Matthew T. Watkins v. Dep't of Corrections

• Court: Court of Appeals of Washington
• Decided: January 25, 2024
• Docket: 39482-4
• Status: Unpublished

Opinion

FILED JANUARY 25, 2024 In the Office of the Clerk of Court WA State Court of Appeals Division III

IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON DIVISION THREE

MATTHEW T. WATKINS, ) ) No. 39482-4-III Appellant, ) ) v. ) ) WASHINGTON STATE DEPARTMENT ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION OF CORRECTIONS, ) ) Respondent. )

COONEY, J. — Matthew Watkins sued the Department of Corrections (DOC),

claiming he was falsely imprisoned when DOC confined him beyond his 120-month

sentence. Following competing motions for summary judgment, the trial court dismissed

Mr. Watkins’ complaint. Because of disputed material facts, we reverse. No. 39482-4-III Watkins v. Dep’t of Corr.

BACKGROUND

On April 25, 2012, Mr. Watkins pleaded guilty to attempted first degree

kidnapping (count I) and second degree assault (count II). The court sentenced Mr.

Watkins to 111.75 months on count I and 63 months on count II. The sentences were to

run concurrently. The court further imposed a 36-month firearm enhancement on count

II, to be served consecutive to the other sentences. The judgment and sentence provided,

“Actual number of months of total confinement ordered is: 120 months.” Clerk’s Papers

(CP) at 143. The relevant portion of the judgment and sentence reads:

CP at 143.1

1 The first notation of “120 months” is outré as “63 (months) on count No. II; +36 months” totals 99 months rather than 120 months. CP at 143.

2 No. 39482-4-III Watkins v. Dep’t of Corr.

DOC received Mr. Watkins into its custody on May 3, 2012, and promptly

calculated his total term of confinement. DOC noted that under RCW 9.94A.533, the

36-month firearm enhancement had to be served consecutive to all other sentencing

provisions. Accordingly, DOC determined Mr. Watkins’ total term of confinement was

147.75 months.2 DOC’s calculation of 147.75 months conflicted with the two notations

in the judgment and sentence that the total term of confinement was 120 months. To

resolve the discrepancy, on May 31, 2012, DOC contacted the Spokane County

Prosecuting Attorney’s Office (Prosecutor). In part, DOC requested the Prosecutor seek

an amended judgment and sentence from the trial court. The Prosecutor did not respond

to DOC’s request.

Nearly six years later, on February 9, 2018, DOC sent an e-mail to the Prosecutor

and Mr. Watkins’ attorney. DOC again noted that, under RCW 9.94A.533, the firearm

enhancement had to be served consecutive to the other sentences. DOC further claimed

that, per the decision in State v. Thomas, 150 Wn.2d 666, 668-69, 80 P.3d 168 (2003), the

statutory maximum for a single crime may be inapplicable when an offender is confined

for multiple offenses. Id.

Mr. Watkins’ attorney responded to DOC, writing:

To be clear, it was the Court’s intent and the parties’ negotiated resolution that Mr. Watkins serve only the statutory maximum of 120 months.

2 111.75 months of confinement followed by the 36-month firearm enhancement.

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Rather than risk any further confusion I’ll end there. Please let me know if you need anything further.

CP at 60. On February 12, the Prosecutor responded, “The sentence cannot extend

beyond the Statutory Maximum of 10 years as both are class B felonies.” CP at 59.

Lorraine Crevier, a DOC employee, forwarded the responses to other DOC employees

asking, “Does this give me authorization to change his sentence to 120 months total?

Thanks.” CP at 59.

On February 27, DOC sent another e-mail to the Prosecutor and Mr. Watkins’

attorney stating, “Per direction from DOC HQ Records, please submit an amended

[judgment and sentence]. Sorry for the inconvenience. Thank you.” CP at 58. On

October 1, 2020, the Prosecutor and Mr. Watkins’ attorney presented an agreed order to

the trial court that clarified Mr. Watkins’ total term of confinement was 120 months.

On January 14, 2021, over eight years after DOC’s first request, an amended

judgment and sentence was entered that reduced Mr. Watkins’ sentence on count I from

111.75 months to 84 months. This altered Mr. Watkins’ earned release date from

October 16, 2022, to September 17, 2020. It further altered Mr. Watkins’ maximum exit

date from August 22, 2023, to May 1, 2021. The amended judgment and sentence

ordered Mr. Watkins to be placed on community custody for 36 months on count I and 18

months on count II, provided the combined term of confinement and community custody

not exceed 10 years.

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Upon receipt of the amended judgment and sentence, DOC processed Mr. Watkins

for release. This required DOC to approve Mr. Watkins’ plans for housing and provide

notice of his release to the victim and law enforcement. Notice was sent to the victim and

law enforcement on January 28, 2021. DOC’s policies precluded Mr. Watkins from

being released until the passing of 35 days after notice to the victim and law enforcement.

Mr. Watkins’ release plan was approved on February 16, 2021. Mr. Watkins was

released from prison on March 4, 2021.

Following his release, Mr. Watkins sued DOC claiming false imprisonment. Mr.

Watkins moved for partial summary judgment on the issue of liability. DOC moved for

summary judgment dismissal of Mr. Watkins’ claim. After considering the competing

motions, the trial court granted DOC’s motion, concluding the “matter is ripe for

summary judgment” because there “are no genuine issues of any material fact.” Rep. of

Proc. (RP) at 36. Mr. Watkins’ complaint was dismissed. Mr. Watkins appeals.

ANALYSIS

On appeal, Mr. Watkins argues that the trial court erred in granting DOC’s motion

for summary judgment. He requests we reverse the trial court’s order of dismissal and,

on remand, direct the trial court to grant his motion for partial summary judgment on the

issue of liability. Because genuine issues of material fact are present, we reverse the

order dismissing Mr. Watkins’ claim and decline to order partial summary judgment in

his favor on the issue of liability.

5 No. 39482-4-III Watkins v. Dep’t of Corr.

The summary judgment procedure is designed to avoid the time and expense of an

unnecessary trial. Maybury v. City of Seattle, 53 Wn.2d 716, 719, 336 P.2d 878 (1959).

Orders on summary judgment are reviewed de novo. Keck v. Collins, 184 Wn.2d 358,

370, 357 P.3d 1080 (2015). In deciding a summary judgment motion, the court must

consider the evidence and all reasonable inferences from the evidence in the light most

favorable to the nonmoving party. Id. (citing Folsom v. Burger King, 135 Wn.2d 658,

663, 958 P.2d 301 (1998)). “[W]hen reasonable minds could reach but one conclusion,

questions of fact may be determined as a matter of law.” Hartley v. State, 103 Wn.2d

768, 775, 698 P.2d 77 (1985).

Summary judgment is appropriate only if there are no genuine issues of material

fact and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Keck, 184 Wn.2d at

370. “A material fact is one upon which the outcome of the litigation depends in whole

or in part.” Atherton Condo. Apt.-Owners Ass’n Bd. of Dirs. v. Blume Dev. Co., 115

Wn.2d 506, 516, 799 P.2d 250 (1990). In response to a motion for summary judgment,

the nonmoving party may not rely on speculation or having its own affidavits accepted at

face value. Seven Gables Corp. v. MGM/UA Entm’t Co., 106 Wn.2d 1, 13, 721 P.2d 1

(1986). Instead, the nonmoving party must put “forth specific facts that sufficiently rebut

the moving party’s contentions and disclose that a genuine issue as to a material fact

exists.” Id. An appellate court may affirm summary judgment on any basis supported by

the record. Swinehart v. City of Spokane, 145 Wn. App. 836, 844, 187 P.3d 345 (2008).

6 No. 39482-4-III Watkins v. Dep’t of Corr.

DOC’S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

To succeed on a claim for false imprisonment against DOC, a plaintiff must

establish that DOC acted without lawful authority and that the imprisonment was not

enacted pursuant to a valid legal process. Stephens v. State, 186 Wn. App. 553, 558, 345

P.3d 870 (2015) (citing Blick v. State, 182 Wn. App. 24, 33, 328 P.3d 952 (2014)). DOC

is bound by a judgment and sentence, even if it is erroneous, and lacks the authority to

either correct or ignore the judgment and sentence. Dress v. Dep’t of Corr., 168 Wn.

App. 319, 328, 279 P.3d 875 (2012); In re Pers. Restraint of Gronquist, 192 Wn.2d 309,

323, 429 P.3d 804 (2018). An erroneous judgment and sentence can only be corrected by

the trial court. Dress, 168 Wn. App. at 325-26 (citing In re Pers. Restraint of Davis,

67 Wn. App. 1, 9, 834 P.2d 92 (1992)). Consequently, DOC acts without lawful

authority when it corrects or ignores a judgment and sentence. Id. at 329.

Should DOC perceive any errors of law in a judgment and sentence, it may

petition for review with the Court of Appeals. RCW 9.94A.585(7). The review shall be

limited to errors of law, and the petition must be filed within 90 days after DOC has

actual knowledge of terms of the sentence. Id. The petition must also include a

certification by DOC that all reasonable efforts to resolve the dispute at the superior court

have been exhausted. Id.

If DOC follows the plain language of a judgment, and that judgment was enacted

pursuant to a valid legal process and court sentence, then DOC has not falsely imprisoned

7 No. 39482-4-III Watkins v. Dep’t of Corr.

an offender. Blick, 182 Wn. App. at 33. Therefore, even if a judgment and sentence is

erroneous and later corrected, provided that DOC was acting in good faith and in the

lawful performance of its duty, DOC will not be liable for false imprisonment. Stephens,

186 Wn. App. at 560 (citing Mundt v. United States, 611 F.2d 1257, 1259 (9th Cir.

1980)).

However, an initially lawful imprisonment may become unlawful if an individual

is held for “an unreasonable amount of time after [DOC] is under a duty to release the

individual.” Id. at 561 (citing Tufte v. City of Tacoma, 71 Wn.2d 866, 870, 431 P.2d 183

(1967)). Thus, DOC does not act with lawful authority if, after receiving an amended

judgment and sentence, it continues to hold an offender for more than a reasonable

amount of time. What is considered a reasonable amount of time has varied ranging from

as low as 1 day to as high as a 101 days. Kellogg v. State, 94 Wn.2d 851, 854, 621 P.2d

133 (1980); In re Pers. Restraint of Crowder, 97 Wn. App. 598, 599, 985 P.2d 944

(1999).

Mr. Watkins claims DOC ignored the plain language of the judgment and sentence

by calculating his total term of confinement at 147.75 months rather than the 120 months

listed in the judgment and sentence, thereby falsely imprisoning him beyond his earned

release date of September 17, 2020. According to Mr. Watkins, if DOC believed the trial

court imposed an erroneous sentence it should have sought review with the Court of

Appeals. DOC contends that, in conformity with Thomas, 150 Wn.2d at 671, it followed

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the plain language of the judgment and sentence when it calculated Mr. Watkins’ term of

confinement.

As we held in Dress, “[t]he relevant case law is clear that DOC has no authority to

correct or ignore a final judgment and sentence, even if [that sentence] is erroneous.”

168 Wn. App. at 328. Under this standard, the evidence before us exposes the presence

of genuine issues of material fact. Specifically, material questions linger as to whether

DOC disregarded the 120-month maximum term of confinement contained in the

judgment and sentence, whether DOC attempted to correct the judgment and sentence

when it calculated Mr. Watkins’ term of confinement at 147.75 months, and whether

DOC failed to act in good faith when it neglected to timely seek judicial review under

RCW 9.94A.585(7). We will address these three questions in turn.

Mr. Watkins has presented sufficient evidence to create a genuine issue of material

fact that DOC ignored the maximum term of confinement contained in the judgment and

sentence. In section 4.1 of the judgment and sentence, the trial court twice noted Mr.

Watkins’ total term of confinement was 120 months. Although the first 120-month entry

may be a mathematical error, the second entry is clear⎯the trial court ordered “[a]ctual

number of months of total confinement ordered is: 120 months.” CP at 143. DOC

became aware of the maximum sentence when it accepted Mr. Watkins into its custody in

May 2012. As will be discussed below, had DOC honored the 120-month maximum, Mr.

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Watkins’ early release date would have been September 17, 2020. DOC did not release

him from custody until March 4, 2021.

The second issue of material fact is closely related to the first. Rather than

adhering to the 120-month maximum term of confinement, DOC calculated Mr. Watkins’

total term of confinement at 147.75 months. DOC is bound by a judgment and sentence,

even if it is erroneous, and lacks the authority to correct it. By designating a term of

confinement 27.75 months greater than what the trial court ordered, a question exists as

to whether DOC attempted to correct a perceived erroneous judgment and sentence.

The third question of material fact is found in DOC’s alleged failure to seek

judicial intervention under RCW 9.94A.585(7). Rather than correct a perceived

erroneous judgment and sentence or ignore its provisions, DOC may seek judicial

intervention under RCW 9.94A.585(7). RCW 9.94A.585(7) was “‘designed to alleviate

the dilemma previously facing DOC: enforcing what it considers to be an unlawful

sentence or ignoring the sentence imposed by the trial court.’” Dress, 168 Wn. App.

at 326-27 (quoting In re Sentence of Hilborn, 63 Wn. App. 102, 104, 816 P.2d 1247

(1991)). “Such petition shall be filed with the [C]ourt of [A]ppeals no later than

ninety days after the department has actual knowledge of terms of the sentence.”

RCW 9.94A.585(7).

DOC received Mr. Watkins into its custody on May 3, 2012. DOC promptly

reviewed the judgment and sentence, calculated Mr. Watkins’ term of confinement, and

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discovered the conflict between the 120-month maximum and its calculated term of

147.75 months. In an attempt to clarify the conflicting durations, on May 31, 2012, DOC

contacted the Prosecutor. The Prosecutor failed to respond to DOC.

DOC delayed nearly six years before readdressing the issue. On February 9, 2018,

DOC sent another e-mail to the Prosecutor. In response, the Prosecutor wrote, “The

sentence cannot extend beyond the Statutory Maximum of 10 years as both are class B

felonies.” CP at 59. On February 27, 2018, DOC again e-mailed the Prosecutor

requesting an amended judgment and sentence. The amended judgment and sentence

was not entered until January 14, 2021.

DOC had notice of the potentially erroneous judgment and sentence within days of

accepting Mr. Watkins into its custody in May 2012. In adherence to the statute, DOC

made reasonable efforts to resolve the dispute at the superior court level by contacting the

Prosecutor. Instead of seeking judicial review within 90 days, as required by the statute,

DOC waited nearly six years before attempting to resolve the conflict. Thus, a material

question exists as to whether DOC failed to act in good faith and in the lawful

performance of its duties when it purportedly failed to timely file a petition under RCW

9.94A.585(7). Because genuine issues of material fact are present, we reverse the trial

court’s order of dismissal.

11 No. 39482-4-III Watkins v. Dep’t of Corr.

MR. WATKINS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT

On remand, Mr. Watkins requests we direct the trial court to enter judgment in his

favor on the issue of liability. Because questions of material fact linger, we decline his

request.

There exists a general presumption that offenders will serve their complete

sentences. Blick, 182 Wn. App. at 29. RCW 9.94A.728 provides:

(1) No incarcerated individual serving a sentence imposed pursuant to this chapter and committed to the custody of the department shall leave the confines of the correctional facility or be released prior to the expiration of the sentence except as follows: (a) An incarcerated individual may earn early release time as authorized by RCW 9.94A.729.

Accordingly, earned early release is an exception to the general presumption. Id.

“The earned release time shall be for good behavior and good performance, as

determined by the correctional agency having jurisdiction.” RCW 9.94A.729(1)(a).

DOC shall make its earned release determinations “in accordance with procedures that

shall be developed and promulgated by the correctional agency having jurisdiction in

which the offender is confined.” Id. In doing so, DOC has wide latitude in developing

the standard of eligibility. In re Pers. Restraint of Mattson, 166 Wn.2d 730, 739, 214

P.3d 141 (2009). Once DOC has determined an individual is eligible for earned early

release to community custody, the obligation shifts to the offender to propose a release

plan. Id. Thus, the permissive nature of the early release statute does not create a

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requirement that DOC release an offender on their earned release date, nor does it create

an expectation that the offender shall be released on that date. Id. at 740. “The statute

does not create an expectation of release and cannot establish a liberty interest.” Id.

After an offender’s eligibility for early release has been determined, DOC may

deny an offender’s transfer to community custody if DOC determines an offender’s

release plan would present a risk to the victim, the community, or present a risk that the

offender may violate the law. Id. at 739. The only limitation placed on DOC’s discretion

for denying early release is that the basis for doing so be legitimate. Id. at 742.

Accordingly, if DOC has a legitimate reason for denying earned early release of an

offender, it is then permitted to hold the offender until their maximum exit date, or until a

valid release plan is approved. Blick, 182 Wn. App. at 32.

Here, there remains a genuine issue of material fact as to when Mr. Watkins

should have been released. It could have been as early as September 17, 2020, his earned

early release date following the amendments to the judgment and sentence, or as late as

May 1, 2021, his maximum exit date under the amended judgment and sentence. Based

on DOC’s internal procedures prohibiting the release of an offender within a 35-day

period of notice being sent to the victim and law enforcement, coupled with the

requirement that an offender have an approved release plan, when Mr. Watkins should

have been released is a question for the finder of fact.

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CONCLUSION

We reverse the order of dismissal, deny Mr. Watkins’ request for partial summary

judgment, and remand for further proceedings.

A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the

Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW

2.06.040.

Cooney, J.

WE CONCUR:

Lawrence-Berrey, A.C.J.

Staab, J.