Mauck v. MADING-DUGAN DRUG COMPANY

361 F. Supp. 1314, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12686
CourtDistrict Court, N.D. Illinois
DecidedJuly 16, 1973
Docket70 C 2151
StatusPublished
Cited by2 cases

This text of 361 F. Supp. 1314 (Mauck v. MADING-DUGAN DRUG COMPANY) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, N.D. Illinois primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Mauck v. MADING-DUGAN DRUG COMPANY, 361 F. Supp. 1314, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12686 (N.D. Ill. 1973).

Opinion

MEMORANDUM OPINION AND ORDER .

BAUER, District Judge.

This cause comes on the motion of certain defendants to dismiss the first and second cross-claims of Texas Consumer Finance Corporation.

The instant action arose out of the acquisition in December, 1968 of Fidelity General Insurance Company (hereinafter “Fidelity General”) by a group of corporations and individuals, including the Mading-Dugan Drug Company, (hereinafter the “Mading-Dugan Group”) and the subsequent liquidation of Fidelity General.

The instant suit is brought by the Illinois Director of Insurance, qua Liquidator of Fidelity General, and names as defendants the Mading-Dugan Group. The complaint alleges that the Mading-Dugan Group, subsequent to the acquisition of Fidelity General, removed assets from that Company through allegedly “unfair contracts” thereby causing the insolvency and subsequent liquidation of Fidelity General. The plaintiff claims this action by the defendants violated sections 10(b) and 20 of the Securities Exchange Act of 1934, 15 U.S.C. § 78j (b) and § 78t. In essence, the complaint alleges that the Mading-Dugan Group acquired Fidelity General utilizing a boot-strap design. This type of boot-strap acquisition of an insurance company has been held to violate federal securities laws. Superintendent v. Bankers Life and Casualty Co., 404 U.S. 6, 92 S.Ct. 165, 30 L.Ed.2d 128 (1971).

The plaintiff in the instant complaint alleges certain facts, inter alia, which should be considered for the proper disposition of the instant motion:

1. Prior to December 31, 1968, Fidelity General was a multi-line casualty insurance company chartered in Illinois. It was a publicly traded corporation and its stock was owned by various individuals and corporations. On December 30, 1968, Mading Dugan Drug Company (“Mading-Dugan”), a corporation, purchased from a small group of controlling shareholders approximately 51% of the outstanding shares of Fidelity General at a price of $3.10 per share. After the consumation of this transaction, Mading-Dugan controlled a majority of Fidelity General’s Board of Directors. (This Court notes that there is nothing in the complaint which indicates that the price paid per share was less than fair market value.)
*1316 Subsequent to its acquisition of 51% of Fidelity General, Mading-Dugan made a tender offer to purchase the remaining Fidelity General shares at $3.10 per share on or before July 30, 1969. In May of 1969, Mading-Dugan’s interest in Fidelity General was transferred to Contran Corporation (“Contran”). Contran, or its nominees, completed the tender offer and acquired a substantial number of the remaining shares. After July 30, 1969, Contran completely controlled and dominated Fidelity General’s Board of Directors. In all, Mading-Dugan and Contran (or its nominees) paid approximately $3.3 million for the shares of Fidelity General which they had acquired.
2. During times relevant to the complained-of activity, Mading-Dugan and Contran were affiliated directly or indirectly through the device of interlocking directors, dominated directors, substantial stock ownership, holding companies, or substantial identity of equitable control with each other and with a number of other companies including, inter alia: Dealers National Insurance Company (“Dealers National”) ; Liberty Universal Insurance Company (“Liberty Universal”); and Texas Consumer Finance Company (“Texas Consumer”). Defendant Harold Simmons (“Simmons”) and others were, during time relevant to the complained-of activity, directors of both Fidelity General and one or more of the above mentioned related companies. Defendant Gilbert Goodman and others were, during times relevant to the complained-of activity, directors of Fidelity General under the domination and control of the interlocking directors mentioned herein-above.
3. Shortly after December 31, 1968, defendants caused Fidelity General to sell approximately $6 million worth of municipal bonds for cash. With this cash, defendants then caused Fidelity General to purchase $3.7 million worth of securities consisting of stock, letter stock, surplus debentures and subordinated debentures in the related companies mentioned hereinabove. The market and actual value of these securities was substantially less than the $3.7 million paid for them. The net result of these transactions was to give back to Mading-Dugan and Contran all of the cash expended in the original purchase of Fidelity General and in the July 30, 1969, tender offer. Thus, the complaint alleges, defendants purchased Fidelity General with no cash investment on their own part.
4. In August or September, 1969, defendants caused Fidelity General to enter into two agreements with Dealers National retroactive to June 30, 1969. Pursuant to these agreements, Fidelity General (1) transferred $1.9 million representing 35% of its loss reserves to Dealers National in exchange for Dealers National’s assumption of 35% of all of Fidelity General’s losses; and (2) transferred all of its previously acquired securities of the related companies carried at about $3.5 million, plus $2 million in cash to Dealers National in exchange for Dealers National’s agreement to enter into an 80/20 reinsurance agreement with Fidelity General. At the time that these agreements were entered into, Dealers National claimed assets worth approximately $18 million consisting of letter stock of Contran and Mading-Dugan. The stock owned by Dealers National was not readily marketable to pay losses incurred in the ordinary course of its own insurance business; further, Dealers National was grossly short of cash and inadequately reserved to pay its own anticipated loss expenses. The complaint alleges that the defendants knew that Dealers National would be unable to perform its agreement to reinsure Fidelity General.
5. In November of 1969, or January of 1970, the defendants, with actual knowledge that Texas Consumer was insolvent and would soon be placed in bankruptcy, caused Dealers National *1317 to exchange its stock in Contran and Mading-Dugan for letter stock in Texas Consumer. In all, Dealers National acquired approximately 3,220,000 shares of an authorized issue of 3,455,000 shares of Texas Consumer. This newly acquired stock was carried as an asset of Dealers National at approximately $5.00 per share because the defendants caused Dealers National to maintain a market in Texas Consumer stock by publicly buying the stock on the open market when the stock was offered at less than $5.00 per share. A substantial number of these Texas Consumer shares bought on the open market were not recorded in Dealers National’s books. The Texas Consumer stock owned by Dealers National was not readily marketable to pay losses incurred by Dealers National in the ordinary course of its insurance business. Accordingly, the complaint alleges that this exchange of Mading-Dugan and Contran letter stock for Texas Consumer stock further depleted the financial condition of Dealers National and virtually assured the fact that it would be placed in liquidation.
6.

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Bluebook (online)
361 F. Supp. 1314, 1973 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 12686, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/mauck-v-mading-dugan-drug-company-ilnd-1973.