Maurice Olanders Loyd v. State of Iowa

• Court: Court of Appeals of Iowa
• Decided: July 2, 2025
• Docket: 24-0498
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA

No. 24-0498 Filed July 2, 2025

MAURICE OLANDERS LOYD, Applicant-Appellant,

vs.

STATE OF IOWA, Respondent-Appellee. ________________________________________________________________

Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Boone County, Derek Johnson,

Judge.

An applicant appeals the denial of postconviction relief. AFFIRMED.

Sara Pasquale of Pasquale Law, Ankeny, for appellant.

Brenna Bird, Attorney General, and David Banta, Assistant Attorney

General, for appellee State.

Considered without oral argument by Schumacher, P.J., and Buller and

Sandy, JJ. 2

BULLER, Judge.

Maurice Loyd sexually abused M.W. in July 2021 by penetrating her vagina

with his fingers without her consent while she was asleep. We affirmed his

conviction for sexual abuse in the third degree, a class “C” felony in violation of

Iowa Code section 709.4(1)(a) (2021), on direct appeal. See State v. Loyd,

No. 22-0067, 2022 WL 17826935, at *1–2 (Iowa Ct. App. Dec. 21, 2022).

Loyd applied for postconviction relief in 2023. The sole claim tried to the

court was whether trial counsel failed to effectively cross-examine the victim and a

corroborating witness based on alleged inconsistencies identified by Loyd while he

was incarcerated.

The postconviction court conducted an exhaustive comparison of the

victim’s and witness’s trial testimony and their depositions (copies of which were

marked up by Loyd’s handwriting, pinpointing the alleged inconsistencies). What

Loyd pointed to were essentially minor complaints about phraseology, explainable

lapses in memory, or were not actually inconsistent. The only truly inconsistent

statements were on trivial facts like whether a television was on or off. Trial

counsel did not testify at the postconviction trial, but the postconviction court

reviewed the trial transcript to evaluate counsel’s performance.

The court found that trial counsel performed effectively, established the

witness’s “fuzzy memory,” pointed out inconsistencies, and undermined the victim

and witness’s credibility. The court found no breach of essential duty and

expressly concluded that, even if the jury had been directly presented with all of

Loyd’s claimed inconsistencies in detail, there was no reasonable probability of

acquittal. In a fourteen-page written ruling, the postconviction court denied relief. 3

Loyd appeals, reprising his complaints about trial counsel and making new

complaints about postconviction counsel.

Our review is de novo. See Sothman v. State, 967 N.W.2d 512, 522

(Iowa 2021). “The benchmark for judging any claim of ineffectiveness must be

whether counsel’s conduct so undermined the proper functioning of the adversarial

process that the trial cannot be relied on as having produced a just result.”

Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 686 (1984). A postconviction applicant

claiming ineffective assistance must prove both (1) counsel’s performance fell

below objectively reasonable standards and (2) if counsel had acted differently,

there would have been a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. Id.

at 687–88, 694.

First, as to Loyd’s complaints about trial counsel, we agree entirely with the

postconviction court’s detailed ruling, which we adopt as our own. The alleged

inconsistencies Loyd identifies either were largely not inconsistent or were minor.

None of the inconsistencies fatally undermined the victim’s or witness’s testimony.

And our review of the trial transcript confirms counsel’s performance met or

exceeded reasonable professional standards, as evidenced by vigorous—though

concise—cross-examination. Loyd has not proven either breach of an essential

duty or the reasonable probability of a different outcome. See id.

Second, as to Loyd’s claims about postconviction counsel, we find we

cannot reach the claim. The State’s appellate brief, citing a structural-error case,

“does not contest” error preservation and urges us to analyze the merits. But

Loyd’s argument is not about structural error. And, in any event, we consider error

preservation and our power to decide issues on our own motion, regardless of a 4

party’s failure to cite controlling case law. See Top of Iowa Coop v. Sime Farms,

Inc., 608 N.W.2d 454, 470 (Iowa 2000).

We generally do not decide claims regarding postconviction counsel’s

effectiveness on appeal from a postconviction action, as we typically need a

developed record to decide these claims. Goode v. State, 920 N.W.2d 520, 526

(Iowa 2018) (explaining a limited exception to decide postconviction ineffective-

assistance claims “on direct appeal when the appellate record is adequate” and it

would not prejudice any party). Instead of deciding the claims without an adequate

record or ordering a remand, typically “the claims must be filed as a separate

application in district court.” Id. at 527. We have consistently applied Goode in

our court’s decisions, declining to speculate on undeveloped records or find

postconviction counsel ineffective without an opportunity to explain their conduct.

See, e.g., Ernst v. State, No. 23-1598, 2025 WL 271479, at *6 (Iowa Ct. App.

Jan. 23, 2025); Freese v. State, No. 23-0139, 2024 WL 2842312, at *2 (Iowa Ct.

App. June 5, 2024); Spellman v. State, No. 22-0499, 2024 WL 1551158, at *3–4

(Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 10, 2024); Brown v. State, No. 22-0459, 2023 WL 3335384,

at *3–4 (Iowa Ct. App. May 10, 2023). We apply Goode here and decline to reach

the effectiveness of postconviction counsel on this undeveloped record. And we

note that, even if we were able to reach the merits, and even if Loyd were able to

prove counsel’s deficient performance, his appellate brief makes no plausible

argument establishing the reasonable probability of a different outcome had

postconviction counsel acted differently, and this bars relief on the merits. See

Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694.

AFFIRMED.