Matthews v. United States

• Court: District Court, D. Guam
• Decided: January 10, 2011
• Docket: 1:07-cv-00030
• Status: Unknown

Opinion

1 2 3 4 5 6 7 DISTRICT COURT OF GUAM 8 TERRITORY OF GUAM 9 DAVID G. MATTHEWS, Civil Case No. 07-00030 10

Plaintiff, 11 12 vs. ORDER UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, 13 Defendant. 14 15 16 This case is before the court on a Motion to File Second Amended Complaint filed by the 17 Plaintiff David G. Matthews (“Plaintiff”). See Docket No. 151. The Defendant United States of 18 America (“the Government”) opposes. See Docket No. 160. 19 The Plaintiff asks leave to file a second amended complaint, and to exceed any page 20 limit under federal or local rules. See Docket No. 151. He states that he “failed to overly 21 include” a cause of action that the Commander, U.S. Naval ForcesMarianas (“COMNAVMAR”) 22 “ordered him to perform a function that was fraught with fraud, waste and abuse – an unlawful 23 order.” Docket No. 151, p. 1. He contends that upon his refusal to follow the order, he was 24 “threatened with disciplinary action” which, with the Family Advocacy Program (“FAP”) Case 25 Review Committee (“CRC”) proceeding “resulted in constructive discharge.” Id. 26 The Government opposes the motion, arguing that amended complaint attempts to bolster 27 his claims by “masquerading it as a new cause of action for constructive discharge based on the 28 Navy’s alleged unlawful housing program.” Docket No. 160. The Government contends that 1 the new claim is “entirely unrelated” to the FAP and that it does not arise out of the conduct, 2 transaction or occurrence set out in the original pleading. 3 The Plaintiff filed his initial complaint in this case on November 9, 2007, and filed an 4 amended complaint on April 18, 2008. See Docket Nos. 1 and 25. Therefore, amendment is 5 permitted “only with the opposing party’s written consent or the court’s leave.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 6 15(a)(2). Furthermore, such amendment “relates back to the date of the original pleading when: 7 (A) the law that provides the applicable statute of limitations allows relation back; 8 (B) the amendment asserts a claim or defense that arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or attempted to be set out--in the original 9 pleading; or 10 (C) the amendment changes the party or the naming of the party against whom a claim is asserted, if Rule 15(c)(1)(B) is satisfied and if, within the period provided 11 by Rule 4(m) for serving the summons and complaint, the party to be brought in by amendment: 12 (i) received such notice of the action that it will not be prejudiced in 13 defending on the merits; and 14 (ii) knew or should have known that the action would have been brought against it, but for a mistake concerning the proper party's identity. 15 16 Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1). The relevant provision in this case would be that the Plaintiff’s new 17 constructive discharge claim “ arose out of the conduct, transaction, or occurrence set out--or 18 attempted to be set out--in the original pleading.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(c)(1)(B). 19 The court recognizes that Rule 15 provides that leave to amend should be freely given 20 “when justice so requires.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 15(a)(2). “Four factors are commonly used to 21 determine the propriety of a motion for leave to amend. These are: bad faith, undue delay, 22 prejudice to the opposing party, and futility of amendment.” Roth v. Garcia Marquez, 942 F.2d 23 617, 628 (9th Cir. 1991). 24 But more specifically, when the amendment is sought in order to state a new claim 25 against an original defendant, the Ninth Circuit has articulated the following test: “We consider 26 whether the original and amended pleadings share a common core of operative facts so that the 27 adverse party has fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or conduct called into question.” 28 Martell v. Trilogy Ltd., 872 F.2d 322, 325 (9th Cir. 1989). “Claims arise out of the same 1 conduct, transaction, or occurrence if they “share a common core of operative facts” such that 2 the plaintiff will rely on the same evidence to prove each claim.” Williams v. Boeing Co., 517 3 F.3d 1120, 1133 (9th Cir. 2008). 4 The Government asserts that the Plaintiff cannot satisfy the Ninth Circuit’s standard. See 5 Docket No. 160. The Ninth Circuit instructed that “the district court should . . . analyze[] the 6 two pleadings to determine whether they share a common core of operative facts sufficient to 7 impart fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or conduct called into question.” Martell, 872 8 F.2d at 327. A comparison of the previously filed complaints and the Second Amended 9 Complaint reveals that they do not “share a common core of operative facts to impart fair 10 notice.” Id. 11 The original and amended complaint raise claims of infliction of emotional distress and 12 invasion of privacy. See Docket Nos. 1 and 25. Both complaints focus on allegations of child 13 abuse and how these allegations were handled by the FAP and the CRC, and the subsequent 14 identification of the Plaintiff as a child abuser in the Navy-Marine Corps Central Registry. See 15 id. 16 The new claim of unlawful discharge in the Second Amended Complaint alleges 17 improprieties in COMNAVMAR’s Overseas Housing Allowance Program (“OHA”). However, 18 upon review, nothing in the Second Amended Complaint demonstrates how the Plaintiff’s 19 position as the Director of the OHA Program and his dispute with the administration of the OHA 20 program are supported by the same evidence as the claims originally raised. The evidence 21 supporting the new constructive discharge claim arise from the Plaintiff’s civilian employment, 22 while the previously raised claims arise from the allegations of child abuse and the how these 23 allegations were handled by the FAP and the CRC. The prior complaints and the Second 24 Amended Complaint do not “share a common core of operative facts sufficient to impart fair 25 notice” that the Plaintiff could raise a new claim of constructive discharge. Martell, 872 F.2d at 26 327. 27 Furthermore, adding the new claim of constructive discharge would result in undue delay 28 and undue prejudice. See Roth, 942 F.2d at 628. According to the Government, defending 1 || against the new claim would require opening discovery for another six months to one year to 2 || allow for deposing new witnesses and re-depose existing witnesses, to investigate and collect 3 || documents. See Docket No. 160. Moreover, the new claim would result in unfair prejudice, as 4 || the Government would have to begin a new investigation into the new claim, because it could 5 || not have inferred the new claim from the amended complaint. 6 Relation back of pleadings under Rule 15 is allowed, and the Ninth Circuit “will find 7 || such a link when ‘the claim to be added will likely be proved by the “same kind of evidence” 8 || offered in support of the original pleadings.’” Dominguez v. Miller, 51 F.3d 1502, 1508 (9th Cir. 9 || 1995) (quoting Rural Fire Prot. Co. v. Hepp, 366 F.2d 355, 362 (9th Cir. 1966)). This is not the 10 || case here. The court finds that the Plaintiff would not “rely on the same evidence to prove” the 11 || claims of invasion of privacy and emotional distress and the new claim of constructive discharge. 12 || Williams, 517 F.3d at 1133. 13 In conclusion, this court’s analysis of the amended complaint and the Second Amended 14 |} Complaint reveals that they do not “share a common core of operative facts sufficient to impart 15 || fair notice of the transaction, occurrence, or conduct.” Martell, 872 F.2d at 327. Finally, the 16 || court finds that allowing amendment would result in undue delay and unfair prejudice. 17 || Accordingly, the Motion to File Second Amended Complaint is hereby denied. 18 SO ORDERED. 19 & Sg /s/ Joaquin V.E. Manibusan, Jr. 21 ae. U.S. Magistrate Judge 9 Dated: Jan 10, 2011 23 24 25 26 27 28 Page 4 of 4