Mauro E. Garza & Everett Holdings, LLC v. Julia Perez

• Court: Court of Appeals of Texas
• Decided: August 23, 2023
• Docket: 07-23-00240-CV
• Status: Published

Opinion

In The Court of Appeals Seventh District of Texas at Amarillo

No. 07-23-00240-CV

MAURO E. GARZA AND EVERETT HOLDINGS, LLC, APPELLANTS

V.

JULIA PEREZ, APPELLEE

On Appeal from the 57th District Court Bexar County, Texas1 Trial Court No. 2023-CI-08559, Honorable David A. Canales, Presiding

August 23, 2023 MEMORANDUM OPINION Before PARKER and DOSS and YARBROUGH, JJ.

Appellants, Mauro E. Garza and Everett Holdings, LLC, bring this interlocutory

appeal from the issuance of a temporary injunction against them.2 We reverse the trial

1 This appeal was transferred to this Court from the Fourth Court of Appeals by docket equalization

order of the Supreme Court of Texas. See TEX. GOV’T CODE ANN. § 73.001. 2 See TEX. CIV. PRAC. & REM. CODE ANN. § 51.014(a)(4). court’s order, dissolve the temporary injunction, and remand the case to the trial court for

further proceedings.

BACKGROUND

Appellee, Julia Perez, obtained a default judgment against M Garza Enterprises,

Inc., and Everett Holdings in September of 2022. The trial court appointed a receiver to

aid in the collection of the judgment. In May of 2023, Perez filed the underlying lawsuit

against Appellants alleging that Everett Holdings fraudulently transferred property to

Garza, individually, to avoid its obligations to her under the judgment. The trial court

granted Perez’s request for a temporary restraining order and then, on May 11, granted

her request for a temporary injunction. Appellants filed this appeal.

ANALYSIS

A trial court has discretion in whether to grant or deny an application for temporary

injunction. Butnaru v. Ford Motor Co., 84 S.W.3d 198, 204 (Tex. 2002) (op. on reh’g).

We review a trial court’s order granting a temporary injunction for clear abuse of

discretion. Henry v. Cox, 520 S.W.3d 28, 33 (Tex. 2017).

A temporary injunction is an extraordinary remedy granted to preserve the status

quo pending a trial on the merits. Butnaru, 84 S.W.3d at 204. “Every order granting an

injunction and every restraining order shall set forth the reasons for its issuance; shall be

specific in terms; shall describe in reasonable detail and not by reference to the complaint

or other document, the act or acts sought to be restrained . . . .” TEX. R. CIV. P. 683; RCI

Entm’t (San Antonio), Inc. v. City of San Antonio, 373 S.W.3d 589, 603 (Tex. App.—San

Antonio 2012, no pet.). These requirements “are mandatory and must be strictly 2 followed.” Qwest Commc’ns Corp. v. AT & T Corp., 24 S.W.3d 334, 337 (Tex. 2000) (per

curiam). A trial court abuses its discretion if it issues a temporary injunction order that

does not comply with the requirements of Rule 683. Charter Med. Corp. v. Miller, 547

S.W.2d 77, 78 (Tex. Civ. App.—Dallas 1977, no writ).

Appellants contend that the temporary injunction at issue violates Rule 683

because it describes enjoined conduct by reference to other documents, fails to set forth

reasons why the relief is necessary to prevent irreparable injury, and is vague. They

argue in the alternative that the temporary injunction must be reversed and dissolved in

part because it is unsupported by the pleadings.

Perez argues in response that Appellants did not raise their complaint regarding

Rule 683 defects in the trial court and thus may not raise it on appeal. But the Fourth

Court of Appeals, from which this case was transferred, has held that the failure to meet

the requirements of Rule 683 renders an injunction order “fatally defective and void,

whether specifically raised by point of error or not.” EOG Res., Inc. v. Gutierrez, 75

S.W.3d 50, 53 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2002, no pet.) (quoting Hopper v. Safeguard

Bus. Sys., Inc., 787 S.W.2d 624, 626 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 1990, no writ)).3

Therefore, we turn to the question of whether the requirements of Rule 683 have been

met.

3 This Court, along with the Third Court of Appeals, holds the minority view that failure to make a

trial objection to the form of the injunction waives a party’s right to complain on appeal. See Malcom v. Cobra Acquisitions, LLC, 07-19-00405-CV, 2020 Tex. App. LEXIS 3732, at *18 (Tex. App.—Amarillo Apr. 30, 2020, no pet.) (mem. op.).

3 “Under Rule 683 the reason for the granting of a temporary injunction must be

stated in the order. . . . [The order must] give the reasons why injury will be suffered if

the interlocutory relief is not ordered.” State v. Cook United, Inc., 464 S.W.2d 105, 106

(Tex. 1971) (citing Transp. Co. of Tex. v. Robertson Transps., 261 S.W.2d 549, 556 (Tex.

1953)); see also City of Corpus Christi v. Friends of the Coliseum, 311 S.W.3d 706, 708

(Tex. App.—Corpus Christi–Edinburg 2010, no pet.) (“When a temporary injunction is

based in part on a showing that the applicant would suffer irreparable harm if the

injunction is not issued, Rule 683 requires the order to state precisely why the applicant

would suffer irreparable harm.”) (emphasis in original). The order “must be specific and

legally sufficient on its face and not merely conclusory.” El Tacaso, Inc. v. Jireh Star, Inc.,

356 S.W.3d 740, 744 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2011, no pet.). If a temporary injunction order

fails to comply with the mandatory requirements of Rule 683, it is “subject to being

declared void and dissolved.” Qwest Communs. Corp., 24 S.W.3d at 337.4

The order at hand recites only one finding by the trial court: “The Court finds the

record establishes the findings necessary to issue a Temporary Injunction as requested

by the Plaintiff.” Following that statement, the order lists the actions Appellants are

enjoined from taking and then sets forth the trial setting and amount of bond. The order

does not specify the facts the trial court relied on or identify the injury Perez will suffer if

the injunction does not issue. As such, it fails to satisfy Rule 683’s mandate to state the

reasons for its issuance and to be specific in its terms. See Grounds v. First GroundRock

Royalties, LLC, 629 S.W.3d 674, 676 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2021, no pet.) (temporary

4 The Fourth Court of Appeals holds that such orders are “fatally defective and void.” See In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d 268, 271 (Tex. App.—San Antonio 2003, orig. proceeding).

4 injunction order void because reference to application did not satisfy Rule 683’s

requirement that order specifically state “reasons why injury will be suffered”); Quintanilla

v. De La Rosa, No. 13-20-00575-CV, 2021 Tex. App. LEXIS 5849, at *5 (Tex. App.—

Corpus Christi–Edinburg July 22, 2021, no pet.) (mem. op.) (temporary injunction order

void because it did not contain any statement explaining reasons for its issuance); Indep.

Capital Mgmt., L.L.C. v. Collins, 261 S.W.3d 792, 795 (Tex. App.—Dallas 2008, no pet.).

These deficiencies render the order void. In re Garza, 126 S.W.3d at 271 (temporary

injunction order that failed to meet the requirements of Rule 683 is void, not voidable). A

void order has no force or effect and confers no right; it is a nullity. See id. Therefore,

we sustain Appellants’ challenge to the order’s compliance with Rule 683.

CONCLUSION

Because the trial court’s temporary injunction order does not comply with Rule 683,

it is void. Accordingly, we reverse the trial court’s order, dissolve the temporary injunction,

and remand this cause to the trial court.

Judy C. Parker Justice