Maurice Booker v. State

• Court: Court of Criminal Appeals of Tennessee
• Decided: June 30, 1997
• Docket: 01C01-9606-CC-00271
• Status: Published

Opinion

IN THE COURT OF CRIMINAL APPEALS OF TENNESSEE

AT NASHVILLE FILED MAY 1997 SESSION June 30, 1997

Cecil W. Crowson Appellate Court Clerk

MAURICE BOOKER, ) ) C.C.A. No. 01C01-9606-CC-00271 Appellant, ) ) Williamson County V. ) ) Honorable Donald P. Harris, Judge ) STATE OF TENNESSEE, ) (Post-Conviction) ) Appellee. )

FOR THE APPELLANT: FOR THE APPELLEE:

John H. Henderson Charles W. Burson District Public Defender Attorney General & Reporter

C. Diane Crosier Lisa A. Naylor Assistant District Public Defender Assistant Attorney General 407-C Main Street Criminal Justice Division P.O. Box 68 450 James Robertson Parkway Franklin, TN 37065-0068 Nashville, TN 37243-0493

Joseph D. Baugh, Jr. District Attorney General

Derek K. Smith Assistant District Attorney General Williamson County Courthouse, Suite G-6 P.O. Box 937 Franklin, TN 37065-0937

OPINION FILED: ___________________

AFFIRMED

PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge OPINION

The appellant, Maurice Booker, was convicted of the sale of cocaine and

conspiracy to sell or deliver cocaine. He received an effective sentence of

twenty years. The appellant filed a petition for post-conviction relief alleging that

the reasonable doubt instruction used at his trial was unconstitutional. After a

hearing, his petition was denied. He appeals challenging the constitutionality of

the reasonable doubt jury instruction. Upon review, we affirm.

The appellant contends that the trial court's reasonable doubt jury

instruction violated his constitutional rights. The jury instruction at issue reads as

follows:

Reasonable doubt is that doubt engendered by an investigation of all the proof in the case and an inability, after such investigation, to let the mind rest easily as to the certainty of guilt. Reasonable doubt does not mean a captious, possible or imaginary doubt. Absolute certainty of guilt is not demanded by the law to convict of any criminal charge, but moral certainty is required, and this certainty is required as to every proposition of proof requisite to constitute the offense.

The appellant alleges that this instruction unconstitutionally lowers the state's

burden of proving every element of the offense beyond a reasonable doubt.

Specifically, he avers that the language "let the mind rest easily" and "moral

certainty" taken together suggest to a reasonable juror a lower burden of proof

than what is constitutionally required. In support of his argument, the appellant

cites Rickman v. Dutton, 864 F. Supp. 686 (M.D. Tenn. 1994). In Rickman, the

U.S. District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee found a similar

reasonable doubt instruction unconstitutional.

The Court first points out that it is not bound by rulings of the lower federal

courts or those of sister states. State v. Jones, 598 S.W.2d 209 (Tenn. 1980).

Moreover, this Court and the Tennessee Supreme Court have specifically

addressed and upheld the constitutionality of very similar reasonable doubt

instructions. State v. Nichols, 877 S.W.2d 722 (Tenn. 1994); Pettyjohn v. State,

-2- 885 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tenn. Crim. App. 1994). We find that the reasonable

doubt instruction given at the appellant's trial properly reflects the evidentiary

certainty required by the state and federal constitutions. The instruction clearly

conveyed the jury's responsibility to decide the verdict based on the facts and the

law. The appellant's contention is without merit. The judgment dismissing his

petition is affirmed.

________________________________ PAUL G. SUMMERS, Judge

CONCUR:

_____________________________ DAVID G. HAYES, Judge

_____________________________ JERRY L. SMITH, Judge

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