Maurice Oparaji v. Fitz Malcolm

• Court: New Jersey Superior Court Appellate Division
• Decided: January 15, 2026
• Docket: A-1636-24
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1636-24

MAURICE OPARAJI,

Plaintiff-Appellant,

v.

FITZ MALCOLM,

Defendant-Respondent. ________________________

Submitted January 6, 2026 – Decided January 15, 2026

Before Judges Firko and Perez Friscia.

On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. DC-008628-24.

Maurice Oparaji, self-represented appellant.

Respondent has not filed a brief.

PER CURIAM

Plaintiff Maurice Oparaji, self-represented, appeals from a September 12,

2024 Special Civil Part judgment dismissing his complaint against defendant Fitz Malcolm after a bench trial.1 Plaintiff also appeals from several motion

court orders, which denied his motions to vacate the dismissal of his complaint

and to amend the complaint. After reviewing the record, plaintiff's argument,

and applicable law, we affirm.

I.

On April 5, 2024, plaintiff filed a breach of contract complaint against

defendant. The parties entered a residential home renovation agreement

(agreement) on August 27, 2018. Plaintiff claimed defendant caused $20,000 in

damages to his property. While plaintiff's complaint referenced the agreement

defendant entered on behalf of Malcolm Construction, LLC (Malcolm

Construction), plaintiff did not name the company as a party. Defendant's

answer alleged he did not breach the agreement because it was plaintiff who

failed to "show up" with the necessary materials, only paid him "$4,000," and

received "more work than" defendant was paid to complete.

On September 12, 2024, the trial court conducted a bench trial at which

both parties testified. Plaintiff asserted the parties signed the renovation

agreement in August 2018 for work at a house he had purchased but did not

reside in. Plaintiff explained that the total agreement price was $8,000 and he

1 Defendant failed to file a responsive brief to this appeal. A-1636-24 2 paid defendant $4,000. Pursuant to the agreement, defendant was to finish the

renovation work by September 10, 2018. Plaintiff spent $1,323.38 and

$2,185.06 at Home Depot on materials such as "piping, brass fittings, [and]

vanities," and also obtained other supplies. He testified that defendant

"abandoned the job," kept the purchased supplies, and never returned his house

key. Additionally, plaintiff maintained defendant left "junk" and "garbage" all

over the house. During the trial, plaintiff introduced pictures, dated April 2019,

depicting trash left throughout the house and damage to the interior, including

holes in the walls.

In addressing why he waited almost five and a half years to file the

complaint, plaintiff explained he initially tried to file a New York action against

defendant and then traveled overseas because his mother passed away. He

acknowledged having no pictures from "when [he] bought the house," which

would have shown the condition of the house before defendant's work. Plaintiff

asserted he did "not know whether [defendant] caused the damage or . . . kept

the place open" and "[s]ome other person entered and caused th[e] damage[]."

While a tenant previously resided at the property, no one had lived there for

almost "six years."

A-1636-24 3 Defendant testified he painted two of the house's three floors, starting on

the top floor and working down. He produced pictures that contradicted

plaintiff's photographs and asserted plaintiff's assertions were "totally lies." He

further testified about the work he performed and produced pictures showing

spackled walls, changed linoleum, an "installed ceramic[] floor," and rooms free

of debris. He posited his pictures were "nothing" like plaintiff's pictures.

At the conclusion of the testimony, the trial court entered judgment in

favor of defendant and issued an oral decision. After summarizing the evidence,

the trial court found plaintiff had failed to establish "his cause of action [for

breach of contract] with any specificity as to what was not completed for $4,000"

and defendant established "sufficient proofs to verify that he did approximately

$4,000 worth of work." Regarding plaintiff's allegations of property damage,

the trial court reasoned that "[p]apers and garbage . . . d[id not] come from the

contractor" and defendant did not cause the windows to be "[b]oarded up."

Plaintiff did not produce an expert to support his claim for damages or pictures

depicting the property's condition before defendant's work. The trial court noted

plaintiff's pictures were from "2019" and "depict[ed] various areas of demolition

within the house," including "plaster and lath walls destroyed, holes in the

ceiling, [and] holes in the pipes." However, the trial court noted that such

A-1636-24 4 damage was "not a contractor's issue." Further, the trial court specifically

afforded greater weight to defendant's testimony that he painted "the second and

third floor" of the house and had produced pictures showing completed work.

After finding plaintiff failed to satisfy his burden, the trial court advised the

parties that "the case [wa]s dismissed" and instructed them to wait for "a copy

of the order."

Plaintiff maintains he waited for the order and staff directed him to

another room in the courthouse but was never provided with the written order.

He maintains he later spoke with a clerk about appealing the judgment and was

provided "forms to complete for [a] motion to vacate dismissal." On September

12, 2024, plaintiff filed his first motion to vacate the dismissal of his complaint.

Plaintiff inserted the name "Malcolm Const." in the caption as a defendant,

despite never having joined Malcolm Construction in the original action.

On September 27, 2024, a different court (motion court) denied the motion

to vacate the dismissal for lack of proper service. Plaintiff then filed a second

motion to vacate the dismissal of his complaint, again naming Malcolm

Construction and defendant. On November 8, the motion court denied the

motion because plaintiff "provide[d] neither a factual or legal basis for [the

requested motion] relief." Plaintiff filed the same motion a third time, which

A-1636-24 5 the motion court denied on December 6, finding plaintiff "still fail[ed] . . . to

proffer any legal or factual evidence in support of the relief requested."

Plaintiff filed a fourth motion to vacate the dismissal and added a request

to amend the complaint, which the court denied on January 3, 2025. The motion

court found plaintiff failed to include the proposed amended complaint, which

sought "to add another defendant" and failed to state any "factual allegations . . .

as to this potential defendant."

Plaintiff filed a fifth motion, again seeking to vacate the dismissal and to

amend the complaint, this time including a proposed amended complaint

containing the same allegations against Malcolm Construction that he

previously presented, and which were dismissed, against defendant. On January

31, the motion court denied plaintiff's motion to amend the complaint, stating,

"movant seeks to amend a complaint that has been dismissed with prejudice"

and "[t]here is no[] basis in law for this relief." The motion court also denied

plaintiff's request to vacate the dismissal, stating that "to the extent . . . [plaintiff]

seeks to challenge" the trial court's judgment after trial, "there is an insufficient

basis . . . to vacate that final judgment." This appeal followed.

On appeal, plaintiff raises the following contentions: the motion court

erred in failing to reinstate his complaint because it found no fault by plaintiff

A-1636-24 6 or prejudice to defendant; the motion court abused its discretion in denying leave

to amend the complaint; and defendant admitted not repairing the first floor.

II.

We "review a 'trial court's determinations, premised on the testimony of

witnesses and written evidence at a bench trial, in accordance with a deferential

standard.'" Nelson v. Elizabeth Bd. of Educ., 466 N.J. Super. 325, 336 (App.

Div. 2021) (quoting D'Agostino v. Maldonado, 216 N.J. 168, 182 (2013)).

Ordinarily, "[t]he scope of [our] review of a trial court's fact-finding function is

limited." Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205 N.J. 150, 169 (2011)

(quoting Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411 (1998)). "[W]e defer to the trial

court's credibility determinations, because it '"hears the case, sees and observes

the witnesses, and hears them testify," affording it "a better perspective than a

reviewing court in evaluating the veracity of a witness."'" City Council of

Orange Twp. v. Edwards, 455 N.J. Super. 261, 272 (App. Div. 2018) (quoting

Gnall v. Gnall, 222 N.J. 414, 428 (2015)).

We will "'not disturb the factual findings and legal conclusions of the trial

judge' unless convinced that those findings and conclusions were 'so manifestly

unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant[,] and reasonably

credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice.'" Allstate Ins. Co. v.

A-1636-24 7 Northfield Med. Ctr., P.C., 228 N.J. 596, 619 (2017) (quoting Griepenburg v.

Township of Ocean, 220 N.J. 239, 254 (2015)). "[A] trial court's interpretation

of the law and the legal consequences that flow from established facts are not

entitled to any special deference." Rowe v. Bell & Gossett Co., 239 N.J. 531,

552 (2019) (quoting Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140

N.J. 366, 378 (1995)).

To prevail on a breach of contract claim, a plaintiff must prove: (1) "the

parties entered into a contract containing certain terms"; (2) "plaintiff did what

the contract required [plaintiff] to do"; (3) "defendant did not do what the

contract required [defendant] to do"; and (4) "defendant's breach . . . caused a

loss to the plaintiff." Woytas v. Greenwood Tree Experts, Inc., 237 N.J. 501,

512 (2019) (alterations in original) (quoting Globe Motor Co. v. Igdalev, 225

N.J. 469, 482 (2016)). "Each element must be proven by a preponderance of the

evidence." Globe Motor Co., 225 N.J. at 482.

Further, "[i]t is well-settled that '[c]ourts enforce contracts "based on the

intent of the parties, the express terms of the contract, surrounding

circumstances[,] and the underlying purpose of the contract."'" Barila v. Bd. of

Educ. of Cliffside Park, 241 N.J. 595, 615-16 (2020) (second alteration in

original) (quoting In re County of Atlantic, 230 N.J. 237, 254 (2017)). "We do

A-1636-24 8 not supply terms to contracts that are plain and unambiguous, nor do we make a

better contract for either of the parties than the one which the parties themselves

have created." Barr v. Barr, 418 N.J. Super. 18, 31-32 (App. Div. 2011) (quoting

Maglies v. Est. of Guy, 193 N.J. 108, 143 (2007)). "The interpretation of a

contract is generally subject to de novo review." Arbus, Maybruch & Goode,

LLC v. Cohen, 475 N.J. Super. 509, 515 (App. Div. 2023).

III.

Plaintiff contends the motion court erred in denying his motion to reinstate

his complaint because, after the trial court entered judgment in favor of

defendant, it never provided him with a written order. He acknowledges the

trial court issued an oral decision after the bench trial, finding plaintiff failed to

prove a breach of contract and dismissing his complaint. Nevertheless, he

contends the trial court's oral decision is insufficient and the dismissal of his

complaint should be vacated. After a review of the record and the trial court's

oral decision, we discern no merit in plaintiff's argument.

While the trial court should have provided the parties with a written order

after it instructed them to "take a seat" and wait for "a copy of the order," we

conclude it nevertheless substantially complied with Rule 1:7-4. At the

conclusion of the trial, the trial court provided the parties with its decision and

A-1636-24 9 reasons. The trial court satisfied the Rule's requirement that it "shall, by an

opinion or memorandum decision, either written or oral, find the facts and state

its conclusions of law thereon in all actions tried without a jury." R. 1:7-4(a).

We also note plaintiff failed to address why he did not return to the courtroom

for a copy of the order, write to the trial court requesting a copy of the order, or

file a motion seeking the trial court issue a written order.

Plaintiff also failed to timely move to set aside the court's verdict and for

a new trial. R. 4:49-1; R. 6:6-1. Plaintiff was required to move to set aside the

verdict within twenty days "after the court's conclusions [we]re announced." R.

4:49-1(b); see Spedick v. Murphy, 266 N.J. Super. 573, 587 (App. Div. 1993)

(noting that "[h]istorically, our courts have strictly construed R[ule] 4:49-1(b)[]

and denied" relief when "motions [were] not served within the required . . .

period"). We, therefore, discern no error in the motion court's denial of

plaintiff's multiple motions to vacate.

We also reject plaintiff's argument that reversal is warranted because the

motion court failed to permit him to amend his complaint to add Malcolm

Construction as a party after his initial complaint was dismissed. Plaintiff's

amended complaint simply restated the same breach of contract claim against

Malcolm Construction that he had asserted against defendant, which was

A-1636-24 10 dismissed after trial. While the relation back doctrine, Rule 4:9-3, provides a

basis to permit the filing of an amended complaint under the principle of

fundamental fairness, a party is not to invoke the doctrine to add a party based

on the same previously adjudicated allegations against that party's principal. It

is well-recognized that "[t]he doctrine of res judicata 'contemplates that when a

controversy between parties is once fairly litigated and determined it is no longer

open to relitigation.'" Selective Ins. Co. v. McAllister, 327 N.J. Super. 168, 172

(App. Div. 2000) (italicization omitted) (quoting Lubliner v. Bd. of Alcoholic

Beverage Control, 33 N.J. 428, 435 (1960)). For these reasons, the motion court

appropriately denied plaintiff's motions to amend.

Finally, plaintiff's contention that his complaint should be reinstated

because defendant admitted not working on the house's first floor lacks merit.

The trial court's finding that plaintiff failed to prove his breach of contract is

sufficiently supported by the evidence. Plaintiff's remaining contentions lack

sufficient merit to warrant discussion in our written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

A-1636-24 11