Mauran v. Warren
Opinion
In the case .cited from the Massachusetts Reports, Warren & Co. acted merely as brokers, and the master appears to have given a gratuitous promise to consign the ship to them, which the court suggests is probably void. Here they [1170]*1170were charterers, and had a right to say where the vessel should discharge, and their commission was part of the consideration for the entire contract. I must confess, however, that I have considerable doubts whether a master can bind himself to put his vessel into the hands of the charterer’s agents at a port of necessity. But in this case he made the assignment after the disaster, when he had a right to do so; and his action seems to have met the approbation of the libellant, so that no question of ultra vires arises. All that I have to decide is, why the contract was broken, and whether the respondents are entitled to any damages which they can recoup in this action.
Upon the preponderance of the evidence, it seems to me that the true account is that given by the Seotts; that the master refused to show his bills. This is the only thepry that reconciles nearly all the evidence, ánd indeed all, if we suppose that the master has forgotten the reasons given for the refusal. It seems a reasonable and proper precaution for the consignees to take, and is sworn to be usual at Queenstown, to require the accounts to be exhibited; and the master ought not to regard it as any imputation on his honesty. I do not think it is shown that a new contract was entered into in this particular in the interview between the libellant and Mr. Warren. It is not likely that any such point should have been brought up; and the statement of Mr. Mauran appears to be rather of a result, as it rested in his mind after the interview, than of the words, or even the substance, of the conversation; and as the burden rests on him to make out this new contract, and as he is contradicted by Mr. Warren, and to some extent by the other respondents, I cannot hold that he has proved his new contract. Then the case is, that the respondents were ready and willing to furnish the money in the usual way, and, as they swear, kept it on hand for that purpose. It seems to me they are fairly entitled to the two and a half per cent on the disbursements. I remain of the opinion expressed at the hearing, that the true construction of the charter-party is, that they were to charge only this commission. There is evidence that five per cent would have been a reasonable charge, and was paid to the agent actually employed; but this cannot overrule the contract, which agrees for the lesser commission: The respondents undertake to divide the u^ual commission, and to charge one half of it as the commission on disbursements, and the other half for general care of the business; but the custom does not so divide it. If the usual charge had been two per cent, the libellants would still be entitled to two and a half; and so they are when it is five or more. The evidence that an additional two and a half per cent would be a reasonable charge for the general conduct of the business. is only an argument founded on the fact that five per cent is the usual charge at Queenstown, and would be equally strong in favor of three, four, or five per cent, if they had been necessary to make up the usual charge at that port. If the case had been that the master applied to the respondents to do his business for the agreed commission, and they had insisted that they should charge the usual commission, he might well have refused to employ them, and would have had his action against them if he had been obliged to employ some one else at five per cent. It is only on this ground that the contract can be understood, or perhaps supported, at all. But the evidence does not show that this was the cause of quarrel, and, upon the whole, I think they are entitled to their two and a half per cent. This seems to me the time measure of damages for not using the money which was ready and waiting.
The respondents have charged precisely what Dawson, the agent who was applied to, and acted, did charge; namely, five per cent on'disbursements, £25 for care of cargo, and one per cent for indorsing the draft drawn by the master on Baring Brothers, at four months, for the amount of the dis bursements. The measure of damages for not fulfilling the contract and not employing the respondents ought not to include one per cent for indorsing a bill which they never indorsed. It may be that they were to be paid by a bill on a banker, but the libellant would have been at liberty to pay them in some other way. They might as well add the interest for four months, which, I suppose, was added to the draft. For a like reason it seems to me the £25 ought not to be charged. It was for services not rendered. and does not come into the damages for not employing the respondents.
Coming to the charges in Boston, I understand the questions raised to be, — 1. Whether a commission is to be charged on the total amount of the general average loss, or only on that, paid by the cargo and the freight. 2. Whether the commission is to be on the face of the freight bills, or only on the amount collected. 3. Whether the discount which the average adjuster allowed to the respondents from the face of his bill ought to be credited to the libellant, so far as his proportionate share is concerned.
The evidence is not sufficient to enable me to decide the first point to my own satisfaction. I do not know what part the respondents took in the adjustment, nor how these sums were in fact settled and collected. I will hear the case further on this point, if either party desires it
The second point involves only a trifle, as I apprehend. The true rule is, that the libel-lant, by the terms of the charter-party, takes the risk of the solvency of the shippers; but if any freight cannot be collected, he is not to be charged a commission on it.
It is said to be usual for the adjuster to make some discount from his regular charge, for the benefit of the person who gives him [1171]*1171the business. This is common in many trades and callings; but it is plain that, ■when an agent receives such a drawback, he must credit his principal with it. It is, in fact, a deduction from the bill; and he who pays the bill is entitled to it. I have known this question to come up in various forms, and in different courts; but the result has always been the same. The respondents are to have their agreed compensation from the libellant for doing his business, and the expenses. If they can get any work done at less than the market rate, he must have the reduction. It is precisely as if the agent at Queenstown had received a commission from both sides, the libellant and the material-men. I know this is often done; but no court could sanction it as against the principal, and I have not been instructed that any court ever did sanction it. The libel-lant’s proportion of the discount must be credited to him. Interlocutory decree for libellant. Damages to be made up in accordance with this opinion.
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16 F. Cas. 1169 (Mauran v. Warren) — published by Counsel Stack Legal Research, free access to 12M+ legal documents.