant could have ascertained complete diversity when it 15 was served with the Complaint and the First Amended Complaint, on October 16, 2025, 16 and on February 3, 2026, respectively. Plaintiffs’ Complaint and First Amended 17 Complaint do not merely allege that Plaintiffs currently reside in Arizona, but also that 18 they have been residing in Arizona since and when the incident occurred on June 3, 2023. 19 ECF 1, Exh. A at 2–3, Exh. E at 2. The Ninth Circuit has “widely accepted” that “a party 20 with the burden of proving citizenship may rely on the presumption of continuing 21 domicile, which provides that, once established, a person’s state of domicile continues 22 unless rebutted with sufficient evidence of change.” See Mondragon, 736 F.3d at 885. 23 Indeed, even Defendant cited to Plaintiffs’ First Amended Complaint as proof that 24 Plaintiffs are “resident[s] and citizen[s] of . . . Arizona” in its Notice of Removal. ECF 1 25 at 6. Thus, Defendant did not have to look beyond the Complaint and First Amended 26 Complaint to determine Plaintiffs’ citizenship. 27 Defendant also fails to explain to the Court why it needed additional information 1 identified that they were Arizona residents since at least June 2023 in their Complaint and 2 First Amended Complaint. ECF 1, Exh. A at 2, Exh. E at 2. Plaintiffs’ April 7 responses 3 merely “confirm[ed],” as Defendant acknowledges, that Plaintiffs’ residence has remained 4 the same “for the past five years, from July 2005 to the present.” ECF 1 at 6 (Defendant 5 alleging that “Plaintiffs discovery responses confirm their domicile”); ECF 9 at 3. As 6 such, Plaintiffs’ April 7 responses, like the Complaint and First Amended Complaint, did 7 not explicitly allege that “either Plaintiff is domiciled in Arizona, intends to remain in 8 Arizona, or is a citizen of Arizona.” ECF 17 at 3. And like the March 24 Statement of 9 Damages, the April 7 responses also “did not mention domicile, citizenship, intent to 10 remain, voter registration, tax residence, driver’s licenses, property ownership, location of 11 personal and professional activities, or any domicile-related fact.” Id. Defendant has not 12 explained to the Court how simply alleging additional past residence in Plaintiffs’ April 7 13 responses “materially changed the jurisdictional record” for Plaintiffs’ domiciles such that 14 it previously could not ascertain diversity jurisdiction. ECF 9 at 6. 15 This is especially so because Plaintiffs allege, and Defendant does not dispute, that 16 Plaintiffs never asserted any other residence, address, or inference that their home is not in 17 Arizona, or that they do not intend to remain in Arizona at any time during their ongoing 18 three-year communications with Defendant from 2023 to present. ECF 12 at 1, 6. For 19 example, Plaintiffs used the same location address in their medical records and timeshare 20 purchase agreement, both of which Defendant already had possession of prior to 2026. 21 ECF 12 at 6. Plaintiffs also did not object when Defendant’s Insurance Claims Specialist 22 emailed Plaintiffs’ counsel on August 4, 2025, that “plaintiffs are Arizona residents,” and 23 implied their Arizona citizenship by threatening removal upon an amount of controversy 24 over $75,000. ECF 12, Exh. 4. While “a mailing address, a residence allegation, and a 25 settlement communication do not establish domicile as a matter of law,” the Court 26 examines them as part of the record to help determine whether evidence of residence can 27 properly establish citizenship. ECF 17 at 2. In light of the entire record, it is reasonable to 1 infer that complete diversity was first ascertainable by October 16, 2025, and at least 2 before Defendant received Plaintiffs’ April 7 responses. 3 In conclusion, an examination of the entire record with reasonable inferences shows 4 that removability was “‘unequivocally clear and certain’” by March 24, 2026, when it 5 could be “first ascertained” by Defendant that: (1) the amount in controversy exceeds 6 $75,000 based on Plaintiffs’ Statement of Damages dated March 24, 2026, and (2) the 7 parties were completely diverse based on the entire record, specifically from the Complaint 8 and the First Amended Complaint, which Defendant was served on October 16, 2025, and 9 on February 3, 2026, respectively. ECF 1, Exh. A, Exh. D, Exh. E; ECF 9 at 7; ECF 12 at 10 4, 6, Lucia Decl. ¶ 13; Dietrich, 14 F.4th at 1091. As such, March 24, 2026, triggered the 11 30-day removal clock, and Defendant should have filed the Notice of Removal by April 12 23, 2026. 28 U.S.C. § 1446(b)(2), (3). Defendant has not overcome the strong 13 presumption against removal jurisdiction to prove that its Notice of Removal, filed May 7, 14 2026, was timely. ECF 1; Gaus, 980 F.2d at 566. 15 C. The Removal Timing Defect Is Procedural and Warrants Remand Because 16 It Was Not Waived 17 The untimeliness of the Notice of Removal constitutes a procedural defect. Maniar 18 v. F.D.I.C., 979 F.2d 782, 784 (9th Cir. 1992). 19 “Because procedural defects are waivable, a district court lacks authority to remand 20 based on the defendant’s violation of § 1446(b)’s . . . time limitation absent a timely filed 21 motion to remand.” Smith v. Mylan Inc., 761 F.3d 1042, 1045 (9th Cir. 2014). A motion 22 to remand based on a procedural defect must be made within 30 days after the notice of 23 removal was filed. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 24 Here, the Notice of Removal was filed on May 7, 2026. ECF 1. On June 3, 2026, 25 Plaintiffs timely filed a Motion to Remand based on the procedural removal timing defect. 26 ECF 15. Thus, Plaintiffs did not waive Defendant’s procedural removal timing defect, and 27 the Court has the authority to remand. Smith, 761 F.3d at 1044 (“[T]he court may remand 1 || remand.”). The Court therefore grants Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand based on untimely 2 || removal. 3 || IV. CONCLUSION 4 The Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion to Remand. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 5 This action is ordered and remanded to the California Superior Court, Monterey 6 || County. 7 This order is not reviewable on appeal. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(d). 8 The Clerk of Court shall mail a certified copy of this Order of Remand to the Clerk 9 || of the California Superior Court, Monterey County. 28 U.S.C. § 1447(c). 10 The motion hearing scheduled for August 5, 2026, is vacated and the federal action 11 || is closed. 12 IT IS SO ORDERED. £ 13 || Dated: June 24, 2026 he=————~ NATHANAEL M. COUSINS United States Magistrate Judge

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