Mattis v. Massman

• Court: Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit
• Decided: January 6, 2004
• Docket: 02-1301
• Status: Published

Opinion

RECOMMENDED FOR FULL-TEXT PUBLICATION Pursuant to Sixth Circuit Rule 206 2 Mattis v. Massman, et al. No. 02-1301 ELECTRONIC CITATION: 2004 FED App. 0003P (6th Cir.) File Name: 04a0003p.06 L. Alexopoulos, HARDY, LEWIS & PAGE, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellants. George F. Killeen, II, Flint, Michigan, for Appellee. UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS _________________ FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT _________________ OPINION _________________ JAMES MATTIS , X BOGGS, Chief Judge. Defendants David Massman and Plaintiff-Appellee, - General Motors Corporation (“GM”) appeal from the district - - No. 02-1301 court’s order granting Plaintiff James Mattis’s motion to v. - remand and amend his complaint. Mattis had initially raised > four separate state-law claims in his complaint filed in the , Michigan state court. GM subsequently removed the case to DAVID MASSMAN and - GENERAL MOTORS federal court on the grounds that all Mattis’s claims were - preempted by § 301 of the Labor Management Relations Act, CORPORATION , - 29 U.S.C. § 185. In the district court, Mattis moved to amend Defendants-Appellants. - his complaint and eliminate two of his four claims. He - argued that the remaining two tort claims were not preempted N because they did not implicate the collective bargaining Appeal from the United States District Court agreement governing Mattis’s employment. The district court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Ann Arbor. agreed and granted the motion to remand. Because we find No. 01-60177—Marianne O. Battani, District Judge. that Mattis’s remaining claims were preempted by § 301, we now reverse. Argued: May 21, 2003 I Decided and Filed: January 6, 2004 GM employed James Mattis as an hourly production Before: BOGGS, Chief Judge; and NELSON and COLE, worker in a metal fabricating plant in Flint, Michigan. Circuit Judges. Because Mattis was a member of a bargaining unit represented by the United Automobile, Aerospace, and _________________ Agricultural Implement Workers (“UAW”), his employment was governed by the collective bargaining agreement COUNSEL (“CBA”) entered into by UAW and GM. He worked at the plant up through October 11, 2000, when he was terminated ARGUED: Timothy K. McConaghy, HARDY, LEWIS & after allegedly striking his supervisor, David Massman. PAGE, Birmingham, Michigan, for Appellants. George F. Mattis disputed this allegation and subsequently filed a Killeen, II, Flint, Michigan, for Appellee. ON BRIEF: Alex

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complaint against both Massman and GM in the Michigan In reaching its decision, the district court reasoned that the state court. tort claims were not preempted because they were premised on the alleged harassment, rather than the wrongful In his complaint, Mattis raised four separate state-law termination. The district court granted the motion on claims against GM: (1) “Interference with an Existing December 17, 2001, and GM filed a Motion for Contract”; (2) “Tortious Interference with an Advantageous Reconsideration on January 2, 2002. The district court denied Economic Relationship or Expectation”; (3) “Tortious this motion on February 12, 2002. GM now timely appeals Interference with Contractual Relationship”; and both the granting of Mattis’s motion to remand and amend his (4) “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” To support complaint, along with the denial of GM’s motion to each claim, Mattis alleged that he had been wrongfully reconsider. terminated and that he had been subjected to repeated harassment by Massman long before his termination. II According to Mattis, Massman’s harassment included assigning workers with less seniority to the more desirable We must decide whether the district court erred in finding jobs, preventing Mattis from learning how to perform certain that Counts II (“Tortious Interference with an Advantageous tasks, following Mattis around and recording when he was Economic Relationship or Expectation”) and IV (“Intentional late, forcing Mattis to perform the more difficult jobs in the Infliction of Emotional Distress”) were not preempted by plant, causing Mattis to lose vacation days, and refusing to § 301. We review the district court’s decision regarding grant Mattis an excused absence when he was ill. On the day subject matter jurisdiction de novo. Long v. Bando Mfg. of Mattis allegedly struck Massman, Mattis claimed that Am., 201 F.3d 754, 759 (6th Cir. 2000). Massman had insulted his daughters. Section 301 provides that: On August 21, 2001, GM removed the case to federal court on the ground that Mattis’s claims were preempted by § 301 Suits for violations of contracts between an employer and of the Labor Management Relations Act (“LMRA”). Mattis a labor organization representing employees in an responded, on September 19, by filing a motion to amend his industry affecting commerce . . . may be brought in any complaint and remand the case back to state court. Mattis district court of the United States having jurisdiction of wanted to amend his complaint by eliminating Counts I and the parties. . . . III (listed above). According to Mattis, because Counts II and IV (i.e., the remaining claims) were not preempted by § 301, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a). As this court has explained, “[t]he the case should be remanded back to the Michigan state court. Supreme Court has interpreted this language to require federal GM disputed this claim, arguing that Counts II and IV were pre-emption of state law-based actions . . . [when those still preempted by § 301. Although Counts II and IV were actions are] inextricably intertwined with consideration of the tort claims, GM argued that they were essentially claims for terms of the labor contract.” Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 breach of contract, which were clearly preempted by § 301. F.2d 380, 382 (6th Cir. 1991) (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp. v. Lueck, 471 U.S. 202, 213 (1988) and Textile Workers Union After a hearing on the issue of preemption, the district court v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957)) (internal quotations found that Counts II and IV were not preempted by § 301 and and citations omitted). The Supreme Court has justified its granted Mattis’s motion to remand and amend his complaint. No. 02-1301 Mattis v. Massman, et al. 5 6 Mattis v. Massman, et al. No. 02-1301

interpretation by emphasizing the importance of uniform of the labor contract”); DeCoe v. Gen. Motors Corp., 32 F.3d federal law in this area. 212, 216 (6th Cir. 1994) (citing Lingle). [T]he subject matter of Section 301(a) is peculiarly one In Allis-Chalmers Corp., for example, the plaintiff brought that calls for uniform law. . . . The possibility that a Wisconsin tort claim of bad-faith handling of an insurance individual contract terms might have different meanings claim against the defendant. The plaintiff’s right to insurance, under state and federal law would inevitably exert a however, had been established by the collective bargaining disruptive influence upon both the negotiation and agreement entered into by his union and the defendant. In administration of collective agreements. . . . The finding the claim to be preempted, the Supreme Court importance of the area which would be affected by explained, “[b]ecause the right asserted not only derives from separate systems of substantive law makes the need for the contract, but is defined by the contractual obligation of a single body of federal law particularly compelling. The good faith, any attempt to assess liability here inevitably will ordering and adjusting of competing interests through a involve contract interpretation.” 471 U.S. at 218. Yet, in process of free and voluntary collective bargaining is the Lingle, the Supreme Court found that the plaintiff’s keystone of the federal scheme to promote industrial retaliatory discharge claim, which alleged retaliation for filing peace. State law which frustrates the effort of Congress a workers’ compensation claim, was not preempted by § 301. to stimulate the smooth functioning of that process thus The Supreme Court reasoned, “the state-law remedy in this strikes at the very core of federal labor policy. case is ‘independent’ of the collective-bargaining agreement in the sense of ‘independent’ that matters for § 301 pre- Local 174, Teamsters v. Lucas Flower Co., 369 U.S. 95, 103- emption purposes: resolution of the state-law claim does not 04 (1962). require construing the collective bargaining agreement.” 486 U.S. at 407. Thus, the basic question before this court is Given the importance of maintaining uniform federal law, whether Mattis’s state-law tort claims are “independent” of the Supreme Court “has made clear that § 301 of the LMRA the CBA that governed his employment. preempts any state-law claim arising from a breach of a collective bargaining agreement.” Smolarek v. Chrysler To determine whether a state-law claim is sufficiently Corp., 879 F.2d 1326, 1329 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc). “independent” to survive § 301 preemption, this court has Preemption under § 301 applies not only to state-law contract adopted a two-step inquiry. DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216-17. First, claims, but has been expanded to include state-law tort claims courts must determine whether resolving the state-law claim as well. Id. at 1329-30 (citing Allis-Chalmers Corp., 471 would require interpretation of the terms of the collective U.S. at 217). Not every tort claim, however, relating to bargaining agreement. If so, the claim is preempted. Second, employment will be subject to preemption under § 301. Id. courts must ascertain whether the rights claimed by the at 1330. To survive preemption under § 301, the tort claims plaintiff were created by the collective bargaining agreement, must be “independent” of the CBA. Lingle v. Norge Div. of or instead by state law. Id. at 216. If the rights were created Magic Chef, Inc., 486 U.S. 399, 409-10 (1989); Allis- by the collective bargaining agreement, the claim is Chalmers Corp., 471 U.S. at 213 (analyzing state-law claim preempted. In short, if a state-law claim fails either of these to determine if it was “independent of any right established by two requirements, it is preempted by § 301. Using the contract, or, instead, whether evaluation of the tort claim approach established in DeCoe, we now evaluate each of [was] inextricably intertwined with consideration of the terms Mattis’s two state-law claims. No. 02-1301 Mattis v. Massman, et al. 7 8 Mattis v. Massman, et al. No. 02-1301

A because it asserted a right created not by state law, but by the collective bargaining agreement (thus violating the second In Count II, Mattis raised a claim of “Tortious Interference requirement). “[R]esolution of the plaintiff’s claim will not with an Advantageous Economic Relationship or involve the direct interpretation of [the] CBA, but . . . will Expectation.” In DeCoe, this court construed this particular require a court to address relationships that have been created claim as constituting a claim of tortious interference with a through the collective bargaining process and to mediate a business relationship under Michigan law. 32 F.3d at 218. dispute founded upon rights created by a CBA.” Id. at 218 To prevail, a plaintiff must establish: (quoting Jones v. Gen. Motors Corp., 939 F.2d 380, 382-83 (6th Cir. 1991)). In these two previous cases (DeCoe and (1) the existence of a valid business relation (not Jones), the plaintiffs’ claims sought to vindicate rights created necessarily evidenced by an enforceable contract) or by the collective bargaining agreements. In DeCoe, the expectancy; (2) knowledge of the relationship or plaintiff alleged that the defendant “interfered with Plaintiff’s expectancy on the part of the defendant interferer; (3) an job as a Local 326 committeeman.” 32 F.3d at 218. The intentional interference inducing or causing a breach or rights and responsibilities of the committeeman, however, termination of the relationship or expectancy; and were created and defined by the CBA. Ibid. In Jones, the (4) resulting damage to the party whose relationship or plaintiff alleged that the defendant breached the terms of a expectancy has been disrupted. settlement agreement, which he claimed required him to be reinstated. As we noted, however, “the settlement agreement Wausau Underwriters Ins. Co. v. Vulcan Dev., Inc., 323 F.3d itself [was] a creature wholly begotten by the CBA.” 939 396, 404 (6th Cir. 2002) (citing Mich. Podiatric Med. Ass’n F.2d at 383. Thus, the claim was the “archetype of a state-law v. Nat’l Foot Care Program, Inc., 438 N.W.2d 349, 354 claim that by its very nature involve[d] an examination of the (Mich. Ct. App. 1989). employment relationship of parties to a CBA.” Ibid. The question of whether the elements of this state-law DeCoe requires that Mattis’s claim be preempted. claim should be considered independent of the CBA was Similarly to the plaintiff in DeCoe, Mattis alleged clearly answered by this court in DeCoe, in which we held interference with a business relationship that was “created that § 301 preempted plaintiff’s claim of tortious interference entirely by the CBA.” DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 218. Both Mattis with economic relations (construed as tortious interference and the district court attempted to distinguish DeCoe by with a business relationship). In DeCoe, the plaintiff brought emphasizing that “committeemen” were the unique creations a complaint against several of his co-workers for whom he of the collective bargaining agreement in question, which had served as a committeeman, or supervisor. 32 F.3d at 214- made preemption more compelling. The relationship in this 15. The workers had previously filed administrative case, however, was also created by the CBA. Even more proceedings against the plaintiff for alleged sexual importantly, the question of whether Massman “interfered” harassment, and the plaintiff subsequently sued them for with Mattis’s business relationship would require us to delve defamation, tortious interference, and intentional infliction of into the rights and responsibilities of plant supervisors under emotional distress. In finding the tortious interference claim the CBA. Undoubtedly, the supervisor would claim that his preempted, we assumed that the plaintiff satisfied the first actions were consistent with his duties as a supervisor at the requirement because no interpretation of the contractual terms factory. Congress intended such questions to be addressed was necessary. We still found the claim preempted, however, within the realm of federal, not state, law. No. 02-1301 Mattis v. Massman, et al. 9 10 Mattis v. Massman, et al. No. 02-1301

Finally, we note that Mattis has not established the of course the [c]ourt would have to look to that CBA to existence of any external regime of state law that would allow decide whether or not that termination was outrageous.” As him to allege violations of rights independent from the rights GM points out, however, Mattis’s counsel had just been asked created by the CBA. For example, in Smolarek v. Chrysler (at the hearing) whether Count IV was premised on the Corp., the plaintiff’s tort claim survived preemption in part termination or the harassment. Counsel responded, “The because it asserted rights established by Michigan’s law harassment, and the termination. . . . It was a combination of against handicap discrimination. 879 F.2d 1326, 1331 (6th the two. My answer would have to be both.” While this Cir. 1989) (en banc). Similarly, in O’Shea v. Detroit News, response alone calls the district court’s decision into question, the plaintiff’s claim survived preemption in part because it we hold Count IV to be preempted even if it is premised only asserted claims of retaliatory discharge and age on the alleged harassment. discrimination. 887 F.2d 683, 686-87 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc). Mattis’s complaint, by contrast, alleged violations of Once again, DeCoe governs the outcome. In DeCoe, we rights established only by the CBA. For instance, he alleged concluded that this exact claim was preempted because it that Massman denied him vacation days, failed to provide would require us to interpret the collective bargaining proper training, and failed to excuse his absences for illness. agreement in order to determine whether the alleged conduct These entitlements belonged to Mattis solely because of the was “outrageous.” We explained, “a defendant has not acted CBA. Count II is preempted. outrageously where he has done no more than to insist upon his legal rights in a permissible way.” 32 F.3d at 219 B (quoting Polk v. Yellow Freight Sys., Inc., 801 F.2d 190, 196 (6th Cir. 1986) (internal quotations omitted)). In Count IV, Mattis raised a claim of “Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress.” Although the Michigan Supreme As in DeCoe, determining whether Massman’s alleged Court has yet to recognize this cause of action, “the Michigan harassment constituted “outrageous conduct” would force us Court of Appeals has recognized such a tort, and we have to look to the CBA. Without reference to the CBA, we could assumed that the Michigan Supreme Court would do so too not possibly know whether Massman acted outrageously or under appropriate circumstances.” Andrews v. Prudential was merely insisting on his legal rights as a supervisor Secs., Inc., 160 F.3d 304, 309 (6th Cir. 1998). To prevail on charged with ensuring compliance with the rules of the a claim of intentional infliction of emotional distress, the factory. Even if we give Mattis the benefit of the doubt about plaintiff must establish: (1) extreme and outrageous conduct; whether we would have to interpret the terms of the CBA, his (2) intent or recklessness; (3) causation; (4) and severe claim clearly fails to meet the second requirement announced emotional distress. Ibid. in DeCoe. This is not to say that § 301 has preempted all claims of intentional infliction of emotional distress that may Mattis originally claimed that both his termination and be brought by an employee. See O’Shea v. Detroit News, 887 Massman’s harassment prior to termination constituted F.2d 683, 687 (6th Cir. 1989) (en banc) (finding that § 301 “outrageous” conduct under Michigan law. The district court, did not preempt intentional infliction of emotional distress however, concluded that Mattis’s claim was not preempted claim where allegations were “independent of any alleged because it was premised only on the harassment and not the violation of the contract”). Mattis’s allegations, however, all termination. The district court explained, “if plaintiff’s count involve workplace actions taken under the ostensible four is premised on his termination by General Motors, then authority of the CBA, and seem to be a subtle attempt to No. 02-1301 Mattis v. Massman, et al. 11

present contract claims in tort clothing. See DeCoe, 32 F.3d at 216 (requiring courts to look “to the essence of the plaintiff’s claim, in order to determine whether the plaintiff is attempting to disguise what is essentially a contract claim as a tort”). For example, Mattis alleged that Massman ignored his seniority rights in assigning jobs, failed to train him properly, assigned him the most strenuous jobs, prevented him from receiving his pay on time, reduced his vacation days, and punished Mattis for using the company phone. To allow such allegations to proceed in state court would eviscerate the uniform federal regime established by Congress via § 301. III Because we find Mattis’s two remaining state-law claims to be preempted, we REVERSE the district court’s order to the extent it remanded the case to state court. Our decision makes it unnecessary to review GM’s motion to reconsider. The case will be REMANDED to the district court, which may consider any motions to amend the complaint in light of our decision.