Cite as 2023 Ark. 177 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-23-300
Opinion Delivered: December 7, 2023 MAURICE TRAMMEL APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CHICOT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 09CV-22-107]
DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF III, JUDGE CORRECTION APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice
Appellant Maurice Trammel appeals from the denial of his petition to proceed in
forma pauperis in seeking a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus. For reversal,
Trammel argues that the circuit court did not provide sufficient findings setting forth the
basis for its conclusion that Trammel had failed to state a colorable cause of action. Because
Trammel’s underlying petition fails to state a colorable cause of action, we affirm.
I. Facts
In September 2018, Trammel pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated robbery, theft
of property, and furnishing prohibited items. Trammel was sentenced to 240 months’
imprisonment with 60 months’ suspended imposition of the sentence for his aggravated-
robbery conviction. Trammel was concurrently sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment
for his theft conviction and 240 months’ imprisonment for his furnishing-prohibited-items
conviction. The sentencing order reflects that he was sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2017). The record
also contains the amended information, which included the habitual-offender charge.
On October 17, 2022, Trammel filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and a petition for declaratory judgment, writ of mandamus, and request for
injunctive relief. In his petition, Trammel contended that he was entitled to declaratory
relief because there was no proof offered by the State that he was a habitual offender who
had committed more than one but less than four felonies pursuant to Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-4-501(a) (Supp. 2017). Trammel alleged in the petition for declaratory
relief filed in the circuit court that because the State failed to provide proof of his prior
felony convictions, the sentencing order should be declared illegal, which would shorten
the period of his parole eligibility. The circuit court found that Trammel was indigent but
that he had failed to state a colorable cause of action for declaratory relief.
Trammel appeals the circuit court’s denial of his in forma pauperis petition and argues
that the circuit court erroneously concluded that he had failed to state a colorable cause of
action.
II. Standard of Review, Declaratory Judgment, and Writ of Mandamus
Our standard of review of a decision to grant or deny a petition to proceed in forma
pauperis is abuse of discretion. Berger v. Bryant, 2020 Ark. 157, at 2, 598 S.W.3d 36, 38. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly. Id., 598 S.W.3d
at 38. If the underlying petition clearly fails to state a colorable cause of action, there has
been no abuse of discretion, and this court may summarily affirm the denial of in forma
pauperis status. Id., 598 S.W.3d at 38. A colorable cause of action is a claim that is legitimate
2 and may be reasonably asserted given the facts presented and the current law or a reasonable
and logical extension or modification of it. Id., 598 S.W.3d at 38.
The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to settle and to afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. Rogers v.
Knight, 2017 Ark. 267, at 2, 527 S.W.3d 719, 721. Declaratory relief may be granted if the
petitioner establishes (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) that the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue involved in the controversy is ripe for judicial
determination. Id. at 2–3, 527 S.W.3d at 721. A justiciable controversy is when a claim of
right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Id. at 3, 527 S.W.3d at 721.
A case is nonjusticiable when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect
upon a then-existing legal controversy. Id., 527 S.W.3d at 721. The question whether there
was an absence of a justiciable issue shall be reviewed de novo on the record of the circuit
court. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 792.
The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce
the performance of a duty. Harmon v. Noel-Emsweller, 2022 Ark. 26, at 2. A petitioner must
show a clear and certain right to the relief and that there is no other remedy. Id. Unless a
petitioner can establish a right to declaratory judgment, there is no basis for a writ of
mandamus. Waller v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 252, at 5–6, 493 S.W.3d 757, 761. The standard of
review on a denial of a writ of mandamus is likewise whether the circuit court abused its
discretion. Andrews v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 129, at 3, 674 S.W.3d 450, 452.
3 III. Claims for Relief
It is clear from the face of Trammel’s petition that there is no justiciable controversy,
and Trammel has no legally protectible interest. Trammel named the director of the
Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) as the respondent in his petition for relief,
arguing that the ADC has denied him parole on the basis of his habitual-offender status,
which Trammell challenges as being illegally imposed. Trammel’s petition assumes that the
director of the ADC has authority to modify his sentencing order by eliminating the
habitual-offender enhancement reflected in the order entered by the circuit court. While
the ADC has exclusive authority to determine parole eligibility, it does not have the
authority, either by statute or case law, to modify a sentence imposed by a circuit court. See,
e.g., Ward v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 471, at 4, 506 S.W.3d 224, 226 (per curiam). Therefore, the
director of the ADC does not have a legal interest in, or the authority to contest, a sentence
enhancement imposed by a circuit court. Trammel does not have a claim of right to compel
the ADC to nullify a sentence enhancement.
Further, Trammel’s petition for declaratory relief is a claim for postconviction relief
in that he is collaterally attacking a sentence that was placed into execution in 2018 on
grounds that should have been raised in timely postconviction petitions. A collateral attack
challenging a guilty plea, as well as the sentencing orders entered therein, is not cognizable
in a petition for declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 340 Ark. 413, 414, 12
S.W.3d 203, 204 (2000) (per curiam). A declaratory-judgment action is neither a substitute
for an appeal nor a substitute for petitions for postconviction relief. Wise v. Norris, 2011
Ark. 362, at 2. Trammel’s petition for declaratory relief seeks to set aside a sentence that
4 Trammel alleges was illegally imposed. Declaratory judgments are not ordinarily granted
when another adequate remedy is available. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332
(2002). Here, Trammel had adequate postconviction remedies pursuant to either Arkansas
Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016) or Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure. However, the time limitations for filing a petition under section 16-
Free access — add to your briefcase to read the full text and ask questions with AI
Cite as 2023 Ark. 177 SUPREME COURT OF ARKANSAS No. CV-23-300
Opinion Delivered: December 7, 2023 MAURICE TRAMMEL APPELLANT PRO SE APPEAL FROM THE CHICOT COUNTY CIRCUIT COURT V. [NO. 09CV-22-107]
DEXTER PAYNE, DIRECTOR, HONORABLE ROBERT B. GIBSON ARKANSAS DEPARTMENT OF III, JUDGE CORRECTION APPELLEE AFFIRMED.
JOHN DAN KEMP, Chief Justice
Appellant Maurice Trammel appeals from the denial of his petition to proceed in
forma pauperis in seeking a declaratory judgment and a writ of mandamus. For reversal,
Trammel argues that the circuit court did not provide sufficient findings setting forth the
basis for its conclusion that Trammel had failed to state a colorable cause of action. Because
Trammel’s underlying petition fails to state a colorable cause of action, we affirm.
I. Facts
In September 2018, Trammel pleaded nolo contendere to aggravated robbery, theft
of property, and furnishing prohibited items. Trammel was sentenced to 240 months’
imprisonment with 60 months’ suspended imposition of the sentence for his aggravated-
robbery conviction. Trammel was concurrently sentenced to 240 months’ imprisonment
for his theft conviction and 240 months’ imprisonment for his furnishing-prohibited-items
conviction. The sentencing order reflects that he was sentenced as a habitual offender pursuant to Arkansas Code Annotated section 5-4-501(a)(1)(A)(ii) (Supp. 2017). The record
also contains the amended information, which included the habitual-offender charge.
On October 17, 2022, Trammel filed a petition for leave to proceed in forma
pauperis and a petition for declaratory judgment, writ of mandamus, and request for
injunctive relief. In his petition, Trammel contended that he was entitled to declaratory
relief because there was no proof offered by the State that he was a habitual offender who
had committed more than one but less than four felonies pursuant to Arkansas Code
Annotated section 5-4-501(a) (Supp. 2017). Trammel alleged in the petition for declaratory
relief filed in the circuit court that because the State failed to provide proof of his prior
felony convictions, the sentencing order should be declared illegal, which would shorten
the period of his parole eligibility. The circuit court found that Trammel was indigent but
that he had failed to state a colorable cause of action for declaratory relief.
Trammel appeals the circuit court’s denial of his in forma pauperis petition and argues
that the circuit court erroneously concluded that he had failed to state a colorable cause of
action.
II. Standard of Review, Declaratory Judgment, and Writ of Mandamus
Our standard of review of a decision to grant or deny a petition to proceed in forma
pauperis is abuse of discretion. Berger v. Bryant, 2020 Ark. 157, at 2, 598 S.W.3d 36, 38. An
abuse of discretion occurs when the court acts arbitrarily or groundlessly. Id., 598 S.W.3d
at 38. If the underlying petition clearly fails to state a colorable cause of action, there has
been no abuse of discretion, and this court may summarily affirm the denial of in forma
pauperis status. Id., 598 S.W.3d at 38. A colorable cause of action is a claim that is legitimate
2 and may be reasonably asserted given the facts presented and the current law or a reasonable
and logical extension or modification of it. Id., 598 S.W.3d at 38.
The purpose of a declaratory judgment is to settle and to afford relief from
uncertainty and insecurity with respect to rights, status, and other legal relations. Rogers v.
Knight, 2017 Ark. 267, at 2, 527 S.W.3d 719, 721. Declaratory relief may be granted if the
petitioner establishes (1) a justiciable controversy; (2) that the controversy is between persons
whose interests are adverse; (3) that the party seeking relief has a legal interest in the
controversy; and (4) that the issue involved in the controversy is ripe for judicial
determination. Id. at 2–3, 527 S.W.3d at 721. A justiciable controversy is when a claim of
right is asserted against one who has an interest in contesting it. Id. at 3, 527 S.W.3d at 721.
A case is nonjusticiable when any judgment rendered would have no practical legal effect
upon a then-existing legal controversy. Id., 527 S.W.3d at 721. The question whether there
was an absence of a justiciable issue shall be reviewed de novo on the record of the circuit
court. Id., 522 S.W.3d at 792.
The purpose of a writ of mandamus is to enforce an established right or to enforce
the performance of a duty. Harmon v. Noel-Emsweller, 2022 Ark. 26, at 2. A petitioner must
show a clear and certain right to the relief and that there is no other remedy. Id. Unless a
petitioner can establish a right to declaratory judgment, there is no basis for a writ of
mandamus. Waller v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 252, at 5–6, 493 S.W.3d 757, 761. The standard of
review on a denial of a writ of mandamus is likewise whether the circuit court abused its
discretion. Andrews v. Payne, 2023 Ark. 129, at 3, 674 S.W.3d 450, 452.
3 III. Claims for Relief
It is clear from the face of Trammel’s petition that there is no justiciable controversy,
and Trammel has no legally protectible interest. Trammel named the director of the
Arkansas Department of Correction (ADC) as the respondent in his petition for relief,
arguing that the ADC has denied him parole on the basis of his habitual-offender status,
which Trammell challenges as being illegally imposed. Trammel’s petition assumes that the
director of the ADC has authority to modify his sentencing order by eliminating the
habitual-offender enhancement reflected in the order entered by the circuit court. While
the ADC has exclusive authority to determine parole eligibility, it does not have the
authority, either by statute or case law, to modify a sentence imposed by a circuit court. See,
e.g., Ward v. Kelley, 2016 Ark. 471, at 4, 506 S.W.3d 224, 226 (per curiam). Therefore, the
director of the ADC does not have a legal interest in, or the authority to contest, a sentence
enhancement imposed by a circuit court. Trammel does not have a claim of right to compel
the ADC to nullify a sentence enhancement.
Further, Trammel’s petition for declaratory relief is a claim for postconviction relief
in that he is collaterally attacking a sentence that was placed into execution in 2018 on
grounds that should have been raised in timely postconviction petitions. A collateral attack
challenging a guilty plea, as well as the sentencing orders entered therein, is not cognizable
in a petition for declaratory judgment. See, e.g., Johnson v. State, 340 Ark. 413, 414, 12
S.W.3d 203, 204 (2000) (per curiam). A declaratory-judgment action is neither a substitute
for an appeal nor a substitute for petitions for postconviction relief. Wise v. Norris, 2011
Ark. 362, at 2. Trammel’s petition for declaratory relief seeks to set aside a sentence that
4 Trammel alleges was illegally imposed. Declaratory judgments are not ordinarily granted
when another adequate remedy is available. Jegley v. Picado, 349 Ark. 600, 80 S.W.3d 332
(2002). Here, Trammel had adequate postconviction remedies pursuant to either Arkansas
Code Annotated section 16-90-111 (Repl. 2016) or Rule 37.1 of the Arkansas Rules of
Criminal Procedure. However, the time limitations for filing a petition under section 16-
90-111 alleging that the sentence was imposed in an illegal manner were superseded by
Arkansas Rule of Criminal Procedure 37.2(c). See Green v. State, 2021 Ark. 19, at 3, 615
S.W.3d 389, 392. Trammel’s sentencing order was entered in September 2018; therefore,
under Rule 37.2(c), his claims that his sentence was illegally imposed are barred as untimely.
Id., 615 S.W.3d at 392. In sum, Trammel does not have a legally protected interest.
Moreover, a guilty plea is, in itself, a conviction, and an admission of all elements of
the charges constitutes a waiver of any defense other than a jurisdictional claim. Waller v.
State, 2020 Ark. 381, at 6. Trammel was charged as a habitual offender and pleaded guilty
to all the charges, including his habitual-offender status. Trammel’s challenge to the
sufficiency of the evidence supporting his habitual-offender status was not a jurisdictional
issue and was therefore waived by his guilty plea. Id.
Because there is no right to declaratory judgment, there is no basis for the issuance
of a writ of mandamus. Waller, 2016 Ark. 252, at 5–6, 493 S.W.3d at 761. Based on our de
novo review, we hold that the circuit court did not abuse its discretion when it found that
Trammel had failed to state a colorable cause of action in that he had not stated a justiciable
controversy that would entitle him to declaratory relief. Accordingly, we affirm the circuit
court’s denial of Trammel’s in forma pauperis petition.
5 Affirmed.
WOOD, J., concurs.
WOMACK, J., dissents.
SHAWN A. WOMACK, Justice, dissenting. Appellant’s request for relief is barred
by article 5, section 20 of the Arkansas Constitution.1 Because there is not an express
constitutional provision that allows the State to be a defendant in this context, dismissal is
proper.2 For the reasons set forth in my dissent in Perry v. Payne, I respectfully dissent.3
Maurice Trammell, pro se appellant.
Tim Griffin, Att’y Gen., by: Adam Jackson, Ass’t Att’y Gen., for appellee.
1 See, e.g., Perry v. Payne, 2022 Ark. 112, at 5 (Womack, J., dissenting). 2 Id. 3 Id.