NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited . R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY APPELLATE DIVISION DOCKET NO. A-1428-24
MAURICE CLINE,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF PATERSON and TIMOTHY MUNGO,
Defendants-Respondents. __________________________
Argued March 2, 2026 – Decided March 25, 2026
Before Judges Walcott-Henderson and Bergman.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law Division, Passaic County, Docket No. L-1475-22.
Fredrick L. Rubenstein argued the cause for appellant (Shah & Rubenstein, LLC, attorneys; Fredrick L. Rubenstein, on the briefs).
Christopher K. Harriott argued the cause for respondents (Florio Kenny Raval LLP, attorneys; Christopher K. Harriott, on the brief).
PER CURIAM Plaintiff Maurice Cline appeals from a December 10, 2024 order granting
summary judgment in favor of the City of Paterson (the City) and Timothy
Mungo (Mungo) (collectively defendants). Cline's complaint alleged hostile
work environment and retaliation claims against defendants pursuant to the New
Jersey Law Against Discrimination (LAD), N.J.S.A. 10:5-1 to -50, and the
Conscientious Employee Protection Act (CEPA), N.J.S.A. 34:19-1 to -8. For
the reasons that follow, we affirm.
I.
We begin by reviewing the facts in the summary judgment record, viewed
in the light most favorable to Cline as the non-moving party. Brill v. Guardian
Life Ins. Co. of Am., 142 N.J. 520, 540 (1995).
Cline began working for the City in 2020 as a building maintenance and
repair worker in the facilities department. From the outset, Cline was supervised
by and reported to both Louis Guzman, Director of Facilities and senior
supervisor, and Mungo, a junior supervisor. During this period, Cline claimed
to have overheard an offensive statement made by Guzman about Jamaicans.
Cline, however, did not file a complaint regarding Guzman's comment, but was
subsequently interviewed about the incident by the City's Law Department in
connection with another employee's complaint concerning the same remark.
A-1428-24 2 Several months later, on February 8, 2021, Cline was injured at work
while moving a filing cabinet under Mungo's supervision. Cline was out of work
for approximately six months, during which time he filed a workers'
compensation claim. Cline returned to work in August 2021 with restrictions
against heavy lifting. Despite these restrictions, Cline claims Mungo asked him
to lift heavy objects. Cline complained to the City and sought a transfer to a
less physically demanding position, which he claims prompted Guzman and
William Rodriguez, the Director of Public Works, to give him a "hard time."
According to Cline, approximately two months later, Mungo directed him
to pick up paint and a large bucket of spackle. Cline carried the paint but left
the spackle and immediately complained of sharp back pain. The next day, Cline
received a write-up for incompetency and insubordination, and was informed
that he would need a fitness for duty exam if he refused to perform his duties.
Despite this write-up, however, Cline was never formally disciplined.
In another incident, at "some point in 'late 2021,'" Cline was present when
Juan Hernandez, a co-worker, "came driving real fast through the park," nearly
striking Cline and another co-worker. When asked about the reason for his
reckless driving, Hernandez allegedly responded, "he [drove] like that so he
A-1428-24 3 could kill Jamaicans." At the time, Cline did not formally complain about
Hernandez's statement.
On November 3, 2021, Cline filed a workplace harassment complaint
against Mungo, asserting he was unfairly asked to lift heavy objects following
his return from workers' compensation leave despite his medical restrictions.
The following month, Cline filed a supplemental complaint alleging that Mungo
wore a body camera and recorded him while he performed his duties, and that
Mungo interrupted his assignments even when Cline was not under his direct
supervision, causing him emotional distress. The City commenced a workplace
investigation and interviewed Cline and several other employees.
The investigator issued her finding on April 25, 2022, concluding that
Cline "was disciplined because he failed to complete his work assignments, not
because of his membership [in] a protected class" based on any characteristic in
the City's Personnel Policies and Procedures Manual or the LAD. The
investigator further concluded no harassment occurred. Cline was subsequently
transferred to another position within the facilities department where he was no
longer supervised by Mungo.
In June 2022, Cline filed a three-count discrimination complaint in the
Law Division, alleging violations of the LAD and CEPA. A period of discovery
A-1428-24 4 ensued wherein Cline was deposed. Regarding the incident involving Guzman,
Cline stated:
I can't tell you what initiated the conversation because I really wasn't paying attention to it initially. . . . [O]nce he made the comment, I turned around and was like, you know, you got three Jamaicans standing in front of you. And he went further on about saying how he didn't like both Jamaicans and Dominicans. And my remark was, but you're Dominican, and he went to go explain, and I kind of walked off because I was – you know, I just didn't want to hear it anymore.
Guzman's comments were allegedly made in Cline's presence, although
they were not directed at him. Two other employees were also in the vicinity at
the time and one of them filed a complaint against Guzman and named Cline as
a witness. The record does not contain any additional deposition testimony from
any other party or witness related to this incident.
On August 30, 2024, defendants moved for summary judgment, arguing
Cline could not establish a disability-based hostile work environment claim, the
alleged remarks were neither severe nor pervasive, and that Cline suffered no
adverse employment action or retaliation.
On December 10, the motion judge granted summary judgment in favor
of defendants, dismissing Cline's complaint with prejudice. The motion judge
concluded that there was "[in]sufficient evidence at this stage to support an
A-1428-24 5 adverse employment action," and, thus, Cline failed to meet the prerequisites for
either of his LAD or CEPA claims. The court reasoned that Cline was never
formally disciplined and "a worker[s'] compensation claim in and of itself is not
a protected characteristic" for purposes of raising a claim under LAD. The court
found that the two alleged anti-Jamaican remarks made by different individuals
roughly a year apart were, at most, "offensive, perhaps rude," but not severe and
pervasive, particularly where no adverse employment action resulted. This
appeal followed.
II.
We review de novo the trial court's grant of summary judgment to
defendants. Branch v. Cream-O-Land Dairy, 244 N.J. 567, 582 (2021) (citing
Townsend v. Pierre, 221 N.J. 36, 59 (2015)). In considering a summary
judgment motion, "both trial and appellate courts must view the facts in the light
most favorable to the non-moving party." Bauer v. Nesbitt, 198 N.J. 601, 604
n.1 (2009). That standard compels the grant of summary judgment "if the
pleadings, depositions, answers to interrogatories and admissions on file,
together with the affidavits, if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any
material fact challenged and that the moving party is entitled to a judgment or
order as a matter of law." R. 4:46-2(c).
A-1428-24 6 In deciding whether a genuine issue of material fact exists, "the motion
judge must 'consider whether the competent evidential materials presented,
when viewed in the light most favorable to the non-moving party, are sufficient
to permit a rational factfinder to resolve the alleged disputed issue in favor of
the non-moving party.'" Green v. Monmouth Univ., 237 N.J. 516, 529 (2019)
(citing Brill, 142 N.J. at 540). However, this court owes "no deference to the
motion judge's conclusions on issues of law." Bove v. AkPharma Inc., 460 N.J.
Super. 123, 138 (App. Div. 2019) (citing Manalapan Realty, L.P. v. Twp.
Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). Our review of an order
granting summary judgment requires consideration of "the competent evidential
materials submitted by the parties to identify whether there are genuine issues
of material fact and, if not, whether the moving party is entitled to summary
judgment as a matter of law." Bhagat v. Bhagat, 217 N.J. 22, 38 (2014).
A.
We first address Cline's argument that the court erred in granting summary
judgment on his hostile work environment claim brought under the LAD.
To establish a cause of action for a hostile work environment under the
LAD, a plaintiff must prove by a preponderance of the evidence "that the
complained-of conduct (1) would not have occurred but for the employee's
A-1428-24 7 protected status, and was (2) severe or pervasive enough to make a (3)
reasonable person believe that (4) the conditions of employment have been
altered and that the working environment is hostile or abusive." Shepherd v.
Hunterdon Dev. Ctr., 174 N.J. 1, 24 (2002) (citing Lehmann v. Toys 'R' Us, Inc.,
132 N.J. 587, 603-04 (1993)). The principal inquiry in determining severe or
pervasive conduct is whether a reasonable person would believe the conditions
of his or her employment are altered and the working environment is hostile.
Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 24; Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 604.
The LAD is not intended to be a general workplace civility code. The
reasonable person standard views the conduct objectively and does not allow
"claims based on the idiosyncratic response of a hypersensitive plaintiff to
conduct that is not objectively harassing." Lehmann, 132 N.J. at 613. "[T]he
required showing of severity or seriousness of the harassing conduct varies
inversely with the pervasiveness or frequency of the conduct." Id. at 607
(alteration in original) (quoting Ellison v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 878 (9th Cir.
1991)). The burden of proving discrimination "remains with the employee at all
times." Zive v. Stanley Roberts, Inc., 182 N.J. 436, 450 (2005).
Cline alleges that the remarks made by Mungo and Hernandez
demonstrate animosity based on Jamaican ethnicity and support a hostile work
A-1428-24 8 environment claim. Specifically, he contends that his supervisor Guzman's
comment about "not liking Jamaicans," Hernandez's statement that he "drives
like that so he could kill Jamaicans," and the City's handling of his workplace
restrictions and assignments, taken together, create an objectively hostile work
environment. We are unpersuaded.
We note that Cline's claim is predicated on two isolated comments made
over the course of more than a year apart from each other by different
individuals, only one of whom—Guzman—was Cline's supervisor. As the court
acknowledges, these comments may be "offensive, perhaps rude," but they are
not otherwise indicative of a pattern of harassment or hostile conduct in the
workplace. Although made in his presence, neither comment was directed at
Cline. Moreover, the remarks did not materially alter the terms or conditions of
Cline's employment or his working environment. Mere offhanded comments
and isolated incidents are not sufficient to sustain a hostile work environment
claim, unless it becomes "so severe as to pollute the work environment,
rendering it irretrievably hostile." Cutler v. Dorn, 196 N.J. 419, 432 (2008)
(citing Taylor v. Metzger, 152 N.J. 490, 495, 499, 502 (1998)). These remarks,
though inappropriate in the workplace, do not satisfy the LAD standard, which
requires "an outrageous and offensive statement made by a supervisor directly
A-1428-24 9 to the complaining subordinate." El-Sioufi v. St. Peter's University Hosp., 382
N.J. Super. 145, 179 (App. Div. 2005).
Further, to the extent Cline contends that being required to lift heavy items
contributed to a hostile work environment, the City's investigation concluded he
was disciplined for failing to complete work assignments, not for his
membership in a protected class. Protected activity, when based on a complaint,
must concern discrimination. Dunkley v. S. Coraluzzo Petroleum Transporters,
437 N.J. Super. 366, 377 (App. Div. 2014) (citing Reyes v. McDonald Pontiac-
GMC Truck, Inc., 997 F. Supp. 614, 619 (D.N.J. 1998)) (finding complaints
stemming from "outbursts and name-calling" not sexual in nature not to suffice).
We further conclude requesting plaintiff to perform tasks required by his job
were insufficient to create genuine factual issues that the alleged conduct was
"severe or pervasive enough to make a reasonable person believe that the
conditions of employment have been altered and that the working environment
is hostile or abusive." Shepherd, 174 N.J. at 24.
Accordingly, the record does not support Cline's contention that the City's
handling of his work assignments was motivated by discriminatory animus or
contributed to an objectively hostile work environment within the meaning of
the LAD.
A-1428-24 10 B.
Similarly, Cline claims he was subjected to retaliation under the LAD and
CEPA after engaging in protected activity. The prima facie elements of a
retaliation claim require Cline to demonstrate that: (1) he was in a protected
class; (2) he engaged in protected activity known to the employer; (3) he was
thereafter subjected to an adverse employment consequence; and (4) that there
is a causal link between the protected activity and the adverse employment
consequence. Victor v. State, 203 N.J. 383, 409 (2010) (citing Woods-Pirozzi
v. Nabisco Foods, 290 N.J. Super. 252, 274 (App. Div. 1996)).
As the motion judge found, Cline's initial complaint only raised a workers'
compensation claim for the injuries he sustained and did not raise any other basis
for Mungo's actions. Cline points to Mungo's issuance of a disciplinary write-
up as an adverse employment action. Even considering the alleged adverse
employment action in the aggregate, this conduct did not result in any change to
Cline's compensation, rank, or employment status. Cline further fails to show a
causal connection between the alleged adverse employment action and protected
activity as required under the fourth prong of the LAD. He does not identify
any adverse employment action tied to his alleged protected activity, as he
remained employed by the City and was never subjected to formal discipline or
A-1428-24 11 any material change in the terms or conditions of his employment. Thus, even
when viewing the evidence most favorable to Cline, no rational jury could find
that he established a prima facie case for retaliation under the LAD.
Cline's CEPA claim fails for the same reason: he cannot establish an
adverse employment action, protected whistleblower activity, or a causal
connection between his November 2021 complaint and any alleged retaliatory
conduct.
Under the CEPA, Cline must show:
1. That [he] reasonably believes that [his] employer's conduct was violating either a law, or regulation promulgated pursuant to law;
2. [T]hat [he] performed a 'whistle-blowing' activity described in N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(a);
3. [T]hat an adverse employment action was taken against [him]; and
4. [T]hat a causal connection exists between the whistle-blowing activity and the adverse employment action.
[Dzwonar v. McDevitt, 177 N.J. 451, 462 (2003) (citing Kolb v. Burns, 320 N.J. Super. 467, 476 (App. Div. 1999)).]
Cline asserts that his complaints and cooperation in his co-worker's
discrimination investigation constituted "whistle-blowing" activity protected
A-1428-24 12 under CEPA. In pertinent part, CEPA defines whistle-blowing activity as
"[d]isclos[ing], or threaten[ing] to disclose to a supervisor or to a public body
an activity, policy or practice of the employer . . . that the employee reasonably
believes" violates the law, a rule, or a regulation, or is "fraudulent or criminal"
in nature. N.J.S.A. 34:19-3(c)(1) to (2). Even if Cline established that his
internal harassment complaints about Guzman and Mungo and his participation
as a witness constitutes protected whistleblowing activity, he fails to satisfy the
remaining CEPA factors.
Retaliatory conduct under CEPA refers to "the discharge, suspension or
demotion of an employee, or other adverse employment action taken against an
employee in the terms and conditions of employment." N.J.S.A. 34:19-2(e).
Our court requires such actions either impact on the employee's "compensation
or rank" or be "virtually equivalent to discharge" in order to give rise to the level
of a retaliatory action required for a CEPA claim. Klein v. Univ. of Med. and
Dentistry of N.J., 377 N.J. Super. 28, 46 (App. Div. 2005) (citing Hancock v.
Borough of Oaklyn, 347 N.J. Super. 350, 360 (App. Div. 2002)).
Again, Cline does not point to any suspension, demotion, termination,
reduction in pay, or other material alteration of employment following his
alleged whistleblower activity. Additionally, after his October 2021 write-up,
A-1428-24 13 Cline received no formal discipline, and the City took remedial action by
transferring him, at his request, to a different supervisor in a position that did
not require heavy lifting. We are satisfied neither the reassignment nor the
friction or "hard time" Cline encountered with management constitutes an
adverse employment action under CEPA. See Hancock, 347 N.J. Super. at 360
("Not every employment action that makes an employee unhappy constitutes an
actionable adverse action under CEPA").
Because Cline cannot show an adverse employment action, he likewise
cannot establish a causal connection to any alleged whistleblowing activity. The
record is devoid of any evidence connecting Cline's supervisors' actions to
retaliatory animus in response to the alleged protected activity. Temporal
proximity alone, unsupported by evidence of a material employment detriment
or circumstances permitting a reasonable inference of retaliatory motive, is
insufficient to establish causation. See Maimone v. City of Atl. City, 188 N.J.
221, 237 (2006); Dickson v. Community Bus Lines, Inc., 458 N.J. Super. 522,
533 (App. Div. 2019).
C.
Cline next argues that Mungo should be individually liable under the
LAD's "aiding and abetting" provision, asserting that as a supervisor, he was
A-1428-24 14 involved in some "affirmative acts of discrimination." Cline further contends
that Mungo may be liable for aiding and abetting "because Mungo had
supervisory authority over [him] and Guzman directly engaged in acts [that]
discriminated against and harassed [him] on the basis of his race."
The LAD makes it "unlawful '[f]or any person, whether an employer or an
employee or not, to aid, abet, incite, compel or coerce the doing of any of the
acts forbidden [under the LAD],' N.J.S.A. 10:5-12[(e)], and such conduct may
result in personal liability." N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e); Tarr v. Ciasulli, 181 N.J. 70,
83 (2004).
To establish a prima facie case for aiding and abetting under the LAD, a
plaintiff must prove:
(1) the party whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury; (2) the defendant must be generally aware of his role as part of an overall illegal or tortious activity at the time that he provides the assistance; [and] (3) the defendant must knowingly and substantially assist the principal violation.
[Id. at 84 (alteration in original) (quoting Hurley v. Atl. City Police Dep't, 174 F.3d 95, 127 (3d Cir. 1999)).]
Individual aiding and abetting liability is limited only to supervisors. See,
e.g., Herman v. Coastal Corp., 348 N.J. Super. 1, 28 (App. Div. 2002). However,
supervisory status alone is insufficient to establish liability. Here, Cline
A-1428-24 15 attempts to tie Mungo's liability to Guzman's alleged discriminatory remarks
about Jamaicans. The record, however, does not support the contention that
Mungo "aided and abetted" any such conduct undertaken by Guzman. To hold
a supervisor liable for aiding and abetting, there must be "active and purposeful
conduct." See Cicchetti v. Morris County Sheriff's Office, 194 N.J. 563, 594
(2008); see also Leang v. Jersey City Bd. of Educ., 198 N.J. 557, 576 (2009).
The record before us, however, is devoid of any evidence that Mungo engaged
in active and purposeful conduct or knowingly and substantially assisted another
in violating the LAD. Thus, Cline fails to establish any underlying violation of
the LAD by defendants. See Tarr, 181 N.J. at 84 (requiring proof that "the party
whom the defendant aids must perform a wrongful act that causes an injury ").
Moreover, even if Cline could establish a viable LAD claim against
defendants, the discrete acts he identifies do not show that Mungo knowingly
participated in or substantially assisted any unlawful discrimination. At best,
Cline seeks to impose individual liability based on Mungo's supervisory status,
which does not satisfy the requirements for aiding and abetting liability under
N.J.S.A. 10:5-12(e). See Cicchetti, 194 N.J. at 594-95.
Accordingly, we conclude the motion judge properly granted summary
judgment because Cline failed to establish the elements of his LAD and CEPA
A-1428-24 16 claims and presented no genuine issue of material fact in opposition to the
motion. See Branch, 244 N.J. at 582; Green, 237 N.J. at 529.
To the extent we have not addressed any of plaintiff's remaining
arguments, we conclude they lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-1428-24 17