Matute v. Garland

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit
• Decided: June 3, 2024
• Docket: 22-6171
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

22-6171 Matute v. Garland BIA Sagerman, IJ A216 473 472

UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS FOR THE SECOND CIRCUIT

SUMMARY ORDER RULINGS BY SUMMARY ORDER DO NOT HAVE PRECEDENTIAL EFFECT. CITATION TO A SUMMARY ORDER FILED ON OR AFTER JANUARY 1, 2007, IS PERMITTED AND IS GOVERNED BY FEDERAL RULE OF APPELLATE PROCEDURE 32.1 AND THIS COURT’S LOCAL RULE 32.1.1. WHEN CITING A SUMMARY ORDER IN A DOCUMENT FILED WITH THIS COURT, A PARTY MUST CITE EITHER THE FEDERAL APPENDIX OR AN ELECTRONIC DATABASE (WITH THE NOTATION “SUMMARY ORDER”). A PARTY CITING A SUMMARY ORDER MUST SERVE A COPY OF IT ON ANY PARTY NOT REPRESENTED BY COUNSEL.

At a stated term of the United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, held at the Thurgood Marshall United States Courthouse, 40 Foley Square, in the City of New York, on the 3rd day of June, two thousand twenty-four.

PRESENT: REENA RAGGI, DENNY CHIN, STEVEN J. MENASHI, Circuit Judges. _____________________________________

RAMON MATUTE, Petitioner,

v. 22-6171

MERRICK B. GARLAND, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY GENERAL, Respondent. _____________________________________

FOR PETITIONER: JOHN H. PENG (Karen L. Murtagh, Executive Director, on the brief), Prisoners’ Legal Services of New York, Albany, NY. FOR RESPONDENT: STEPHANIE L. GROFF, Trial Attorney, Office of Immigration Litigation (Brian M. Boynton, Principal Deputy Assistant Attorney General, Civil Division, Jennifer P. Levings, Assistant Director, Office of Immigration Litigation, on the brief), United States Department of Justice, Washington, DC.

UPON DUE CONSIDERATION of this petition for review of a decision of the

Board of Immigration Appeals (“BIA”), it is hereby ORDERED, ADJUDGED, and

DECREED that the petition for review is DENIED.

Petitioner Ramon Matute seeks review of a decision of the BIA that affirmed the

removal order of an Immigration Judge (“IJ”) following the denial of Matute’s motion to

suppress an affidavit admitting his alienage. In re Ramon Matute, No. A-216-473-472

(B.I.A, Mar. 9, 2022), aff’g No. A-216-473-472 (Immigr. Ct. Napanoch Sept. 29, 2021). 1 We

assume the parties’ familiarity with the underlying facts and procedural history.

I

“When the BIA issues an opinion, the opinion becomes the basis for judicial review

of the decision of which the alien is complaining.” Bhagtana v. Garland, 93 F.4th 592, 593

(2d Cir. 2023) (internal quotation marks omitted). And when, as in this case, “the decision

of the BIA is consistent with the decision of the IJ, we may consider both decisions ‘for

the sake of completeness.’” Singh v. Garland, 11 F.4th 106, 112 (2d Cir. 2021) (quoting

1 Matute does not challenge the agency’s denial of his claim for protection under the Convention Against Torture. 2 Wangchuck v. DHS, 448 F.3d 524, 528 (2d Cir. 2006)). Because “Congress has specified that

‘the administrative findings of fact are conclusive unless any reasonable adjudicator

would be compelled to conclude to the contrary,’” id. (quoting 8 U.S.C. § 1252(b)(4)(B)),

we “review the agency’s decision for substantial evidence and must defer to the

factfinder’s findings based on such relevant evidence as a reasonable mind might accept

as adequate to support a conclusion,” id. at 113 (internal quotation marks omitted). “By

contrast, we review legal conclusions de novo.” Id. 2

II

Matute argues that the agency erred in denying his motion to suppress an affidavit

admitting his alienage. Matute signed the affidavit following an interview with an

immigration officer while he was serving a five-year sentence at the Downstate

Correctional Facility for a New York state robbery conviction.

The exclusionary rule does not apply in immigration proceedings unless “record

evidence establishe[s] either (a) that an egregious violation that was fundamentally

unfair ha[s] occurred, or (b) that the violation—regardless of its egregiousness or

unfairness—undermined the reliability of the evidence in dispute.” Almeida-Amaral v.

2 Although our jurisdiction to review a final order of removal is limited when a petitioner, such as Matute, has committed a crime involving moral turpitude under 8 U.S.C. § 1182(a)(2), we retain threshold jurisdiction to determine whether the petitioner is in fact an alien. See Bell v. Reno, 218 F.3d 86, 89 (2d Cir. 2000). In addition, we have jurisdiction to consider constitutional claims and questions of law. See 8 U.S.C. § 1252(a)(2)(C), (D). 3 Gonzales, 461 F.3d 231, 235 (2d Cir. 2006). “If the documentary evidence that an applicant

submits in support of h[is] motion could support a basis for excluding the evidence, then

[]he is entitled to an evidentiary hearing at which []he may attempt to establish a prima

facie case for suppression and thereby shift the burden to the government to justify its

actions.” Millan-Hernandez v. Barr, 965 F.3d 140, 143 (2d Cir. 2020) (internal quotation

marks and citations omitted). “In determining whether the petitioner has made out a

prima facie case … the agency must view the evidence and facts alleged ‘most favorably

to petitioner.’” Id. at 146 (quoting Almeida-Amaral, 461 F.3d at 237). Matute argues that the

alienage affidavit should have been suppressed because it was obtained through an

egregious violation of his Fourth and Fifth Amendment rights and because it was

unreliable. We conclude that the agency did not err in denying the motion to suppress

without a hearing.

A

First, the agency correctly concluded that, even viewing the evidence in the light

most favorable to Matute, it could not support a finding that his Fourth or Fifth

Amendment rights were egregiously violated. There was no egregious Fourth

Amendment violation because immigration officers are authorized by statute “without

warrant … to interrogate any alien or person believed to be an alien as to his right to be

or to remain in the United States.” 8 U.S.C. § 1357(a)(1). Nor did the state corrections

officer egregiously violate Matute’s Fourth Amendment rights by bringing him to the

4 immigration officer for questioning. Matute was already in prison, and the officer did not

effect an unreasonable seizure by bringing Matute from one place in the prison to

another. In any event, the agency correctly concluded that none of the factors that our

court has identified “to guide the BIA in its assessment of the egregiousness of [a] Fourth

Amendment violation” was present here. Cotzojay v. Holder, 725 F.3d 172, 182 (2d Cir.

2013) (stating that, in assessing the egregiousness of a purported violation, the agency

may consider “whether the violation was intentional; whether the seizure was ‘gross or

unreasonable’ and without plausible legal ground; whether the invasion involved

‘threats, coercion, physical abuse’ or ‘unreasonable shows of force’; and whether the

seizure or arrest was based on race or ethnicity”) (alteration omitted) (quoting Oliva-

Ramos v. Att’y Gen. of U.S., 694 F.3d 259, 279 (3d Cir. 2012)).

While the Cotzojay factors are “non-exhaustive,” id., Matute failed to show that the

alleged Fourth Amendment violation was otherwise egregious. He claims that he did not

understand the immigration officer’s questions because the interview was conducted in

English and he spoke only Spanish. But the affidavit form provided a Spanish translation

of each question, and Matute had an opportunity to review the written form after

answering the questions; indeed, he initialed each page of the document. In addition,

Matute’s answers to the questions were responsive and relevant, indicating that he

understood what was asked.

5 In considering a purportedly egregious Fourth Amendment violation in the

immigration context, we have explained that “[s]omething egregious is by nature

extreme, rare, and obvious.” Maldonado v. Holder, 763 F.3d 155, 165 (2d Cir. 2014). Matute

has not shown that questioning of state prisoners by immigration officers is a “rare”

occurrence. Nor does such questioning appear to be an “extreme” or “obvious” violation

of his rights given that, as the IJ noted, “[i]t is certainly well-established … that

immigration officials can ask anyone regarding their immigration status.” Cert. Admin.

R. 57.

B

Second, Matute argues that the alienage affidavit should have been suppressed

under the second prong of the Almeida-Amaral test because the alleged Fourth

Amendment violation undermined its reliability. The government responds that Matute

failed to raise this argument before the IJ. See Prabhudial v. Holder, 780 F.3d 553, 555 (2d

Cir. 2015) (“[T]he BIA may refuse to consider an issue that could have been, but was not,

raised before an IJ.”). Even if the argument were properly raised, however, it would fail.

We have held that a Fourth Amendment violation does not affect the reliability of

evidence establishing a straightforward fact such as a person’s nationality. For that

reason, “we have affirmed the denial of suppression motions on the basis that the

evidence was nonetheless reliable” when “the evidence related to simple, specific, and

objective facts, e.g., whether a person is a foreign citizen or has a passport and valid visa.”

6 Singh v. Mukasey, 553 F.3d 207, 216 (2d Cir. 2006). The objective fact of Matute’s alienage

is “not altered by coercive interrogation” because “a person either is or is not a citizen of

a particular country and either does or does not have a visa.” Id. Accordingly, as the BIA

recognized, Matute’s reliability argument would fail even if it were properly raised. See

Cert. Admin. R. 4 (“The respondent’s reliability argument also does not justify a remand

of the record because the respondent has neither developed it on appeal nor made any

offer of proof to substantiate it.”).

C

Third, the agency did not err in rejecting Matute’s argument that the affidavit

should be suppressed because his Fifth Amendment rights were egregiously violated

when the interviewing immigration officer failed to provide him with warnings against

self-incrimination pursuant to Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966).

Miranda warnings are required in situations of “custodial interrogation.” See

United States v. Morales, 834 F.2d 35, 38 (2d Cir. 1987); Zuniga-Perez v. Sessions, 897 F.3d

114, 123 (2d Cir. 2018) (acknowledging in the immigration context that, under some

circumstances, “[s]tatements made during a custodial interrogation” should be excluded

“unless a suspect has first been advised of his or her [Miranda] rights”) (quoting United

States v. Faux, 828 F.3d 130, 134 (2d Cir. 2016)). But we have held that “the solicitation of

information concerning a person’s identity and background does not amount to custodial

interrogation prohibited by Miranda.” United States v. Adegbite, 846 F.2d 834, 838-39 (2d

7 Cir. 1988); see also United States v. Familetti, 878 F.3d 53, 57 (2d Cir. 2017) (“[P]edigree

questions that pertain to administration or a defendant’s basic identification information

do not trigger Miranda.”) (internal quotation marks omitted).

In addition, we have held that Miranda warnings are not required when an

immigration officer questions an alien incarcerated for a state crime “solely for the

purpose of determining whether [the alien] would be subject to administrative

deportation after his release.” United States v. Rodriguez, 356 F.3d 254, 259 (2d Cir. 2004).

Matute was interviewed while in state custody for a robbery conviction, and there is no

basis in the record for inferring that the immigration officer’s questions “were reasonably

likely to elicit an incriminating response.” Familetti, 878 F.3d at 57 (quoting Rhode Island

v. Innis, 446 U.S. 291, 300-01 (1980)). Indeed, the information obtained in the interview

was never used in any criminal proceeding. Because no Miranda warnings were required,

Matute failed to provide evidence that could support a finding that an egregious Fifth

Amendment violation occurred.

* * *

We have considered Matute’s remaining arguments, which we conclude are

without merit. For the foregoing reasons, the petition for review is denied.

FOR THE COURT: Catherine O’Hagan Wolfe, Clerk of Court