Maurice Daronte Davis v. Jeff Macomber, et al.

• Court: District Court, E.D. California
• Decided: December 3, 2025
• Docket: 2:25-cv-00308
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 9 FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF CALIFORNIA 10 11 MAURICE DARONTE DAVIS, No. 2:25-cv-0308 AC P 12 Plaintiff, 13 v. ORDER 14 JEFF MACOMBER, et al., 15 Defendants. 16 17 Plaintiff is a state inmate who filed this civil rights action pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983 18 without a lawyer. He has requested leave to proceed without paying the full filing fee for this 19 action, under 28 U.S.C. § 1915. Plaintiff has submitted a declaration showing that he cannot 20 afford to pay the entire filing fee. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(a)(2). Accordingly, plaintiff’s motion to 21 proceed in forma pauperis is granted.1 22 I. Statutory Screening of Prisoner Complaints 23 The court is required to screen complaints brought by prisoners seeking relief against “a 24 1 This means that plaintiff is allowed to pay the $350.00 filing fee in monthly installments that 25 are taken from the inmate’s trust account rather than in one lump sum. 28 U.S.C. §§ 1914(a). As 26 part of this order, the prison is required to remove an initial partial filing fee from plaintiff’s trust account. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(1). A separate order directed to the appropriate agency 27 requires monthly payments of twenty percent of the prior month’s income to be taken from plaintiff’s trust account. These payments will be taken until the $350 filing fee is paid in full. 28 See 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b)(2). 1 governmental entity or officer or employee of a governmental entity.” 28 U.S.C. § 1915A(a). A 2 claim “is [legally] frivolous where it lacks an arguable basis either in law or in fact.” Neitzke v. 3 Williams, 490 U.S. 319, 325 (1989). The court may dismiss a claim as frivolous if it is based on 4 an indisputably meritless legal theory or factual contentions that are baseless. Id., 490 U.S. at 5 327. The critical inquiry is whether a constitutional claim, however inartfully pleaded, has an 6 arguable legal and factual basis. Jackson v. Arizona, 885 F.2d 639, 640 (9th Cir. 1989), 7 superseded by statute on other grounds as stated in Lopez v. Smith, 203 F.3d 1122, 1130 (9th Cir. 8 2000). 9 In order to avoid dismissal for failure to state a claim a complaint must contain more than 10 “naked assertion[s],” “labels and conclusions,” or “a formulaic recitation of the elements of a 11 cause of action.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 555, 557 (2007). In other words, 12 “[t]hreadbare recitals of the elements of a cause of action, supported by mere conclusory 13 statements, do not suffice.” Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009). A claim upon which the 14 court can grant relief has facial plausibility. Twombly, 550 U.S. at 570. “A claim has facial 15 plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual content that allows the court to draw the reasonable 16 inference that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.” Iqbal, 556 U.S. at 678 (citation 17 omitted). When considering whether a complaint states a claim, the court must accept the 18 allegations as true, Erickson v. Pardus, 551 U.S. 89, 94 (2007) (per curiam), and construe the 19 complaint in the light most favorable to the plaintiff, Jenkins v. McKeithen, 395 U.S. 411, 421 20 (1969) (citations omitted). 21 II. Factual Allegations of the Complaint 22 The complaint alleges that defendants Macomber and Kincaid violated plaintiff’s Fourth, 23 Eighth, and Fourteenth Amendment rights2 while he was housed at California State Prison (CSP)- 24 Sacramento. ECF No. 1. Plaintiff alleges that on a September 21, 2024, he was ambushed and 25 attacked by multiple inmates and did not receive aid until staff walked by and found him with 26

27 2 Plaintiff also cites the Ninth Amendment. However, “the ninth amendment has never been recognized as independently securing any constitutional right, for purposes of pursuing a civil 28 rights claim.” Strandberg v. City of Helena, 791 F.2d 744, 748 (9th Cir. 1986). 1 facial injuries. Id. at 2. After the attack, rather than being sent directly to medical, plaintiff was 2 subjected to a strip search in an open dwelling where he was made to squat and cough. Id. He 3 asserts that these failures occurred under Macomber’s watch and that as the head of the CDCR he 4 is responsible for protecting inmates and properly training staff. Id. 5 Plaintiff next alleges that defendant Kincaid has lied about his restitution amount, and he 6 has had money deducted from his inmate account which is unauthorized. Id. at 3. Macomber is 7 supposed to enforce the laws and procedures and allowed the CDCR to deduct money from his 8 account even though it was not supposed to be deducted. Id. 9 Finally, plaintiff alleges that he has a seafood and shellfish allergy but does not receive 10 substitutions when fish is served because he does not have an approved religious diet. Id. at 4. 11 Defendant Macomber is responsible for the policy and is aware of this issue because all 12 grievances are sent to the Sacramento Office of Appeals and he has been complaining about it for 13 years. Id. As a result of the failure to provide him with substitutions, plaintiff alleges that he 14 does not receive enough food on days when fish is served. He also alleges that he diet he receives 15 is not healthy and even though he has chronic kidney disease, medical staff tells him his condition 16 has to get worse before he is issued a special diet. Id. 17 III. Failure to State a Claim 18 Having conducted the screening required by 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, the court finds that the 19 complaint does not state a valid claim for relief against any defendant. Plaintiff makes only 20 general allegations that Macomber is liable because of his position as CDCR Secretary. There is 21 no supervisory liability under § 1983 and plaintiff must allege facts showing Macomber’s 22 personal involvement in the violations. To the extent plaintiff alleges that Macomber was 23 responsible for the policy regarding lack of food substitutions for allergies, his only alleged harm 24 is that he did not receive sufficient food on days when fish was served. There are no facts 25 indicating how often fish was served or whether plaintiff was able to eat any other food served on 26 those days that would support an inference that the reduction in food created a serious risk of 27 injury. Plaintiff also fails to state a due process claim against Macomber or Kincaid based on the 28 unauthorized deduction of money from his trust account because California has an adequate post- 1 deprivation remedy. To the extent plaintiff may be attempting to state claims against any 2 individuals he claims were involved in carrying out the alleged violations, he has not identified 3 them as defendants or made specific allegations against them. 4 Because of these defects, the court will not order the complaint to be served on 5 defendants. Plaintiff may try to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. In deciding 6 whether to file an amended complaint, plaintiff is provided with the relevant legal standards 7 governing his potential claims for relief which are attached to this order. See Attachment A 8 IV. Legal Standards Governing Amended Complaints 9 If plaintiff chooses to file an amended complaint, he must demonstrate how the conditions 10 about which he complains resulted in a deprivation of his constitutional rights. Rizzo v. Goode, 11 423 U.S. 362, 370-71 (1976). The complaint must also allege in specific terms how each named 12 defendant is involved. Arnold v. Int’l Bus. Machs. Corp., 637 F.2d 1350, 1355 (9th Cir. 1981). 13 There can be no liability under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 unless there is some affirmative link or 14 connection between a defendant’s actions and the claimed deprivation. Id.; Johnson v. Duffy, 15 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 1978). Furthermore, “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official 16 participation in civil rights violations are not sufficient.” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 17 268 (9th Cir. 1982) (citations omitted). 18 Plaintiff is also informed that the court cannot refer to a prior pleading in order to make 19 his amended complaint complete. Local Rule 220 requires that an amended complaint be 20 complete in itself without reference to any prior pleading. This is because, as a general rule, an 21 amended complaint supersedes any prior complaints. Loux v. Rhay, 375 F.2d 55, 57 (9th Cir. 22 1967) (citations omitted). Once plaintiff files an amended complaint, any previous complaint no 23 longer serves any function in the case. Therefore, in an amended complaint, as in an original 24 complaint, each claim and the involvement of each defendant must be sufficiently alleged. 25 V. Plain Language Summary of this Order for Party Proceeding Without a Lawyer 26 Your complaint will not be served because the facts alleged are not enough to state a 27 claim. You are being given a chance to fix these problems by filing an amended complaint. If 28 you file an amended complaint, pay particular attention to the legal standards attached to this 1 | order. Be sure to provide facts that show exactly what each defendant did to violate your rights. 2 | Any claims and information not in the amended complaint will not be considered. 3 CONCLUSION 4 In accordance with the above, IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that: 5 1. Plaintiff's motion to proceed in forma pauperis (ECF No. 2) is GRANTED. 6 2. Plaintiff is obligated to pay the statutory filing fee of $350.00 for this action. Plaintiff 7 || is assessed an initial partial filing fee in accordance with the provisions of 28 U.S.C. 8 | § 1915(b)(1). All fees shall be collected and paid in accordance with this court’s order to the 9 || appropriate agency filed concurrently herewith. 10 3. Plaintiffs complaint fails to state a claim upon which relief may be granted, see 28 11 | U.S.C. § 1915A, and will not be served. 12 4. Within thirty days from the date of service of this order, plaintiff may file an amended 13 || complaint that complies with the requirements of the Civil Rights Act, the Federal Rules of Civil 14 || Procedure, and the Local Rules of Practice. The amended complaint must bear the docket 15 || number assigned this case and must be labeled “First Amended Complaint.” 16 5. Failure to file an amended complaint in accordance with this order will result in a 17 || recommendation that this action be dismissed pursuant to Rule 41(b) of the Federal Rules of Civil 18 || Procedure. 19 6. The Clerk of the Court is directed to send plaintiff a copy of the prisoner complaint 20 | form used in this district. 21 | DATED: December 3, 2025 Ate0r— [U, ‘ , 22 ALLISON CLAIRE 33 UNITED STATES MAGISTRATE JUDGE

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1 Attachment A 2 This Attachment provides, for informational purposes only, the legal standards that may 3 apply to your claims for relief. Pay particular attention to these standards if you choose to file an 4 amended complaint. 5 A. Personal Involvement and Supervisory Liability 6 “Liability under § 1983 must be based on the personal involvement of the defendant,” 7 Barren v. Harrington, 152 F.3d 1193, 1194 (9th Cir. 1998) (citing May v. Enomoto, 633 F.2d 8 164, 167 (9th Cir. 1980)), and “[v]ague and conclusory allegations of official participation in civil 9 rights violations are not sufficient,” Ivey v. Bd. of Regents, 673 F.2d 266, 268 (9th Cir. 1982) 10 (citations omitted). “A person ‘subjects’ another to the deprivation of a constitutional right, 11 within the meaning of section 1983, if he does an affirmative act, participates in another’s 12 affirmative acts, or omits to perform an act which he is legally required to do that causes the 13 deprivation of which complaint is made.” Johnson v. Duffy, 588 F.2d 740, 743 (9th Cir. 14 1978) (citation omitted). In other words, to state a claim for relief under section 1983, plaintiff 15 must link each individual defendant with some affirmative act or omission that shows a violation 16 of plaintiff’s federal rights. 17 Furthermore, “[t]here is no respondeat superior liability under section 1983,” Taylor v. 18 List, 880 F.2d 1040, 1045 (9th Cir. 1989) (citation omitted), which means that a supervisor 19 cannot be held responsible for the conduct of his subordinates just because he is their supervisor. 20 “A supervisor is only liable for constitutional violations of his subordinates if the supervisor 21 participated in or directed the violations, or knew of the violations and failed to act to prevent 22 them.” Id. A supervisor may also be liable, without any personal participation, if he 23 “implement[ed] a policy so deficient that the policy ‘itself is a repudiation of the constitutional 24 rights’ and is ‘the moving force of the constitutional violation.’” Hansen v. Black, 885 F.2d 642, 25 646 (9th Cir. 1989) (quoting Thompkins v. Belt, 828 F.2d 298, 304 (5th Cir. 1987)). 26 B. Failure to Protect 27 “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two requirements are met. 28 First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, sufficiently serious; a prison official’s act or 1 omission must result in the denial of the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.” Farmer 2 v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 834 (1994) (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). Second, 3 the prison official must subjectively have a sufficiently culpable state of mind, “one of deliberate 4 indifference to inmate health or safety.” Id. (internal quotation marks and citations omitted). The 5 official is not liable under the Eighth Amendment unless he “knows of and disregards an 6 excessive risk to inmate health or safety.” Id. at 837. He must then fail to take reasonable 7 measures to lessen the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 847. Negligent failure to protect an 8 inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Id. at 835. 9 C. Strip Searches 10 The Fourth Amendment protects against unreasonable searches, and that right is not lost 11 to convicted inmates. Jordan v. Gardner, 986 F.2d 1521, 1524 (9th Cir. 1993). However, 12 “incarcerated prisoners retain a limited right to bodily privacy.” Michenfelder v. Sumner, 860 13 F.2d 328, 333 (9th Cir. 1988) (emphasis added). 14 A detention facility’s strip-search policy is analyzed using the test for reasonableness 15 outlined in Bell v. Wolfish, as “[t]he Fourth Amendment prohibits only unreasonable searches.” 16 Bull v. City and County of San Francisco, 595 F.3d 964, 971-72 (9th Cir. 2010) (alteration in 17 original) (internal quotation marks omitted) (quoting Bell, 441 U.S. at 558). Under Bell, the court 18 must balance “the need for the particular search against the invasion of personal rights that the 19 search entails.” 441 U.S. at 559. In order to do so, courts must consider “the scope of the 20 particular intrusion, the manner in which it is conducted, the justification for initiating it, and the 21 place in which it is conducted.” Id. Strip searches that are limited to “visual inspection,” even if 22 “invasive and embarrassing,” can be resolved in favor of the institution. Bull, 595 F.3d at 975 23 (holding that visual strip searches that are held in a “professional manner and in a place that 24 afforded privacy” and done to prevent the smuggling of contraband did not violate Fourth 25 Amendment). However, searches done for the purpose of harassment are not constitutionally 26 valid—the Supreme Court has held that “intentional harassment of even the most hardened 27 criminals cannot be tolerated” by the Fourth Amendment’s protections. Hudson v. Palmer, 468 28 U.S. 517, 528 (1984). 1 D. Deliberate Indifference to Medical Needs 2 “[T]o maintain an Eighth Amendment claim based on prison medical treatment, an inmate 3 must show ‘deliberate indifference to serious medical needs.’” Jett v. Penner, 439 F.3d 1091, 4 1096 (9th Cir. 2006) (quoting Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 (1976)). This requires plaintiff 5 to show (1) “a ‘serious medical need’ by demonstrating that ‘failure to treat a prisoner’s condition 6 could result in further significant injury or the unnecessary and wanton infliction of pain,’” and 7 (2) “the defendant’s response to the need was deliberately indifferent.” Id. (some internal 8 quotation marks omitted) (quoting McGuckin v. Smith, 974 F.2d 1050, 1059-60 (9th Cir. 1992)). 9 A plaintiff can establish deliberate indifference “by showing (a) a purposeful act or failure 10 to respond to a prisoner’s pain or possible medical need and (b) harm caused by the 11 indifference.” Id. (citing McGuckin, 974 F.2d at 1060). Deliberate indifference “may appear 12 when prison officials deny, delay or intentionally interfere with medical treatment, or it may be 13 shown by the way in which prison physicians provide medical care.” Hutchinson v. United 14 States, 838 F.2d 390, 394 (9th Cir. 1988) (citation omitted). “[A] complaint that a physician has 15 been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state a valid claim of 16 medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.” Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106. 17 E. Conditions of Confinement 18 “The Constitution does not mandate comfortable prisons, but neither does it permit 19 inhumane ones.” Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 832 (1994) (internal quotation marks and 20 citation omitted). “[A] prison official violates the Eighth Amendment only when two 21 requirements are met.” Id. at 834. 22 “First, the deprivation alleged must be, objectively, ‘sufficiently serious.’” Id. (quoting 23 Wilson v. Seiter, 501 U.S. 294, 298 (1991)). To be sufficiently serious, “a prison official’s act or 24 omission must result in the denial of ‘the minimal civilized measure of life’s necessities.’” Id. 25 (quoting Rhodes v. Chapman, 452 U.S. 337, 347 (1981)). “[R]outine discomfort inherent in the 26 prison setting” does not rise to the level of a constitutional violation. Johnson v. Lewis, 217 F.3d 27 726, 732 (9th Cir. 2000). Rather, “extreme deprivations are required to make out a[n] [Eighth 28 Amendment] conditions-of-confinement claim.” Hudson v. McMillian, 503 U.S. 1, 9 (1992). 1 “More modest deprivations can also form the objective basis of a violation, but only if such 2 deprivations are lengthy or ongoing.” Johnson, 217 F.3d at 732. 3 Second, the prison official must subjectively have a “sufficiently culpable state of mind,” 4 “one of ‘deliberate indifference’ to inmate health or safety.” Farmer, 511 U.S. at 834 (citations 5 omitted). “[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn 6 that a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and he must also draw the inference.” Id. at 837. He 7 must then fail to take reasonable measures to lessen the substantial risk of serious harm. Id. at 8 847. If a prison official’s response to a known risk is reasonable, they “cannot be found liable.” 9 Id. at 845. Negligent failure to protect an inmate from harm is not actionable under § 1983. Id. at 10 835. 11 F. Deprivation of Property 12 Intentional or negligent deprivations of property by a prison official that are unauthorized 13 do not state a claim under § 1983 if the state provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy. 14 Hudson v. Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984). The Ninth Circuit has ruled that “California Law 15 provides an adequate post-deprivation remedy for any property deprivations.” Barnett v. Centoni, 16 31 F.3d 813, 816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (per curiam) (citing Cal. Gov’t Code §§ 810-895). The 17 deprivation of property only states a claim for violation of due process if the deprivation was 18 intentional and authorized. An authorized deprivation is one carried out pursuant to established 19 state procedures, regulations, or statutes. Piatt v. MacDougall, 773 F.2d 1032, 1036 (9th Cir. 20 1985). 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28