Maureen Simmonds Gibson v. Department of the Army

Merit Systems Protection Board·Decided October 18, 2022·No. DA-0752-16-0092-I-1·Unpublished

Opinion

UNITED STATES OF AMERICA MERIT SYSTEMS PROTECTION BOARD

MAUREEN A. SIMMONDS GIBSON, DOCKET NUMBER Appellant, DA-0752-16-0092-I-1

v.

DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY, DATE: October 18, 2022 Agency.

THIS FINAL ORDER IS NONPRECEDENTIAL 1

Maureen A. Simmonds Gibson, Killeen, Texas, pro se.

Blaine Markuson, Esquire, Fort McCoy, Wisconsin, for the agency.

BEFORE

Cathy A. Harris, Vice Chairman Raymond A. Limon, Member Tristan L. Leavitt, Member

FINAL ORDER

¶1 The appellant has filed a petition for review of the in itial decision, which sustained her removal for failure to maintain a condition of employment . For the reasons set forth below, the appellant’s petition for review is DISMISSED as untimely filed without good cause shown. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e), (g).

1 A nonprecedential order is one that the Board has determined does not add significantly to the body of MSPB case law. Parties may cite nonprecedential orders, but such orders have no precedential value; the Board and administrative judges are not required to follow or distinguish them in any future decisions. In contrast, a precedential decision issued as an Opinion and Order has been identified by the Board as significantly contributing to the Board’s case law. See 5 C.F.R. § 1201.117(c). 2

BACKGROUND ¶2 Effective November 1, 2015, the agency removed the appellant from the position of U.S. Army Reserve Unit Administrator for failure to maintain a condition of employment. Initial Appeal File (IAF), Tab 5 at 15, 17-19. On November 20, 2015, the appellant filed an appeal through the Board’s e-Appeal system in which she alleged that the removal was “rushed” because she had requested and was approved to take leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act of 1993 (FMLA). IAF, Tab 1 at 6. On April 12, 2016, the administrative judge held a telephonic hearing in the appeal, and on May 26, 2016, she issued an order reopening the record to allow the parties an opportunity to file evidence and argument on the appellant’s affirmative defense and notifying the appellant of her burden to establish by preponderant evidence that her FMLA activity was a motivating factor in the removal. IAF, Tabs 15-16. In her May 26, 2016 Order, the administrative judge ordered the appellant to file evidence and argument regarding her affirmative defense by June 2, 2016, and warned that if the appellant failed to file a response by the deadline, she would have waived her affirmative defense. IAF, Tab 16 at 3. The appellant failed to respond to the order, and on June 10, 2016, the administrative judge issued an initial decision affirming the agency’s removal action. IAF, Tab 17, Initial Decision (ID). The initial decision informed the appellant that the decision would become final on July 15, 2016, unless a petition for review was filed by that date and informed the appellant how to file a petition for review. ID at 4-5. The initial decision reflects that it was sent to the appellant, as a registered electronic filer (e-filer), by electronic mail on June 10, 2016. IAF, Tab 18. ¶3 The appellant sent correspondence to the Board’s Dallas Regional Office dated August 20, 2016, which was then forwarded to the Office of the Clerk of the Board. Petition for Review (PFR) File, Tab 1. In response to a request for clarification from the Clerk of the Board, the appellant confirmed that she 3

intended this correspondence to be considered a petition for review. PFR File, Tabs 2-3. The Clerk of the Board informed the appellant that her petition was untimely filed and notified her that such a petition must be accompanied by a motion to accept the filing as timely or to waive the time limit for good cause. PFR File, Tab 4 at 1-2. The Clerk’s notice afforded the appellant an opportunity to file the required motion. Id. at 2. ¶4 The appellant submitted a motion and sworn statement addressing her untimely filing. PFR File, Tab 5. In her sworn statement, the appellant first asserted that she did not view the initial decision in her personal email until on or about July 8, 2016. Id. at 3. She stated that, following the hearing in April 2016, she reviewed her emails and checked the Board repository for the next 2 months but was not aware of the affirmative defense order. Id. She further stated that she did not receive any telephone contact regarding the order, whereas she had been contacted about orders issued and her deadline to respond by telephone in the past. 2 Id. The appellant also asserted that she composed a letter dated July 20, 2016, and mailed the letter the following week, but she misaddressed the envelope enclosing the letter, and the letter was returned to her. Id. She stated that she then updated the date of the letter to August 20, 2016, corrected the address, and mailed the letter later accepted by the Board as her peti tion for review. Id. ¶5 The agency subsequently submitted a response opposing the appellant’s petition, and the appellant submitted a reply to the agency’s response. PFR F ile, Tabs 6-7.

2 It is not clear whether the appellant is asserting that she did not receive telephone contact regarding the affirmative defense order, the initial decision, or both ; accordingly, we address the appellant’s argument with respect to the initial decision. See infra ¶ 8. 4

DISCUSSION OF ARGUMENTS ON REVIEW ¶6 A petition for review generally must be filed within 35 days after the date of the issuance of the initial decision or, if the appellant shows that the initial decision was received more than 5 days after the initial decision was issued, within 30 days after the date the appellant received the initial de cision. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(e). The Board will waive this time limit only upon a showing of good cause for the delay in filing. 5 C.F.R. § 1201.114(g). To establish good cause for the untimely filing of a petition, a party must show that she exercised due diligence or ordinary prudence under the particular circumstances of the case. Rivera v. Social Security Administration, 111 M.S.P.R. 581, 583 (2009) (citing Alonzo v. Department of the Air Force, 4 M.S.P.R. 180, 184 (1980)). To determine whether an appellant has shown good cause, the Board will consider the length of the delay, the reasonableness of her excuse and her showing of due diligence, whether she is proceeding pro se, and whether she has presented evidence of the existence of circumstances beyond her control that affected her ability to comply with the time limits or of unavoidable casualty or misfortune which similarly shows a causal relationship to her inability to timely file her petition. Id. at 583-84 (citing Moorman v. Department of the Army, 68 M.S.P.R. 60, 62-63 (1995), aff’d, 79 F.3d 1167 (Fed. Cir. 1996) (Table)). Only if the appellant demonstrates good cause does the Board determine whether the agency has shown it would be prejudiced by a waiver of the time limit. Moorman, 68 M.S.P.R. at 63. ¶7 To the extent the appellant may be attempting to show that she received the initial decision on July 8, 2016, we nevertheless deem her to have received the initial decision on June 10, 2016. The appellant elected to register as an e-filer at the inception of her appeal. IAF, Tab 1 at 3. The appeal form and the Board’s e-filer regulations provide that, as a registered e-filer, the appellant agreed to accept service of documents through electronic service and was required to 5

monitor her case activity at the Repository at e-Appeal Online to ensure she received all case related documents.

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Maureen Simmonds Gibson v. Department of the Army, (Miss. 2022).

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