Maul v. United States

274 U.S. 501, 47 S. Ct. 735, 71 L. Ed. 1171, 1927 U.S. LEXIS 624

• Court: Supreme Court of the United States
• Decided: May 31, 1927
• Docket: 655
• Status: Published

Opinions

Mr. Justice Van Devanter

delivered the opinion of the Court.

This is a libel .of information for the forfeiture of the Underwriter, an American vessel enrolled and licensed for the coastwise trade. Five causes of forfeiture are set forth. One is that, in violation of § 4377 of the Revised Statutes, the vessel was employed in a trade other than that for which she was licensed. Another is that, in violation of § 4337 of the Revised Statutes, the vessel proceeded from the United States on a foreign voyage without giving up her enrolment and license and without being duly registered. The others are not now insisted on.

In December, 1924, officers of the Coast Guard seized the vessel on the high seas, thirty-four miles from the coast, and turned her over to the collector of customs at New- London, Connecticut, whereupon the libel was filed and the vessel arrested.

The case was heard on an agreed statement of facts and an exception by the claimant, Maul, to the court’s jurisdiction. The exception was sustained on the theory that the officers of the Coast Guard were without authority to seize the vessel at sea more than twelve miles from the coast, and a decree dismissing the libel was entered. 6 Fed. (2d) 937. The Circuit Court of Appeals held the exception untenable, sustained the two causes of forfeiture before stated, and accordingly reversed the decree. 13 Fed. (2d) 433. The claimant petitioned for a review by this Court on certiorari and the petition was granted.

The claimant does not question here that the agreed facts establish the two causes of forfeiture, but does insist that the seizure was made without authority, and particularly that officers of the Coast Guard were not authorized to make such a seizure on the high seas more than twelve miles from the coast. The question has several phases which will be considered.

It is well to bear in mind that the case neither involves the seizure of a foreign vessel nor an exercise of asserted authority to board and search a vessel, domestic or foreign, for the purpose of detecting and thwarting intended smuggling.. The seizure was of an American vessel, then on the high seas and more than twelve miles from the coast, which had become “ liable to seizure and forfeiture ” by reason of definite and accomplished violations of the law under which she was enrolled and. licensed.

Section 45 of the Judicial Code declares: “ Proceedings on seizures made on the high seas, for forfeiture under any law of the United States, may be prosecuted in any district into which the property so seized is brought and proceedings instituted.” This provision originated with the Judiciary Act of 1789, c. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 73, has remained in force ever since, § 734 Rev. Stats., and plainly recognizes that seizures for forfeitures may be made on the high seas. See The Merino, 9 Wheat. 391, 401-402; The Abby, 1 Fed. Cas. p. 26. True, it does not indicate how or by whom the seizures may be effected; but.other provisions speak to the point. There is need to trace them from the beginning; and in doing so it should be in mind that officers of the Coast Guard are to be deemed customs officers, a matter which will be explained later on.

The Act of July 31, 1789, c. 5, 1 Stat. 29, regulating the collection of duties on the tonnage of vessels and on the importation of merchandise, contained several provisions declaring that vessels violating its provisions should be liable to seizure and forfeiture, and also a section (26) authorizing customs officers “ to make seizure of and secure any ship or vessel, goods, or merchandise, which shall be. liable to seizure by virtue of this Act, as well without as within their respective districts.” That Act was repealed by thé Act of August 4, 1790, c. 35, 1 Stat. 145, which enlarged the prior regulations and contained a section (50) giving customs officers the same authority to make seizures that was given before. Next came the Act of March 2, 1799, c. 22, 1 Stat. 627, which again enlarged the regulations and contained a section (70) respecting seizures which was like that in the prior acts. This last provision is now § 3072 of the Revised Statutes and reads as follows:

“ It shall be the duty of the several officers- of the customs to seize and secure any vessel or merchandise which shall become liable to seizure by virtue of any law respecting the revenue, as well without as within their respective districts.”

Along with the provision thus carefully preserved, the several acts contained other provisions distinct from it which authorized customs officers to board and search vessels bound to the United States and to inspect their manifests, examine their cargoes, and prevent any unlading while they were coming in. A supplemental Act of July 18, 1866, c. 201, 14 Stat. 178, enlarged that provision by declaring that, if it appeared to the officer making the search that there had been a violation of the laws of the United States whereby the vessel or any merchandise thereon was liable to forfeiture, he should make seizure of the same. The provision so enlarged became § 3059 of the Revised Statutes. In the early acts the authority to board and search was limited, not only to vessels bound to the United States, but to such as were within the territorial waters of the United States or within four leagues (twelve miles) of the coast. But in the Act of 1866 and in § 3059 of the Revised Statutes the words expressing these restrictions were omitted. Possibly the omission was not significant, for the same restrictions were expressed in § 3067 of the Revised Statutes which related to the boarding and searching of vessels.

The Act of September 21, 1922, c. 356, 42 Stat. 858, 979, 989, repealed §§ 3059 and 3067 of the Revised Statutes and enacted a provision dealing with the same subject and reading as follows:

“Sec. 581. Boarding vessels. Officers of the customs or of the Coast Guard, and agents or other persons authorized by the Secretary of the Treasury, or appointed for that purpose in writing by a collector may at any time go on board of any vessel or vehicle at any place in the United States or within four leagues of the coast of the United States, without as well as within their respective districts, to examine the manifest and to inspect, search, and examine the vessel or vehicle, and every part thereof, and any person, trunk, or package on board, and to this end to hail and stop such vessel or vehicle, if under way, and use all necessary force to compel compliance, and if it shall appear that any breach or violation of the laws of the United States has been committed, whereby or in consequence of which such vessel or vehicle, or the merchandise, or any part thereof, on board of or imported by such vessel or vehicle is liable to forfeiture, it shall be the duty of such officer to make seizure of the same, and to arrest, or, in case of escape or attempted escape, to pursue and arrest any person engaged in such breach or violation.

“Officers of the Department of Commerce and other persons authorized by such department may go on board of any vessel at any place in the United States or within four leagues of the coast of the United States, and hail, stop, and board such vessels in the enforcement of the navigation laws and arrest or, in the case, of escape or attempted escape, pursue and arrest any person engaged in the breach or violation of the navigation laws.”

The last paragraph of this provision relates to the apprehension and arrest of individuals violating the navigation laws, not to the seizure of vessels and neither party bases any contention or argument on it. So it may be passed as without bearing here.

But the claimant contends and the District Court ruled that the first paragraph is now the sole source and measure of the authority of Coast Guard officers to seize vessels, and that, as it provides only for seizure within the United States or within twelve miles of the coast, a seizure outside these limits is- unlawful. The contention is faulty in that it puts aside § .3072 of the Revised Statutes, before quoted, which authorizes customs officers to seize any vessel “ liable to seizure by virtue of any law respecting the revenue ” and declares, without limiting words, that this authority may be exercised “ as well without as within their respective districts.”

Without doubt the provision in the Act of 1922 is intended to take the place of §§ 3059 and 3067 of the Revised Statutes. It deals with the same subject and is accompanied by an express repeal of those sections. But it is not accompanied by a repeal of § 3072, and there is otherwise no reason for thinking it is intended to repeal or disturb that section. While.the new provision and § 3072 are closely related and both are directed to the protection of the revenue, they are distinct, free from real repugnance, and well may stand together. One provides primarily for boarding and searching vessels, within prescribed limits, to discover and prevent intended smuggling, and secondarily for the .prompt seizure of the vessel by the searching officer if the search discloses a violation of law which subjects her to forfeiture. The other provides broadly, and without restriction as to place, for the seizure of vessels which, through violation of the laws respecting revenue, have become liable to seizure. While the former restricts the authority to board and search to particular limits — the territorial waters and the high seas twelve miles outward from the coast — it does not purport to lay such a restriction on seizures. Where the seizure is incidental to a boarding and search under that provision the presence of the vessel within - the prescribed limits' -operates to fix the place of seizure. Possibly the restriction may be said to affect such a seizure, but only in a limited sense. In other seizures, of which there are many, the restriction has no bearing .and no effect.. So no reason appears for thinking Congress clearly intended to displace the general and long continued provision in § 3072. In this situation effect should be given to the familiar rule that in construing altered revenue laws “ the whole system must be regarded in each alteration, and no disturbance allowed of existing legislative rules of general application beyond the clear intention of Congress.” Saxonville Mills v. Russell, 116 U. S. 13, 21; Wood v. United States, 16 Pet. 342, 363; United States v. Sixtyseven Packages of Dry Goods, 17 How. 85, 93.

Thus far it has been assumed that the seizure came within the terms of § 3072; but questions are suggested in this connection which will be noticed.

One question is whether the vessel’s liability to seizure was “ by virtue of any law respecting the revenue.” The liability arose from a violation of §§ 4337 and 4377 of the Revised Statutes — in that the vessel, being enrolled and licensed for the coastwise trade, proceeded on a foreign voyage without giving up her enrolment and license and without being duly registered,² and was employed in a trade other than that for which she was licensed. The sections violated are found in a subdivision of the Revised Statutes entitled “Regulation of Vessels in-Domestic Commerce,” but the arrangement of sections in the Revision is without special significance, Rev. Stats. § 5600. That subdivision includes several provisions designed to regulate commerce by vessels and also to protect the revenue, these being related subjects. A reading of the sections violated in connection with others in the same subdivision³ makes it plain that they are directed to the protection of the revenue; and therefore they come within the terms of § 3072. That they are also regulations of commerce by vessels does not make them any the less laws respecting the revenue. '

Another question is whether officers of the Coast Guard are among those whom the section authorizes to make seizures. It says “ officers of the customs ” and speaks of “their respective districts.”

By the Act of 1790 (§§ 62-64) Congress established the Revenue Cutter Service for the express purpose of protecting the revenue, directed that its expenses be paid out of duties collected on imported merchandise and on the tonnage of vessels, and declared that its officers should “be deemed officers of the customs.” By the Act of 1799 (§§ 97-102) these provisions were enlarged and reenacted, collectors of customs were given a power of direction over the service subject to assignments and wide supervision by the Secretary of the Treasury, and officers of the service were given authority to hail “ vessels liable to seizure or examination” and to enforce submission. The enlarged provisions were included in the Revised Statutes (§§ 2747-2765) and áre still in force, save that in 1915 the Coast Guard became the successor of the Revenue Cutter Service and took over its personnel, vessels, duties and powers, c. 20, 38 Stat. 800.

The regulations issued by the Secretary of the. Treasury from time to time show that it early became the practice to assign vessels and officers in this service to particular customs districts and to subject their activities largely to the direction of the collectors of customs.⁴ And it otherwise appears that this practice became so settled that the vessels and officers when assigned were regarded as “ belonging ” to the particular districts. The Eliza, 8 Fed. Cas. p. 455; The Friendship, 9 Fed. Cas. p. 822.

In recent years the number of vessels and the personnel have been enlarged and provision has been made for imposing additional duties not requiring special notice here. The practice of assigning vessels and their officers to particular customs districts also has been changed to the extent that now the assignments are of one or more vessels to coast divisions, including one or more customs districts.⁵ Otherwise the duties and practice in respect of the protection of the revenue remain practically as before.⁶

It is apparent from this review of the statutes and regulations that Coast Guard officers are to be deemed officers of the customs within the meaning of § 3072, and also that their connection with particular customs districts — whether one or more — is such that they properly may be said to have districts in the sense intended by the term “ their respective districts.” The term is not peculiar to § 3072. It was applied to Revenue Cutter officers in § 31 of the Act of 1790, § 54 of the Act of 1799, and §§ 3059 and 3067 of the Revised Statutes, and is now applied to Coast Guard officers in § 581 of the Act of 1922.

The remaining question relates to the meaning of the clause indicating where the officers may seize. It says “as well without as within their respective districts.” Two constructions are suggested — one restricting the natural sense and treating the clause as if saying “as well within other customs districts as within their own ”; and the other accepting the natural sense. The difference is that one excludes and the other includes the sea outside customs districts. In actual practice the latter construction has been adopted and it appears to be right. Besides giving effect to the natural import of the clause, it is better adapted to the attainment of the purpose of the section. If vessels violating the revenue laws and thereby-incurring liability to forfeiture could escape seizure by departing from or avoiding waters within customs d’ - tricts the liability to forfeiture would be. of little practical effect in checking violations; and it is most improbable that Congress intended to leave the avenues of escape thus unguarded. The terms it has used are easily broad, enough to meet the situation "effectively, United States. v. Bowman, 260 U. S. 94, 98-100, and no reason is suggested or perceived for cutting them down as respects domestic vessels. If Congress were without power to provide for the seizure of such vessels on the high sea, a restrictive construction might be justified. But there is no want of power in this regard. The high sea is common to all nations and foreign to none; and evéry nation having vessels there has power to regulate them and also to seize them for a violation of its laws. The Apollon, 9 Wheat. 362, 371; Wilson v. McNamee, 102 U. S. 572, 574; Lord v. Steamship Co. 102 U. S. 541, 544; The Hamilton, 207 U. S. 398, 403; American Banana Co. v. United Fruit Co., 213 U. S. 347, 355; Cunard S. S. Co. v. Mellon, 262 U. S. 100, 123, 129; 3 Opinions A. G. 405; 1 Kent’s Com. *26; Hall’s International Law, 7th ed., § 77; 1 Hyde International Law, § 227.

Some distinctions have been recognized in respect of seizing domestic vessels when in foreign waters and of seizing foreign vessels on the high sea, Cunard S. S. Co. v, Mellon, supra, 123-124; The Apollon, supra, 370-371; Church v. Hubbart, 2 Cr. 187, 234-235; The Marianna Flora, 11 Wheat. 1, 42; Manchester v. Massachusetts, 139 U. S. 240, 258; 1 Hyde International Law, § 236; West-lake Int. Law, p. 177; but the éxtent and application of these distinctions are not involved in this case.

It follows that the seizure in this instance by the officers of the Coast Guard was lawful and therefore that the exception to the District Court’s jurisdiction was ill grounded. Whether if the seizure — made by federal officers — were unlawful the ruling in Dodge v. United States, 272 U. S. 530, would apply need not be considered.

,The decree of the Circuit Court of Appeals is

Affirmed.

2 The distinction between being enrolled and licensed and being registered is. that the former is a condition to employment in the coastwise trade while the latter pertains to foreign trade.

3 Rev. Stat. §§ 4320, 4321, 4324, 4336, 4371; Act of January 16, 1895, c. 24, § 3, 28 Stat. 624.

4 Regulations, 1843, pp. IX, XV, XVI, XVII; Regulations, 1871, §§ 16, 17, 20, 21, 22, 101, 204, 257; Regulations, 1894, §§ 22, 101, 141, 476.

5 Regulations, 1923, §§ 31, 41.

6 Regulations, 1923, §§ 22, 812, 814, 2501, 2503.