Matthews v. Matthews

CourtDistrict Court, M.D. Florida
DecidedMay 7, 2024
Docket3:24-cv-00269
StatusUnknown

This text of Matthews v. Matthews (Matthews v. Matthews) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering District Court, M.D. Florida primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook
Matthews v. Matthews, (M.D. Fla. 2024).

Opinion

UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT MIDDLE DISTRICT OF FLORIDA JACKSONVILLE DIVISION

BENJAMIN JOHN MATTHEWS,

Plaintiff,

v. Case No.: 3:24-cv-269-WWB-MCR

TIFFANIE ROCHELLE DAWN MATTHEWS,

Defendant. / ORDER THIS CAUSE is before the Court on Petitioner’s Motion Under the Hague Convention for Entry of an Ex Parte Temporary Restraining Order (“Motion,” Doc. 13),1 seeking the return of his and Respondent’s minor child (“S.R.M.”) to Australia. Specifically, Petitioner asks this Court to issue an order requiring Respondent to surrender to the Court all identity and travel documents belonging to her and S.R.M. pending final disposition of this action, granting Petitioner temporary sole custody of S.R.M., prohibiting the removal of S.R.M. from the Middle District of Florida unless the removal is to Australia, and awarding all costs and expenses associated with this suit and S.R.M.’s repatriation. (Id. at 12–13).

1 The Motion fails to comply with the font requirements of the January 13, 2021 Standing Order. In the interests of justice, the Court will consider the Motion, but Petitioner is cautioned that future failures to comply with all applicable rules and orders of this Court may result in the striking or denial of filings without notice or leave to refile. I. BACKGROUND2 Petitioner and Respondent are S.R.M.’s biological parents and share parental rights. (Doc. 5, ¶¶ 6, 9; Doc. 13-2 at 2–3). S.R.M. was born in Australia in 2014 and resided there until Respondent brought S.R.M. with her to the United States for several

weeks in mid-2016. (Doc. 5, ¶¶ 4, 11–13; Doc. 13-2 at 11). During that time, Respondent retained S.R.M. in the United States past the agreed upon return date, requiring Petitioner to travel to the United States and bring S.R.M. back to Australia with him. (Doc. 5, ¶ 11). Respondent returned to Australia in 2017 and married Petitioner. (Id. ¶¶ 13–14; Doc. 13- 2 at 15). Petitioner and Respondent had a second child in 2019 and purchased a home together in Western Australia. (Doc. 5, ¶¶ 15–16; Doc. 13-2 at 17, 19). In February 2023, Petitioner approved and financed a visit with Respondent’s family in the United States. (Doc. 5, ¶¶ 17–19; Doc. 13-2 at 24–26). Due to cost constraints, only Respondent and S.R.M. made the trip. (Doc. 5, ¶ 17). On April 22, 2023, while still in the United States, Respondent informed Petitioner that she intended

to relocate with S.R.M. to the United States permanently. (Id. ¶¶ 20, 24; Doc. 13-2 at 28– 32). As a result of Respondent’s failure to return S.R.M. to Australia, Petitioner filed this action. (See generally Doc. 5). Respondent was served on April 29, 2024, but has not timely appeared. (Doc. 7 at 2; Doc. 12 at 1). II. LEGAL STANDARD Pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 65(b), a district court may issue a temporary restraining order “without written or oral notice to the adverse party” if the

2 The facts provided herein are based on the sworn representations contained in the Amended Verified Petition and exhibits submitted by Petitioner, which are taken as true for purposes of this Order. requesting party provides “specific facts . . . [that] clearly show that immediate and irreparable injury, loss, or damage will result to the movant before the adverse party can be heard in opposition.” To obtain a temporary restraining order, the movant must establish: “(1) a substantial likelihood of success on the merits; (2) that irreparable injury

will be suffered if the relief is not granted; (3) that the threatened injury outweighs the harm the relief would inflict on the non-movant; and (4) that entry of the relief would serve the public interest.” Schiavo ex rel. Schindler v. Schiavo, 403 F.3d 1223, 1225–26 (11th Cir. 2005). III. ANALYSIS Petitioner’s request for relief is made pursuant to the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of International Child Abduction (“the Convention”), Oct. 25, 1980, T.I.A.S. No. 11670, available at 1988 WL 411501, and its implementing legislation, the International Child Abduction Remedies Act (“ICARA”), 22 U.S.C. §§ 9001–9011, which confers jurisdiction over ICARA proceedings on this Court, 22 U.S.C. § 9003(a). The

objectives of the Convention are: (1) to secure the prompt return of children wrongfully removed or retained in any Contracting State; and (2) to ensure that rights of custody and of access under the law of one Contracting State are effectively respected in other Contracting States. Convention, art. 1. Children who are wrongfully removed under the provisions of the Convention shall be promptly returned unless one of the exceptions provided in the treaty applies. See 22 U.S.C. § 9001(a)(4). The Convention “does not provide for a determination of custody rights or the merits of a custody dispute”; its “underlying premise is that the child’s country of habitual residence is the proper forum with jurisdiction to issue custody orders.” Leslie v. Noble, 377 F. Supp. 2d 1232, 1238 (S.D. Fla. 2005). Thus, this Court’s task is not to resolve the question of custody but only to address the issue of whether the Child was wrongfully removed or retained. The United States and Australia are Contracting States. See Status Table, Hague Conference on Private International Law, available at

http://www.hcch.net/index_en.php?act=conventions.status&cid=24 (last visited May 7, 2024). To prevail on his Amended Verified Petition, Petitioner must show by a preponderance of the evidence: (1) the child was a “habitual resident” of Australia immediately before retention in the United States; (2) the retention was in breach of Petitioner’s custody rights under Australian law; and (3) Petitioner had been exercising his custody rights at the time of retention.” Chafin v. Chafin, 742 F.3d 934, 938 (11th Cir. 2013). Petitioner has demonstrated a substantial likelihood of success on the merits of his ICARA claim. There is evidence that S.R.M. was born in Australia and resided there habitually prior to her removal to the United States by Respondent. Additionally,

Petitioner has provided evidence that he remains legally married to Respondent, is the biological father of S.R.M., and was residing with Respondent and S.R.M. and exercising his parental and custody rights at the time S.R.M. was removed to the United States. Thus, the Court is satisfied that Petitioner has shown a substantial likelihood of success on the merits. Turning the requested relief, Petitioner asks this Court to issue an order requiring Respondent to surrender to the Court all identity and travel documents belonging to her and S.R.M. pending final disposition of this action, granting Petitioner temporary sole custody of S.R.M., and prohibiting the removal of S.R.M. from the Middle District of Florida during the pendency of these proceedings. ICARA permits courts to take “measures under Federal or State law, as appropriate, to protect the well-being of the child involved or to prevent the child’s further removal or concealment before the final disposition of [a] petition.” 22 U.S.C. § 9004(a).

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Related

Theresa Marie Schindler Schiavo v. Michael Schiavo
403 F.3d 1223 (Eleventh Circuit, 2005)
Leslie v. Noble
377 F. Supp. 2d 1232 (S.D. Florida, 2005)
Lynne Hales Chafin v. Jeffrey Lee Chafin
742 F.3d 934 (Eleventh Circuit, 2013)

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Bluebook (online)
Matthews v. Matthews, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matthews-v-matthews-flmd-2024.