Matthew Smith v. Lauren Holloway

• Court: Louisiana Court of Appeal
• Decided: January 15, 2020
• Docket: 53,352-CA
• Status: Published

Opinion

Judgment rendered January 15, 2020. Application for rehearing may be filed within the delay allowed by Art. 2166, La. C.C.P.

No. 53,352-CA

COURT OF APPEAL SECOND CIRCUIT STATE OF LOUISIANA

*****

MATTHEW SMITH Plaintiff-Appellee

versus

LAUREN HOLLOWAY Defendant-Appellant

Appealed from the Third Judicial District Court for the Parish of Lincoln, Louisiana Trial Court No. 57,818

Honorable Bruce Hampton, Judge

JAMES E. CALHOUN Counsel for Appellant

GINA JONES Counsel for Appellee TERESA CULPEPPER CARROLL

Before GARRETT, STONE, and THOMPSON, JJ. THOMPSON, J.

This appeal of a custody case arises from a judgment granting

domiciliary custody of the minor child, A.S., to her father, Matthew Smith,

subject to visitation in favor of the mother, Lauren Holloway. For the

reasons more fully detailed below, we affirm the judgment of the trial court.

FACTUAL AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY

Matthew Smith (hereinafter “Matthew”) and Lauren Holloway

(hereinafter “Lauren”) married on April 20, 2013, and had a daughter on

January 2, 2014, before separating on February 10, 2015. On August 24,

2015, Matthew filed for divorce from Lauren. The parties stipulated to a

temporary custody order on November 9, 2015, granting them joint custody

of their daughter, A.S., and designating Lauren as the domiciliary parent.

Additionally, they agreed that A.S. could not be left in the exclusive care of

Rebecca Ozment, Matthew’s current wife (hereinafter “Rebecca”), nor was

Richard Smith, Matthew’s uncle, permitted to be around A.S. Both parties

were sworn and placed the stipulations on the record, but no written

judgment was ever confected or placed in the record.

On May 9, 2016, the divorce between the parties was finalized and a

final divorce decree was rendered. The judgment of divorce was signed by

the district judge on January 6, 2017, which also made the interim custody

order a final order, with an incorporated joint custody implementation plan.

On January 10, 2017, Matthew filed an ex parte rule for temporary

custody pursuant to La. C.C.P. art. 3945 requesting to modify custody and

requesting child support. In his filing, Matthew alleged that, upon receiving

A.S. from Lauren at the last custody exchange, he noticed bruises, a bite mark, and red bumps on her private area. Matthew then took A.S. to the

emergency room for an assessment of her injuries where a doctor and nurse

determined that there were signs of child abuse and referred the case to

Child Protective Services.

Matthew’s ex parte rule was set for hearing on February 13, 2017. At

that hearing, Lauren requested a continuance to obtain legal counsel.

Lauren’s request was granted and the case was refixed for April 10, 2017.

In the interim, Lauren was to have supervised visitations with A.S. at a

mutually agreed upon public place and the court reserved the right to order

psychological evaluations of the parties. There is no record regarding the

April 10, 2017, hearing. However, the next minute entry is on May 11,

2017, and neither party nor their counsel were present. That hearing was

upset and refixed to August 21, 2017.

On July 17, 2017, Matthew filed a motion to set the matter for

hearing. A pretrial telephone conference took place on August 21, 2017.

On September 1, 2017, a scheduling order was fixed by the trial court setting

the matter for bench trial on November 2, 2017.

On October 11, 2017, Lauren submitted discovery requests to

Matthew and filed an answer and reconventional demand to his ex parte rule

for temporary custody. In the reconventional demand, Lauren sought sole

custody of A.S. with Matthew having supervised visitation on alternating

weekends. Lauren asserted that she had four protective orders granted

against him for her and A.S.’s protection and that Matthew had been arrested

for battery against her father. Lauren’s filing was set for hearing on the

bench trial date of November 2, 2017.

2 A telephone status conference was held on October 31, 2017, between

counsel for both parties and the trial court. After the conference, the trial

date was upset pending the completion of psychological evaluations of both

parties by Dr. Sally Thigpen (hereinafter “Dr. Thigpen”) and another

telephone status conference was set for November 16, 2017. The interim

custody order was maintained wherein Lauren would have supervised

visitation with A.S., but it would take place at either the Emerson Center or

the Lincoln Center. A new scheduling order was set on November 16, 2017,

setting the matter for bench trial on February 16, 2018.

On the February 16, 2018, bench trial date, both parties were present

and represented by counsel. After a pretrial conference, the matter was

continued without date with all previous orders and judgments to remain in

effect. The court also reiterated the previous order that Dr. Thigpen

complete the psychological evaluations and that counsel for Matthew would

be contacted when Lauren completed her evaluation with Dr. Thigpen. On

June 18, 2018, Lauren filed a motion for status conference to address Dr.

Thigpen’s refusal to submit her report to the court as ordered. That motion

was set for hearing on August 22, 2018.

On July 23, 2018, Lauren filed an application for a civil warrant for

the “return of child to the custodial parent pending further order of the court

having jurisdiction.” Lauren asserted that the initial judgments of May 9,

2016, and January 6, 2017, were the only applicable orders for custody and

visitation because of time delays in having a hearing on Matthew’s ex parte

custody filing. This application was added to the August 22, 2018, hearing

date.

3 During the August 22, 2018, telephone conference, the matter was

again fixed for trial on all pending matters on December 13, 2018, and

Joshua Shell, Lauren’s now husband (hereinafter “Joshua”), was ordered to

undergo an evaluation by Dr. Thigpen prior to trial. On December 12, 2018,

Matthew filed a motion to continue the trial based on the fact that the court-

ordered evaluations had just been received and further discovery was

required as a result of their contents. The continuance was opposed by

Lauren. The matter was ultimately upset and the trial refixed once again for

February 1, 2019.

After the February 1, 2019, bench trial and submission of post-trial

briefs of both parties, the trial court ruled on April 2, 2019, finding that it

was in the best interest of A.S. that she remain in the custody of Matthew,

with him designated as domiciliary parent. Additionally, the court ordered

that there be a gradual reintroduction of Lauren into A.S.’s life, with the

parties following the recommended plan of Rick Emerson.1 In response to

that judgment Lauren filed this appeal.

DEFENDANT’S ASSIGNMENTS OF ERROR

(1) The trial court erred in failing to apply the mandated provisions of the Post-Separation Family Violence Relief Act (La. R.S. 9:361-369).

(2) The trial court erred in rendering a judgment that implied a finding of a pattern of domestic violence on the part of Defendant and ordering her to have supervised visitation with the minor child based on that finding.

1 Rick Emerson is a licensed clinical social worker who also serves as A.S.’s counselor and he was called as an expert witness at trial. He also worked at the center where Lauren exercised some of her supervised visitations with A.S. and interviewed A.S. as a result of the allegations of abuse put forth by Matthew.

4 STANDARD OF REVIEW

Child custody cases are reviewed under the abuse of discretion

standard. Leard v. Schenker, 06-1116 (La. 06/16/06), 931 So. 2d 355. The

determination of the trial judge in child custody matters is entitled to great

weight, and his discretion will not be disturbed on review absent a clear

showing of abuse. Id.

DISCUSSION

By her first assignment of error, Lauren asserts that the trial court

erred in failing to apply the provisions of the Post-Separation Family

Violence Relief Act (hereinafter “PSFVRA”). La. R.S. 9:364(A) provides:

There is created a presumption that no parent who has a history of perpetrating family violence, as defined in R.S. 9:362, or domestic abuse, as defined in R.S. 46:2132, or has subjected any of his or her children, stepchildren, or any household member, as defined in R.S. 42:2132, to sexual abuse, as defined in R.S. 14:403, or has willingly permitted another to abuse any of his children or stepchildren, despite having the ability to prevent the abuse, shall be awarded sole or joint custody of children. The court may find a history of perpetrating family violence if the court finds more than one incident of family violence.

In Simmons v. Simmons, 26,414 (La. App. 2 Cir. 01/25/95), 649 So. 2d 799,

this Court held that in determining whether a parent has a “history of

perpetrating family violence,” the trial court should look at the entire

chronicle of the family, remaining mindful that the paramount goal of the

legislation is the child’s best interest. The determination must be based on a

review of the total circumstances of the family, and necessarily involves a

weighing of the evidence. Id.

We must first determine whether Matthew has a history of

perpetuating family violence such that application of the PSFVRA is

5 mandated. There have been multiple petitions for protection from abuse

filed against Matthew. However, one petition was filed by an ex-girlfriend

of Matthew’s. Matthew testified at trial that their break-up did not go well

and he did not fight the order of protection. Lauren offered no proof at trial

to substantiate the underlying allegations contained in that petition. Lauren

herself had filed more than one protective order against Matthew and she

testified that Matthew was physically abusive toward her. However, Lauren

also testified that she and Matthew had been doing well recently and she

would encourage a relationship between him and A.S. She also told Dr.

Thigpen that she did not think that Matthew would be abusive toward A.S.

Matthew pled guilty to simple battery of Lauren’s father during their

marriage. Lauren asserts that this falls under the definitions provided in the

PSFVRA such that it would apply in this custody determination. We

disagree.

Under the PSFVRA, family violence must be committed by one

parent against another or against any of the children. The relationship

between Matthew and his father-in-law does not fall under this definition.

Next, the PSFVRA mandates that the abuse be committed by one family

member, household member, or dating partner against another. “Family

members” means spouses, former spouses, parents and children, stepparents,

stepchildren, foster parents and foster children. La. R.S. 42:2132.

“Household members” means any person presently or formerly living in the

same residence with the defendant and who is involved or has been involved

in a sexual or intimate relationship with the defendant and who is seeking

protection under the PSFVRA. Id. A father-in-law is not one of the defined

6 family members contemplated by the PSFVRA. Lauren’s father did, at one

time, live with her and Matthew. However, Matthew and his father-in-law

were clearly not involved sexually or intimately such that their relationship

would fall under the purview of the PSFVRA.

Because the provisions of the PSFVRA are inapplicable to this case,

we now analyze whether the trial court abused its discretion in designating

Matthew as domiciliary parent of A.S. Trial courts have vast discretion in

determining matters of child custody and visitation. Chandler v. Chandler,

48,981 (La. App. 2 Cir. 12/13/13), 132 So. 3d 413. The trial court has the

opportunity to better evaluate the credibility of witnesses and its findings

will not be disturbed absent a finding of clear abuse of discretion. Id.

The overriding consideration in determining custody of a child is the

best interest of the child. La C.C. art. 131; Evans v. Lungrin, 97-0541 (La.

02/06/98), 708 So. 2d 731. In determining the best interest of the child, the

court must consider all relevant factors. La. C.C. art. 134; Mercer v.

Mercer, 52,101 (La. App. 2 Cir. 04/11/18), 249 So. 3d 924, writ denied

2018-0808 (La. 06/15/08), 257 So. 3d 681. Each case must be determined

on the basis of particular facts and circumstances by weighing and balancing

those factors favoring and opposing custody for the respective parents.

Manno v. Manno, 49,533 (La. App. 2 Cir. 11/19/14), 154 So. 3d 655.

However, there is no requirement to provide an exhaustive listing of each of

the factors of La. C.C. art. 134 in reaching a determination regarding the best

interest of the child, nor is there a requirement to explain the weighing and

balancing of the factors. Chandler, supra.

7 In his reasons for ruling, the trial court delved into each of the 14

factors outlined in La. C.C. art. 134 for determining the best interest of the

child. The trial court determined, based upon the evidence and testimony,

that the factors of love, affection, and emotional ties; spiritual guidance and

education; stable, adequate environment; responsibility for child

care/rearing; and potential for child to be abused, clearly favored Matthew as

domiciliary parent.

The trial court’s reasons for judgment were exhaustive and specific in

their recitation of why Matthew would be better able to provide for the needs

of A.S. over those that Lauren would be able to provide and why it

determined that Matthew would be a better domiciliary parent.

Additionally, it noted that even Lauren admitted that A.S. was not ready to

come back to her home. Moreover, the trial court noted that Matthew’s

circumstances had changed for the better since the original decree in that he

now has a good job locally, has a more stable life now that his wife has been

to inpatient rehabilitation, and he would therefore be in a better position to

provide for the needs of A.S.

In her second assignment of error, Lauren asserts that the trial court

erred in rendering a judgment that implied a finding of a pattern of domestic

violence on her part and ordering her to have supervised visitation with A.S.

based on that finding. In brief, the crux of Lauren’s argument as to her

second assignment of error mirrors that of the first. For the reasons set forth

above this argument likewise lacks merit.

The trial court methodically and thoughtfully considered all of the

trial testimony and evidence presented and set forth in great detail the

8 reasons why a change in custody was warranted and was in A.S.’s best

interest. The trial court was confronted with a minefield of allegations of

alcohol and drug abuse, protective orders, criminal charges, and a complex

history of a web of decisions where the minor child’s interests were

obviously not the primary concern over that of the selfish motives and

desires of the parties, more often at the hands of Lauren. We find that the

record supports the trial court’s finding that Matthew met his burden of

showing a material change in circumstances and that any harm caused by a

modification would be substantially outweighed by its advantages to A.S.

CONCLUSION

For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the trial court is affirmed.

Costs of appeal are assessed to Defendant, Lauren Holloway.

AFFIRMED.