Matthew Williams v. Dana Corporation

Sixth Circuit

Matthew Williams v. Dana Corporation

442 F.2d 412, 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2135, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10415

CourtCourt of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit

DecidedMay 3, 1971

Docket20816_1

StatusPublished

Cited by2 cases

This text of 442 F.2d 412 (Matthew Williams v. Dana Corporation) is published on Counsel Stack Legal Research, covering Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit primary law. Counsel Stack provides free access to over 12 million legal documents including statutes, case law, regulations, and constitutions.

Bluebook

Matthew Williams v. Dana Corporation, 442 F.2d 412, 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2135, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10415 (6th Cir. 1971).

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Opinion

PER CURIAM.

We consider an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action filed in propria persona by an employee against his employer under § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), for violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Appellant was discharged from his job for absenteeism under criteria embodied in supplementary language added to the contract after initial ratification. He alleges that this contract language was adopted in violation of the UAW Constitution, art. 19, § 3, which requires approval by the affected local union of such changes in a collective bargaining contract.

The District Court dismissed the ease on the grounds that appellant had not exhausted the grievance procedures which were his contractual remedies. However, the complaint alleged that appellant did attempt to invoke these procedures, and that the union failed to press his grievances in good faith.

*413 We hold that appellant has stated a cause of action under § 301, as interpreted in Vaca v. Sipes, 38 6 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), and that his allegations of exhaustion of contractual remedies (which for the purpose of the motion to dismiss must be accepted as true) are sufficient to avoid the bar of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). Cf. Broniman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1965), where the court said “that there was no real attempt to use the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by the employer and the union.” The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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PER CURIAM.

We consider an appeal from a judgment dismissing an action filed in propria persona by an employee against his employer under § 301 of the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C. § 185(a), for violation of a collective bargaining agreement. Appellant was discharged from his job for absenteeism under criteria embodied in supplementary language added to the contract after initial ratification. He alleges that this contract language was adopted in violation of the UAW Constitution, art. 19, § 3, which requires approval by the affected local union of such changes in a collective bargaining contract.

The District Court dismissed the ease on the grounds that appellant had not exhausted the grievance procedures which were his contractual remedies. However, the complaint alleged that appellant did attempt to invoke these procedures, and that the union failed to press his grievances in good faith.

*413 We hold that appellant has stated a cause of action under § 301, as interpreted in Vaca v. Sipes, 38 6 U.S. 171, 87 S.Ct. 903, 17 L.Ed.2d 842 (1967), and that his allegations of exhaustion of contractual remedies (which for the purpose of the motion to dismiss must be accepted as true) are sufficient to avoid the bar of Republic Steel Corp. v. Maddox, 379 U.S. 650, 85 S.Ct. 614, 13 L.Ed.2d 580 (1965). Cf. Broniman v. Great Atlantic & Pacific Tea Co., 353 F.2d 559, 563 (6th Cir. 1965), where the court said “that there was no real attempt to use the contract grievance procedure agreed upon by the employer and the union.” The judgment of the District Court is reversed, and the cause is remanded to the District Court for proceedings not inconsistent with this opinion.

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Bluebook (online)

442 F.2d 412, 77 L.R.R.M. (BNA) 2135, 1971 U.S. App. LEXIS 10415, Counsel Stack Legal Research, https://law.counselstack.com/opinion/matthew-williams-v-dana-corporation-ca6-1971.

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