Maurice Darnell Buckner v. Commonwealth of Virginia

• Court: Court of Appeals of Virginia
• Decided: March 6, 2001
• Docket: 1006002
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

COURT OF APPEALS OF VIRGINIA

Present: Chief Judge Fitzpatrick, Judges Willis and Clements Argued at Alexandria, Virginia

MAURICE DARNELL BUCKNER MEMORANDUM OPINION * BY v. Record No. 1006-00-2 JUDGE JERE M. H. WILLIS, JR. MARCH 6, 2001 COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA

FROM THE CIRCUIT COURT OF THE CITY OF CHARLOTTESVILLE Edward L. Hogshire, Judge

Darryl A. Parker for appellant.

Linwood T. Wells, Jr., Assistant Attorney General (Mark L. Earley, Attorney General, on brief), for appellee.

On appeal from his bench trial conviction of robbery, in

violation of Code § 18.2-58, Maurice Darnell Buckner contends

(1) that the Commonwealth failed to corroborate his confession

and thus failed to prove the corpus delicti and (2) that the

evidence was insufficient because the Commonwealth failed to

disprove his claim that he had the right to take the money. For

the reasons that follow, we affirm the judgment of the trial

court.

I. BACKGROUND

Buckner was charged with robbing Ricco Wells. The

Commonwealth called three witnesses, Wells and two police

* Pursuant to Code § 17.1-413, this opinion is not designated for publication. officers. Although Wells testified that he could not "remember

that day," he testified that he had a "conflict" with Buckner on

February 7, 1999. He further testified that this "conflict"

occurred on 10th Street in the City of Charlottesville.

Detective Thomas Thornton of the Charlottesville Police

Department testified that on February 7, 1999, he took a police

report from Wells. Based on the information that Wells

provided, Buckner was suspected of robbing Wells. Detective

Thornton and two other officers went to a nearby home where they

found Buckner hiding in a closet. Buckner was taken into

custody and was read his Miranda rights. He agreed to talk to

the officers. He admitted taking money from Wells. He then led

the officers to 301 10th Street where he told them he had

discarded the nightstick that he had used during the incident.

The nightstick was recovered from that location. Buckner was

then transported to the police station where he signed a written

statement confessing the crime. Detective Thornton read into

evidence Buckner's statement, as follows:

I was riding around with some friends drinking beer all night. They decided to buy some drugs. They saw Ricco Wells on 10th Street. I got out of the car. Ricco sold to the others in the car. I had a black nightstick in my hand. Ricco had money in his hand. I went up to Ricco and said give me some money or I'll bust your head open. I grabbed the $50 from Ricco's hand. I took the money because Ricco sells dummies, and the money isn't his anyway.

- 2 - Officer Robert Lowry testified that he accompanied

Detective Thornton in locating Buckner and the nightstick. He

testified that Buckner took the officers to 301 10th Street

where they located "[a] black baton with a rubber handle." The

black baton was admitted into evidence.

II. CORROBORATION OF A CONFESSION

Buckner first contends that his confession of robbery was

uncorroborated and was, thus, insufficient to prove the corpus

delicti. We disagree.

In every criminal prosecution, the Commonwealth must prove the element of corpus delicti, that is, the fact that the crime charged has been actually perpetrated. Further, if the accused has fully confessed that he committed the crime, then only slight corroboration of the confession is required to establish corpus delicti beyond a reasonable doubt.

Cherrix v. Commonwealth, 257 Va. 292, 305, 513 S.E.2d 642, 651

(1999) (citations omitted). "[A] confession is competent

evidence tending to prove, along with other evidence, the corpus

delicti, although corpus delicti cannot be established by the

uncorroborated extrajudicial confession of the accused alone."

Canady v. Commonwealth, 214 Va. 331, 333, 200 S.E.2d 575, 576

(1973) (citation omitted).

It is not necessary . . . that there be independent corroboration of all the contents of the confession, or even all the elements of the crime. The requirement of corroboration is limited to the facts constituting the corpus delicti. . . . [W]here . . . the accused has fully

- 3 - confessed the crime, only slight corroborative evidence is necessary to establish the corpus delicti.

Watkins v. Commonwealth, 238 Va. 341, 348-49, 385 S.E.2d 50, 54

(1989), cert. denied, 494 U.S. 1074 (1990) (citation omitted).

The corroborative evidence in this case is far from slight.

Although Wells did not describe the details of the robbery, he

testified that he had a confrontation with Buckner in the area

where Buckner said the robbery was committed. Buckner fled and

hid. Buckner led the police to the location on 10th Street

where he said he had discarded the nightstick. The police

recovered the nightstick at that exact location, and it was

admitted into evidence. Buckner had a motive to take the money,

e.g., Wells was selling "dummies." This evidence more than

sufficiently corroborated Buckner's full confession and,

together with that confession, established the corpus delicti.

III. SUFFICIENCY OF THE EVIDENCE

Buckner next contends that the evidence was insufficient to

support his conviction. Citing Pierce v. Commonwealth, 205 Va.

528, 138 S.E.2d 28 (1964), he argues that because he took the

property "under a bona fide claim of right, as under a claim of

ownership or in a bona fide attempt to enforce payment of a

debt," he lacked the necessary criminal intent to steal. Id. at

533, 138 S.E.2d at 32. Buckner's argument stems from the

portion of his confession where he states that "[he] took the

money because [Wells] sells dummies, and the money [wasn't

- 4 - Wells'] anyway." He argues that this statement compels the

conclusion that he acted under a claim of right, thus absolving

him. We disagree.

Although Buckner testified that he believed Wells owed his

friends some money, no other evidence supported this claim. No

connection was made between the amount Buckner took from Wells

and the amount of any alleged debt. The trial court was

entitled to disbelieve Buckner.

Accordingly, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Affirmed.

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